Hokey Workgroup RFCs

Browse Hokey Workgroup RFCs by Number

RFC5169 - Handover Key Management and Re-Authentication Problem Statement

This document describes the Handover Keying (HOKEY) re-authentication problem statement. The current Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) keying framework is not designed to support re-authentication and handovers without re-executing an EAP method. This often causes unacceptable latency in various mobile wireless environments. This document details the problem and defines design goals for a generic mechanism to reuse derived EAP keying material for handover. This memo provides information for the Internet community.

RFC5295 - Specification for the Derivation of Root Keys from an Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)

The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) defined the Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) generation, but reserved it for unspecified future uses. This memo reserves the EMSK for the sole purpose of deriving root keys. Root keys are master keys that can be used for multiple purposes, identified by usage definitions. This document also specifies a mechanism for avoiding conflicts between root keys by deriving them in a manner that guarantees cryptographic separation. Finally, this document also defines one such root key usage: Domain-Specific Root Keys are root keys made available to and used within specific key management domains. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

RFC5296 - EAP Extensions for EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP)

The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is a generic framework supporting multiple types of authentication methods. In systems where EAP is used for authentication, it is desirable to not repeat the entire EAP exchange with another authenticator. This document specifies extensions to EAP and the EAP keying hierarchy to support an EAP method-independent protocol for efficient re-authentication between the peer and an EAP re-authentication server through any authenticator. The re-authentication server may be in the home network or in the local network to which the peer is connecting. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

RFC5749 - Distribution of EAP-Based Keys for Handover and Re-Authentication

This document describes an abstract mechanism for delivering root keys from an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) server to another network server that requires the keys for offering security protected services, such as re-authentication, to an EAP peer. The distributed root key can be either a usage-specific root key (USRK), a domain-specific root key (DSRK), or a domain-specific usage- specific root key (DSUSRK) that has been derived from an Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) hierarchy previously established between the EAP server and an EAP peer. This document defines a template for a key distribution exchange (KDE) protocol that can distribute these different types of root keys using a AAA (Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting) protocol and discusses its security requirements. The described protocol template does not specify message formats, data encoding, or other implementation details. It thus needs to be instantiated with a specific protocol (e.g., RADIUS or Diameter) before it can be used. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

RFC5836 - Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Early Authentication Problem Statement

Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) early authentication may be defined as the use of EAP by a mobile device to establish authenticated keying material on a target attachment point prior to its arrival. This document discusses the EAP early authentication problem in detail. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.

RFC6440 - The EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) Local Domain Name DHCPv6 Option

In order to derive a Domain-Specific Root Key (DSRK) from the Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) generated as a side effect of an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) method, the EAP peer must discover the name of the domain to which it is attached.

This document specifies a Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol Version 6 (DHCPv6) option designed to allow a DHCPv6 server to inform clients using the EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) EAP method of the name of the local domain for ERP. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

RFC6630 - EAP Re-authentication Protocol Extensions for Authenticated Anticipatory Keying (ERP/AAK)

The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is a generic framework supporting multiple types of authentication methods.

The EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) specifies extensions to EAP and the EAP keying hierarchy to support an EAP method-independent protocol for efficient re-authentication between the peer and an EAP re-authentication server through any authenticator.

Authenticated Anticipatory Keying (AAK) is a method by which cryptographic keying material may be established upon one or more Candidate Attachment Points (CAPs) prior to handover. AAK uses the AAA infrastructure for key transport.

This document specifies the extensions necessary to enable AAK support in ERP. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

RFC6696 - EAP Extensions for the EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP)

The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is a generic framework supporting multiple types of authentication methods. In systems where EAP is used for authentication, it is desirable to avoid repeating the entire EAP exchange with another authenticator. This document specifies extensions to EAP and the EAP keying hierarchy to support an EAP method-independent protocol for efficient re- authentication between the peer and an EAP re-authentication server through any authenticator. The re-authentication server may be in the home network or in the local network to which the peer is connecting. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

RFC6697 - Handover Keying (HOKEY) Architecture Design

The Handover Keying (HOKEY) Working Group seeks to minimize handover delay due to authentication when a peer moves from one point of attachment to another. Work has progressed on two different approaches to reduce handover delay: early authentication (so that authentication does not need to be performed during handover), and reuse of cryptographic material generated during an initial authentication to save time during re-authentication. A basic assumption is that the mobile host or "peer" is initially authenticated using the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), executed between the peer and an EAP server as defined in RFC 3748.

This document defines the HOKEY architecture. Specifically, it describes design objectives, the functional environment within which handover keying operates, the functions to be performed by the HOKEY architecture itself, and the assignment of those functions to architectural components. It goes on to illustrate the operation of the architecture within various deployment scenarios that are described more fully in other documents produced by the HOKEY Working Group. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.