Sidr Workgroup RFCs

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RFC6480 - An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing: This document describes an architecture for an infrastructure to support improved security of Internet routing. The foundation of this architecture is a Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) that represents the allocation hierarchy of IP address space and Autonomous System (AS) numbers; and a distributed repository system for storing and disseminating the data objects that comprise the RPKI, as well as other signed objects necessary for improved routing security. As an initial application of this architecture, the document describes how a legitimate holder of IP address space can explicitly and verifiably authorize one or more ASes to originate routes to that address space. Such verifiable authorizations could be used, for example, to more securely construct BGP route filters. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.
RFC6481 - A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure: This document defines a profile for the structure of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) distributed repository. Each individual repository publication point is a directory that contains files that correspond to X.509/PKIX Resource Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists and signed objects. This profile defines the object (file) naming scheme, the contents of repository publication points (directories), and a suggested internal structure of a local repository cache that is intended to facilitate synchronization across a distributed collection of repository publication points and to facilitate certification path construction. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC6482 - A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs): This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or more prefixes within the address block. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC6483 - Validation of Route Origination Using the Resource Certificate Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs): This document defines the semantics of a Route Origin Authorization (ROA) in terms of the context of an application of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.
RFC6484 - Certificate Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI): This document describes the certificate policy for a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) used to support attestations about Internet Number Resource (INR) holdings. Each organization that distributes IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers to an organization will, in parallel, issue a (public key) certificate reflecting this distribution. These certificates will enable verification that the resources indicated in the certificate have been distributed to the holder of the associated private key and that this organization is the current, unique holder of these resources. This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.
RFC6485 - The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI): This document specifies the algorithms, algorithms' parameters, asymmetric key formats, asymmetric key size, and signature format for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) subscribers that generate digital signatures on certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and signed objects as well as for the relying parties (RPs) that verify these digital signatures. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC6486 - Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI): This document defines a "manifest" for use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). A manifest is a signed object (file) that contains a listing of all the signed objects (files) in the repository publication point (directory) associated with an authority responsible for publishing in the repository. For each certificate, Certificate Revocation List (CRL), or other type of signed objects issued by the authority that are published at this repository publication point, the manifest contains both the name of the file containing the object and a hash of the file content. Manifests are intended to enable a relying party (RP) to detect certain forms of attacks against a repository. Specifically, if an RP checks a manifest's contents against the signed objects retrieved from a repository publication point, then the RP can detect "stale" (valid) data and deletion of signed objects. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC6487 - A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates: This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for the purpose of supporting validation of assertions of "right-of-use" of Internet Number Resources (INRs). The certificates issued under this profile are used to convey the issuer's authorization of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of-use" of the INRs that are described in the certificate. This document contains the normative specification of Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) syntax in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). This document also specifies profiles for the format of certificate requests and specifies the Relying Party RPKI certificate path validation procedure. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC6488 - Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI): This document defines a generic profile for signed objects used in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). These RPKI signed objects make use of Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as a standard encapsulation format. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC6489 - Certification Authority (CA) Key Rollover in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI): This document describes how a Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) performs a planned rollover of its key pair. This document also notes the implications of this key rollover procedure for relying parties (RPs). In general, RPs are expected to maintain a local cache of the objects that have been published in the RPKI repository, and thus the way in which a CA performs key rollover impacts RPs. This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.
RFC6490 - Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor Locator: This document defines a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC6491 - Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA: This document provides specific direction to IANA as to the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) objects it should issue. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC6492 - A Protocol for Provisioning Resource Certificates: This document defines a framework for certificate management interactions between an Internet Number Resource issuer ("issuer") and an Internet Number Resource recipient ("subject") through the specification of a protocol for interaction between the two parties. The protocol supports the transmission of requests from the subject, and corresponding responses from the issuer encompassing the actions of certificate issuance, certificate revocation, and certificate status information reports. This protocol is intended to be limited to the application of Internet Number Resource Certificate management and is not intended to be used as part of a more general certificate management framework. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC6493 - The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Ghostbusters Record: In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), resource certificates completely obscure names or any other information that might be useful for contacting responsible parties to deal with issues of certificate expiration, maintenance, roll-overs, compromises, etc. This document describes the RPKI Ghostbusters Record containing human contact information that may be verified (indirectly) by a Certification Authority (CA) certificate. The data in the record are those of a severely profiled vCard. [STANDARDS- TRACK]
RFC6810 - The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol: In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems of BGP announcements, routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RFC 6480) prefix origin data from a trusted cache. This document describes a protocol to deliver validated prefix origin data to routers. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC6811 - BGP Prefix Origin Validation: To help reduce well-known threats against BGP including prefix mis- announcing and monkey-in-the-middle attacks, one of the security requirements is the ability to validate the origination Autonomous System (AS) of BGP routes. More specifically, one needs to validate that the AS number claiming to originate an address prefix (as derived from the AS_PATH attribute of the BGP route) is in fact authorized by the prefix holder to do so. This document describes a simple validation mechanism to partially satisfy this requirement. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
RFC6907 - Use Cases and Interpretations of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects for Issuers and Relying Parties: This document describes a number of use cases together with directions and interpretations for organizations and relying parties when creating or encountering Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) object scenarios in the public RPKI. All of these items are discussed here in relation to the Internet routing system.
RFC6916 - Algorithm Agility Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI): This document specifies the process that Certification Authorities (CAs) and Relying Parties (RPs) participating in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) will need to follow to transition to a new (and probably cryptographically stronger) algorithm set. The process is expected to be completed over a timescale of several years. Consequently, no emergency transition is specified. The transition procedure defined in this document supports only a top-down migration (parent migrates before children).
RFC6945 - Definitions of Managed Objects for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol: This document defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB) for use with network management protocols in the Internet community. In particular, it describes objects used for monitoring the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol.
RFC7115 - Origin Validation Operation Based on the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI): Deployment of BGP origin validation that is based on the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) has many operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and present those that are most critical. It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin validation continues to be deployed and the dynamics are better understood.
RFC7128 - Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Router Implementation Report: This document is an implementation report for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Router protocol as defined in RFC 6810. The authors did not verify the accuracy of the information provided by respondents. The respondents are experts with the implementations they reported on, and their responses are considered authoritative for the implementations for which their responses represent. The respondents were asked to only use the "YES" answer if the feature had at least been tested in the lab.
RFC7132 - Threat Model for BGP Path Security: This document describes a threat model for the context in which External Border Gateway Protocol (EBGP) path security mechanisms will be developed. The threat model includes an analysis of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) and focuses on the ability of an Autonomous System (AS) to verify the authenticity of the AS path info received in a BGP update. We use the term "PATHSEC" to refer to any BGP path security technology that makes use of the RPKI. PATHSEC will secure BGP, consistent with the inter-AS security focus of the RPKI.; The document characterizes classes of potential adversaries that are considered to be threats and examines classes of attacks that might be launched against PATHSEC. It does not revisit attacks against unprotected BGP, as that topic has already been addressed in the BGP-4 standard. It concludes with a brief discussion of residual vulnerabilities.
RFC7318 - Policy Qualifiers in Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Certificates: This document updates RFC 6487 by clarifying the inclusion of policy qualifiers in the certificate policies extension of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) resource certificates.
RFC7353 - Security Requirements for BGP Path Validation: This document describes requirements for a BGP security protocol design to provide cryptographic assurance that the origin Autonomous System (AS) has the right to announce the prefix and to provide assurance of the AS Path of the announcement.
RFC7382 - Template for a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for the Resource PKI (RPKI): This document contains a template to be used for creating a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an organization that is part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), e.g., a resource allocation registry or an ISP.
RFC7730 - Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor Locator: This document defines a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). This document obsoletes RFC 6490 by adding support for multiple URIs in a TAL.
RFC7909 - Securing Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL) Objects with Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Signatures: This document describes a method that allows parties to electronically sign Routing Policy Specification Language objects and validate such electronic signatures. This allows relying parties to detect accidental or malicious modifications of such objects. It also allows parties who run Internet Routing Registries or similar databases, but do not yet have authentication (based on Routing Policy System Security) of the maintainers of certain objects, to verify that the additions or modifications of such database objects are done by the legitimate holder(s) of the Internet resources mentioned in those objects. This document updates RFCs 2622 and 4012 to add the signature attribute to supported RPSL objects.
RFC7935 - The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure: This document specifies the algorithms, algorithms' parameters, asymmetric key formats, asymmetric key size, and signature format for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) subscribers that generate digital signatures on certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) signed objects and certification requests as well as for the relying parties (RPs) that verify these digital signatures.
RFC8097 - BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community: This document defines a new BGP opaque extended community to carry the origination Autonomous System (AS) validation state inside an autonomous system. Internal BGP (IBGP) speakers that receive this validation state can configure local policies that allow it to influence their decision process.
RFC8181 - A Publication Protocol for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI): This document defines a protocol for publishing Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) objects. Even though the RPKI will have many participants issuing certificates and creating other objects, it is operationally useful to consolidate the publication of those objects. Even in cases where a certificate issuer runs its own publication repository, it can be useful to run the certificate engine itself on a different machine from the publication repository. This document defines a protocol which addresses these needs.
RFC8182 - The RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP): In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), Certificate Authorities (CAs) publish certificates, including end-entity certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), and RPKI signed objects to repositories. Relying Parties retrieve the published information from those repositories. This document specifies a new RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP) for this purpose. RRDP was specifically designed for scaling. It relies on an Update Notification File which lists the current Snapshot and Delta Files that can be retrieved using HTTPS (HTTP over Transport Layer Security (TLS)), and it enables the use of Content Distribution Networks (CDNs) or other caching infrastructures for the retrieval of these files.
RFC8183 - An Out-of-Band Setup Protocol for Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Production Services: This note describes a simple out-of-band protocol to ease setup of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) provisioning and publication protocols between two parties. The protocol is encoded in a small number of XML messages, which can be passed back and forth by any mutually agreeable means which provides acceptable data integrity and authentication.; This setup protocol is not part of the provisioning or publication protocol; rather, it is intended to simplify configuration of these protocols by setting up relationships and exchanging keying material used to authenticate those relationships.
RFC8205 - BGPsec Protocol Specification: This document describes BGPsec, an extension to the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) that provides security for the path of Autonomous Systems (ASes) through which a BGP UPDATE message passes. BGPsec is implemented via an optional non-transitive BGP path attribute that carries digital signatures produced by each AS that propagates the UPDATE message. The digital signatures provide confidence that every AS on the path of ASes listed in the UPDATE message has explicitly authorized the advertisement of the route.
RFC8206 - BGPsec Considerations for Autonomous System (AS) Migration: This document discusses considerations and methods for supporting and securing a common method for Autonomous System (AS) migration within the BGPsec protocol.
RFC8207 - BGPsec Operational Considerations: Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and present the most critical and universal. Operational practices are expected to evolve as BGPsec is formalized and initially deployed.
RFC8208 - BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, and Signature Formats: This document specifies the algorithms, algorithm parameters, asymmetric key formats, asymmetric key sizes, and signature formats used in BGPsec (Border Gateway Protocol Security). This document updates RFC 7935 ("The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure").; This document also includes example BGPsec UPDATE messages as well as the private keys used to generate the messages and the certificates necessary to validate those signatures.
RFC8209 - A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests: This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates used to enable validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that protocol known as BGPsec. BGP is the standard for inter-domain routing in the Internet; it is the "glue" that holds the Internet together. BGPsec is being developed as one component of a solution that addresses the requirement to provide security for BGP. The goal of BGPsec is to provide full AS path validation based on the use of strong cryptographic primitives. The end entity (EE) certificates specified by this profile are issued to routers within an AS. Each of these certificates is issued under a Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificate. These CA certificates and EE certificates both contain the AS Resource extension. An EE certificate of this type asserts that the router or routers holding the corresponding private key are authorized to emit secure route advertisements on behalf of the AS(es) specified in the certificate. This document also profiles the format of certification requests and specifies Relying Party (RP) certificate path validation procedures for these EE certificates. This document extends the RPKI; therefore, this document updates the RPKI Resource Certificates Profile (RFC 6487).
RFC8210 - The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1: In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems and Autonomous System Paths of BGP announcements, routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RFC 6480) prefix origin data and router keys from a trusted cache. This document describes a protocol to deliver them.; This document describes version 1 of the RPKI-Router protocol. RFC 6810 describes version 0. This document updates RFC 6810.
RFC8211 - Adverse Actions by a Certification Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI): This document analyzes actions by or against a Certification Authority (CA) or an independent repository manager in the RPKI that can adversely affect the Internet Number Resources (INRs) associated with that CA or its subordinate CAs. The analysis is done from the perspective of an affected INR holder. The analysis is based on examination of the data items in the RPKI repository, as controlled by a CA (or an independent repository manager) and fetched by Relying Parties (RPs). The analysis does not purport to be comprehensive; it does represent an orderly way to analyze a number of ways that errors by or attacks against a CA or repository manager can affect the RPKI and routing decisions based on RPKI data.
RFC8360 - Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Validation Reconsidered: This document specifies an alternative to the certificate validation procedure specified in RFC 6487 that reduces aspects of operational fragility in the management of certificates in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), while retaining essential security features.; The procedure specified in RFC 6487 requires that Resource Certificates are rejected entirely if they are found to overclaim any resources not contained on the issuing certificate, whereas the validation process defined here allows an issuing Certification Authority (CA) to chose to communicate that such Resource Certificates should be accepted for the intersection of their resources and the issuing certificate.; It should be noted that the validation process defined here considers validation under a single trust anchor (TA) only. In particular, concerns regarding overclaims where multiple configured TAs claim overlapping resources are considered out of scope for this document.; This choice is signaled by a set of alternative Object Identifiers (OIDs) per "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" (RFC 3779) and "Certificate Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)" (RFC 6484). It should be noted that in case these OIDs are not used for any certificate under a trust anchor, the validation procedure defined here has the same outcome as the procedure defined in RFC 6487.; Furthermore, this document provides an alternative to Route Origin Authorization (ROA) (RFC 6482) and BGPsec Router Certificate (BGPsec PKI Profiles -- publication requested) validation.
RFC8416 - Simplified Local Internet Number Resource Management with the RPKI (SLURM): The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origin assertions. ISPs can also use the RPKI to validate the path of a BGP route. However, ISPs may want to establish a local view of exceptions to the RPKI data in the form of local filters and additions. The mechanisms described in this document provide a simple way to enable INR holders to establish a local, customized view of the RPKI, overriding global RPKI repository data as needed.