Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Bush
Request for Comments: 9324 IIJ Research Lab & Arrcus, Inc.
Updates: 8481 K. Patel
Category: Standards Track Arrcus, Inc.
ISSN: 2070-1721 P. Smith
PFS Internet Development Pty Ltd
M. Tinka
SEACOM
December 2022
Policy Based on the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) without
Route Refresh
Abstract
A BGP speaker performing policy based on the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) should not issue route refresh to its neighbors
because it has received new RPKI data. This document updates RFC
8481 by describing how to avoid doing so by either keeping a full
Adj-RIB-In or saving paths dropped due to ROV (Route Origin
Validation) so they may be reevaluated with respect to new RPKI data.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9324.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1.1. Requirements Language
2. Related Work
3. ROV Experience
4. Keeping Partial Adj-RIB-In Data
5. Operational Recommendations
6. Security Considerations
7. IANA Considerations
8. References
8.1. Normative References
8.2. Informative References
Acknowledgements
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
Memory constraints in early BGP speakers caused classic BGP
implementations [RFC4271] to not keep a full Adj-RIB-In (Section 1.1
of [RFC4271]). When doing RPKI-based Route Origin Validation (ROV)
[RFC6811] [RFC8481] and similar RPKI-based policy, if such a BGP
speaker receives new RPKI data, it might not have kept paths
previously marked as Invalid, etc. Such an implementation must then
request a route refresh [RFC2918] [RFC7313] from its neighbors to
recover the paths that might be covered by these new RPKI data. This
will be perceived as rude by those neighbors as it passes a serious
resource burden on to them. This document recommends implementations
keep and mark paths affected by RPKI-based policy, so route refresh
is no longer needed.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Related Work
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP [RFC4271], route
refresh [RFC7313], the RPKI [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations
(ROAs) [RFC6482], the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to
Router Protocol [RPKI-ROUTER-PROT-v2], RPKI-Based Prefix Validation
[RFC6811], and Origin Validation Clarifications [RFC8481].
Note that the term "RPKI-based Route Origin Validation" in this
document means the same as the term "Prefix Origin Validation" used
in [RFC6811].
3. ROV Experience
As Route Origin Validation dropping Invalids has deployed, some BGP
speaker implementations have been found that, when receiving new RPKI
data (Validated ROA Payloads (VRPs) [RPKI-ROUTER-PROT-v2]), issue a
BGP route refresh [RFC7313] to all sending BGP peers so that they can
reevaluate the received paths against the new data.
In actual deployment, this has been found to be very destructive,
transferring a serious resource burden to the unsuspecting peers. In
reaction, RPKI-based Route Origin Validation (ROV) has been turned
off. There have been actual de-peerings.
As RPKI registration and ROA creation have steadily increased, this
problem has increased, not just proportionally, but on the order of
the in-degree of ROV implementing BGP speakers. As Autonomous System
Provider Authorization (ASPA) [AS_PATH-VER] becomes used, the problem
will increase.
Other mechanisms, such as automated policy provisioning, which have
flux rates similar to ROV (i.e., on the order of minutes), could very
well cause similar problems.
Therefore, this document updates [RFC8481] by describing how to avoid
this problem.
4. Keeping Partial Adj-RIB-In Data
If new RPKI data arrive that cause operator policy to invalidate the
best route and the BGP speaker did not keep the dropped routes, then
the BGP speaker would issue a route refresh, which this feature aims
to prevent.
A route that is dropped by operator policy due to ROV is, by nature,
considered ineligible to compete for the best route and MUST be kept
in the Adj-RIB-In for potential future evaluation.
Ameliorating the route refresh problem by keeping a full Adj-RIB-In
can be a problem for resource-constrained BGP speakers. In reality,
only some data need be retained. If an implementation chooses not to
retain the full Adj-RIB-In, it MUST retain at least routes dropped
due to ROV for potential future evaluation.
As storing these routes could cause problems in resource-constrained
devices, there MUST be a global operation, CLI, YANG, or other
mechanism that allows the operator to enable this feature and store
the dropped routes. Such an operator control MUST NOT be per peer,
as this could cause inconsistent behavior.
As a side note, policy that may drop routes due to RPKI-based checks
such as ROV (and ASPA, BGPsec [RFC8205], etc., in the future) MUST be
run and the dropped routes saved per this section, before non-RPKI
policies are run, as the latter may change path attributes.
5. Operational Recommendations
Operators deploying ROV and/or other RPKI-based policies should
ensure that the BGP speaker implementation is not causing route
refresh requests to neighbors.
BGP speakers MUST either keep the full Adj-RIB-In or implement the
specification in Section 4. Conformance to this behavior is an
additional, mandatory capability for BGP speakers performing ROV.
If the BGP speaker does not implement these recommendations, the
operator should enable the vendor's control to keep the full Adj-RIB-
In, sometimes referred to as "soft reconfiguration inbound". The
operator should then measure to ensure that there are no unnecessary
route refresh requests sent to neighbors.
If the BGP speaker's equipment has insufficient resources to support
either of the two proposed options (keeping a full AdjRibIn or at
least the dropped routes), the equipment SHOULD either be replaced
with capable equipment or SHOULD NOT be used for ROV.
The configuration setting in Section 4 should only be used in very
well-known and controlled circumstances where the scaling issues are
well understood and anticipated.
Operators using the specification in Section 4 should be aware that a
misconfigured neighbor might erroneously send a massive number of
paths, thus consuming a lot of memory. Hence, pre-policy filtering
such as described in [MAXPREFIX-INBOUND] could be used to reduce this
exposure.
If route refresh has been issued toward more than one peer, the order
of receipt of the refresh data can cause churn in both best route
selection and outbound signaling.
Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) that provide route servers [RFC7947]
should be aware that some members could be causing an undue route
refresh load on the route servers and take appropriate administrative
and/or technical measures. IXPs using BGP speakers as route servers
should ensure that they are not generating excessive route refresh
requests.
6. Security Considerations
This document describes a denial of service that Route Origin
Validation or other RPKI policy may place on a BGP neighbor and
describes how it may be ameliorated.
Otherwise, this document adds no additional security considerations
to those already described by the referenced documents.
7. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2918] Chen, E., "Route Refresh Capability for BGP-4", RFC 2918,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2918, September 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2918>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC7313] Patel, K., Chen, E., and B. Venkatachalapathy, "Enhanced
Route Refresh Capability for BGP-4", RFC 7313,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7313, July 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7313>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8481] Bush, R., "Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based
on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8481, September 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8481>.
8.2. Informative References
[AS_PATH-VER]
Azimov, A., Bogomazov, E., Bush, R., Patel, K., Snijders,
J., and K. Sriram, "BGP AS_PATH Verification Based on
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Autonomous
System Provider Authorization (ASPA) Objects", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-
verification-11, 24 October 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-
aspa-verification-11>.
[MAXPREFIX-INBOUND]
Aelmans, M., Stucchi, M., and J. Snijders, "BGP Maximum
Prefix Limits Inbound", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-sas-idr-maxprefix-inbound-04, 19 January 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sas-idr-
maxprefix-inbound-04>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC7947] Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker,
"Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", RFC 7947,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7947, September 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7947>.
[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
[RPKI-ROUTER-PROT-v2]
Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 2", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-
10, 16 June 2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-10>.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Alvaro Retana, Ben Maddison, Derek Yeung,
John Heasley, John Scudder, Matthias Waehlisch, Nick Hilliard, Saku
Ytti, and Ties de Kock.
Authors' Addresses
Randy Bush
IIJ Research Lab & Arrcus, Inc.
1856 SW Edgewood Dr
Portland, OR 97210
United States of America
Email: randy@psg.com
Keyur Patel
Arrcus, Inc.
2077 Gateway Place, Suite #400
San Jose, CA 95119
United States of America
Email: keyur@arrcus.com
Philip Smith
PFS Internet Development Pty Ltd
PO Box 1908
Milton QLD 4064
Australia
Email: pfsinoz@gmail.com
Mark Tinka
SEACOM
Building 7, Design Quarter District
Leslie Avenue, Magaliessig
Fourways, Gauteng
2196
South Africa
Email: mark@tinka.africa
