Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Housley
Request for Comments: 5914 Vigil Security, LLC
Category: Standards Track S. Ashmore
ISSN: 2070-1721 National Security Agency
C. Wallace
Cygnacom Solutions
June 2010
Trust Anchor Format
Abstract
This document describes a structure for representing trust anchor
information. A trust anchor is an authoritative entity represented
by a public key and associated data. The public key is used to
verify digital signatures, and the associated data is used to
constrain the types of information or actions for which the trust
anchor is authoritative. The structures defined in this document are
intended to satisfy the format-related requirements defined in Trust
Anchor Management Requirements.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5914.
Housley, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]RFC 5914 TAF June 2010
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Trust Anchor Information Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Public Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.3. Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.4. Trust Anchor Title . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.5. Certification Path Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.6. Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. Trust Anchor List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.1. ASN.1 Module Using 2002 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.2. ASN.1 Module Using 1988 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.2.1. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Housley, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]RFC 5914 TAF June 2010
1. Introduction
Trust anchors are widely used to verify digital signatures and
validate certification paths [RFC5280][X.509]. They are required
when validating certification paths. Though widely used, there is no
standard format for representing trust anchor information. This
document describes the TrustAnchorInfo structure. This structure is
intended to satisfy the format-related requirements expressed in
Trust Anchor Management Requirements [TA-MGMT-REQS] and is expressed
using ASN.1 [X.680]. It can provide a more compact alternative to
X.509 certificates for exchanging trust anchor information and
provides a means of associating additional or alternative constraints
with certificates without breaking the signature on the certificate.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Trust Anchor Information Syntax
This section describes the TrustAnchorInfo structure.
TrustAnchorInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version TrustAnchorInfoVersion DEFAULT v1,
pubKey SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
keyId KeyIdentifier,
taTitle TrustAnchorTitle OPTIONAL,
certPath CertPathControls OPTIONAL,
exts [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL,
taTitleLangTag [2] UTF8String OPTIONAL }
TrustAnchorInfoVersion ::= INTEGER { v1(1) }
2.1. Version
version identifies the version of TrustAnchorInfo. Future updates to
this document may include changes to the TrustAnchorInfo structure,
in which case the version number should be incremented. However, the
default value, v1, cannot be changed.
2.2. Public Key
pubKey identifies the public key and algorithm associated with the
trust anchor using the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure [RFC5280]. The
SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure contains the algorithm identifier
followed by the public key itself. The algorithm field is an
Housley, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]RFC 5914 TAF June 2010
AlgorithmIdentifier, which contains an object identifier and OPTIONAL
parameters. The object identifier names the public key algorithm and
indicates the syntax of the parameters, if present, as well as the
format of the public key. The public key is encoded as a BIT STRING.
2.3. Key Identifier
keyId contains the public key identifier of the trust anchor public
key. See Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC5280] for a description of common
key identifier calculation methods.
2.4. Trust Anchor Title
TrustAnchorTitle ::= UTF8String (SIZE (1..64))
taTitle is OPTIONAL. When it is present, it provides a human-
readable name for the trust anchor. The text is encoded in UTF-8
[RFC3629], which accommodates most of the world's writing systems.
The taTitleLangTag field identifies the language used to express the
taTitle. When taTitleLangTag is absent, English ("en" language tag)
is used. The value of the taTitleLangTag should be a language tag as
described in [RFC5646].
2.5. Certification Path Controls
CertPathControls ::= SEQUENCE {
taName Name,
certificate [0] Certificate OPTIONAL,
policySet [1] CertificatePolicies OPTIONAL,
policyFlags [2] CertPolicyFlags OPTIONAL,
nameConstr [3] NameConstraints OPTIONAL,
pathLenConstraint[4] INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL}
certPath is OPTIONAL. When it is present, it provides the controls
needed to initialize an X.509 certification path validation algorithm
implementation (see Section 6 of [RFC5280]). When absent, the trust
anchor cannot be used to validate the signature on an X.509
certificate.
taName provides the X.500 distinguished name associated with the
trust anchor, and this distinguished name is used to construct and
validate an X.509 certification path. The name MUST NOT be an empty
sequence.
certificate provides an OPTIONAL X.509 certificate, which can be used
in some environments to represent the trust anchor in certification
path development and validation. If the certificate is present, the
subject name in the certificate MUST exactly match the X.500
Housley, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]RFC 5914 TAF June 2010
distinguished name provided in the taName field, the public key MUST
exactly match the public key in the pubKey field, and the
subjectKeyIdentifier extension, if present, MUST exactly match the
key identifier in the keyId field. The complete description of the
syntax and semantics of the Certificate are provided in [RFC5280].
Constraints defined in the policySet, policyFlags, nameConstr,
pathLenConstraint, and exts fields within TrustAnchorInfo replace
values contained in a certificate or provide values for extensions
not present in the certificate. Values defined in these
TrustAnchorInfo fields are always enforced. Extensions included in a
certificate are enforced only if there is no corresponding value in
the TrustAnchorInfo. Correspondence between extensions within
certificate and TrustAnchorInfo fields is defined as follows:
o an id-ce-certificatePolicies certificate extension corresponds to
the CertPathControls.policySet field.
o an id-ce-policyConstraints certificate extension corresponds to
the CertPolicyFlags.inhibitPolicyMapping and
CertPolicyFlags.requireExplicitPolicy fields.
o an id-ce-inhibitAnyPolicy certificate extension corresponds to the
CertPolicyFlags.inhibitAnyPolicy field.
o an id-ce-nameConstraints certificate extension corresponds to the
CertPathControls.nameConstr field.
o the pathLenConstraint field of an id-ce-basicConstraints
certificate extension corresponds to the
CertPathControls.pathLenConstraint field (the presence of a
CertPathControls structure corresponds to a TRUE value in the cA
field of a BasicConstraints extension).
o any other certificate extension corresponds to the same type of
extension in the TrustAnchorInfo.exts field.
CertificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation
PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
policyIdentifier CertPolicyId,
policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL }
CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
policySet is OPTIONAL. When present, it contains a sequence of
certificate policy identifiers to be provided as inputs to the
certification path validation algorithm. When absent, the special
Housley, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]RFC 5914 TAF June 2010
value any-policy is provided as the input to the certification path
validation algorithm. The complete description of the syntax and
semantics of the CertificatePolicies are provided in [RFC5280],
including the syntax for PolicyInformation. In this context, the
OPTIONAL policyQualifiers structure MUST NOT be included.
CertPolicyFlags ::= BIT STRING {
inhibitPolicyMapping (0),
requireExplicitPolicy (1),
inhibitAnyPolicy (2) }
policyFlags is OPTIONAL. When present, three Boolean values for
input to the certification path validation algorithm are provided in
a BIT STRING. When absent, the input to the certification path
validation algorithm is { FALSE, FALSE, FALSE }, which represents the
most liberal setting for these flags. The three bits are used as
follows:
inhibitPolicyMapping indicates if policy mapping is allowed in the
certification path. When set to TRUE, policy mapping is not
permitted. This value represents the initial-policy-mapping-
inhibit input value to the certification path validation algorithm
described in Section 6.1.1 of [RFC5280].
requireExplicitPolicy indicates if the certification path MUST be
valid for at least one of the certificate policies in the
policySet. When set to TRUE, all certificates in the
certification path MUST contain an acceptable policy identifier in
the certificate policies extension. This value represents the
initial-explicit-policy input value to the certification path
validation algorithm described in Section 6.1.1 of [RFC5280]. An
acceptable policy identifier is a member of the policySet or the
identifier of a policy that is declared to be equivalent through
policy mapping. This bit MUST be set to FALSE if policySet is
absent.
inhibitAnyPolicy indicates whether the special anyPolicy policy
identifier, with the value { 2 5 29 32 0 }, is considered an
explicit match for other certificate policies. This value
represents the initial-any-policy-inhibit input value to the
certification path validation algorithm described in Section 6.1.1
of [RFC5280].
NameConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
permittedSubtrees [0] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL,
excludedSubtrees [1] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL }
GeneralSubtrees ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree
Housley, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]RFC 5914 TAF June 2010
GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE {
base GeneralName,
minimum [0] BaseDistance DEFAULT 0,
maximum [1] BaseDistance OPTIONAL }
BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
nameConstr is OPTIONAL. It has the same syntax and semantics as the
Name Constraints certificate extension [RFC5280], which includes a
list of permitted names and a list of excluded names. The definition
of GeneralName can be found in [RFC5280]. When it is present,
constraints are provided on names (including alternative names) that
might appear in subsequent X.509 certificates in a certification
path. This field is used to set the initial-permitted-subtrees and
initial-excluded-subtrees input values to the certification path
validation algorithm described in Section 6.1.1 of [RFC5280]. When
this field is absent, the initial-permitted-subtrees variable is
unbounded and the initial-excluded-subtrees variable is empty.
The pathLenConstraint field gives the maximum number of non-self-
issued intermediate certificates that may follow this certificate in
a valid certification path. (Note: The last certificate in the
certification path is not an intermediate certificate and is not
included in this limit. Usually, the last certificate is an end
entity certificate, but it can be a CA certificate.) A
pathLenConstraint of zero indicates that no non-self-issued
intermediate certification authority (CA) certificates may follow in
a valid certification path. Where it appears, the pathLenConstraint
field MUST be greater than or equal to zero. Where pathLenConstraint
does not appear, no limit is imposed.
When the trust anchor is used to validate a certification path,
CertPathControls provides limitations on certification paths that
will successfully validate. An application that is validating a
certification path SHOULD NOT ignore these limitations, but the
application can impose additional limitations to ensure that the
validated certification path is appropriate for the intended
application context. As input to the certification path validation
algorithm, an application MAY:
o Provide a subset of the certification policies provided in the
policySet;
o Provide a TRUE value, if appropriate, for any of the flags in the
policyFlags;
o Provide a subset of the permitted names provided in the
nameConstr;
Housley, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]RFC 5914 TAF June 2010
o Provide additional excluded names to the ones that are provided in
the nameConstr;
o Provide a smaller value for pathLenConstraint.
2.6. Extensions
exts is OPTIONAL. When it is present, it can be used to associate
additional information with the trust anchor using the standard
Extensions structure. Extensions that are anticipated to be widely
used have been included in the CertPathControls structure to avoid
overhead associated with use of the Extensions structure. To avoid
duplication with the CertPathControls field, the following types of
extensions MUST NOT appear in the exts field and are ignored if they
do appear: id-ce-certificatePolicies, id-ce-policyConstraints, id-ce-
inhibitAnyPolicy, or id-ce-nameConstraints.
3. Trust Anchor List
TrustAnchorInfo allows for the representation of a single trust
anchor. In many cases, it is convenient to represent a collection of
trust anchors. The TrustAnchorList structure is defined for this
purpose. TrustAnchorList is defined as a sequence of one or more
TrustAnchorChoice objects. TrustAnchorChoice provides three options
for representing a trust anchor. The certificate option allows for
the use of a certificate with no additional associated constraints.
The tbsCert option allows for associating constraints by removing a
signature on a certificate and changing the extensions field. The
taInfo option allows for use of the TrustAnchorInfo structure defined
in this document.
TrustAnchorList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF TrustAnchorChoice
TrustAnchorChoice ::= CHOICE {
certificate Certificate,
tbsCert [1] EXPLICIT TBSCertificate,
taInfo [2] EXPLICIT TrustAnchorInfo }
trust-anchor-list PKCS7-CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ TrustAnchorList IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-trustAnchorList }
The TrustAnchorList structure can be protected using the SignedData
structure defined in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
[RFC5652]. The id-ct-trustAnchorList object identifier has been
defined to represent TrustAnchorList payloads with CMS structures.
Housley, et al. Standards Track [Page 8]RFC 5914 TAF June 2010
4. Security Considerations
Compromise of a trust anchor private key permits unauthorized parties
to masquerade as the trust anchor, with potentially severe
consequences. Where TA-based constraints are enforced, the
unauthorized holder of the trust anchor private key will be limited
by the certification path controls associated with the trust anchor,
as expressed in the certPath and exts fields. For example, name
constraints in the trust anchor will determine the name space that
will be accepted in certificates that are validated using the
compromised trust anchor. Reliance on an inappropriate or incorrect
trust anchor public key has similar potentially severe consequences.
The compromise of a CA's private key leads to the same type of
problems as the compromise of a trust anchor private key. The
unauthorized holder of the CA private key will be limited by the
certification path controls associated with the trust anchor, as
expressed in the certPath field or as an extension.
Usage of a certificate independent of the TrustAnchorInfo structure
that envelopes it must be carefully managed to avoid violating
constraints expressed in the TrustAnchorInfo. When enveloping a
certificate in a TrustAnchorInfo structure, values included in the
certificate should be evaluated to ensure there is no confusion or
conflict with values in the TrustAnchorInfo structure.
5. References
5.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
RFC 5652, September 2009.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5646] Phillips, A. and M. Davis, "Tags for Identifying
Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, September 2009.
Housley, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]RFC 5914 TAF June 2010
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)",
RFC 5912, June 2010.
[X.680] "ITU-T Recommendation X.680: Information Technology -
Abstract Syntax Notation One", 2002.
5.2. Informative References
[TA-MGMT-REQS] Reddy, R. and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor Management
Requirements", Work in Progress, March 2010.
[X.509] "ITU-T Recommendation X.509 - The Directory -
Authentication Framework", 2000.
Housley, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]RFC 5914 TAF June 2010
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules
A.1. ASN.1 Module Using 2002 Syntax
Appendix A.1 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the
structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
[X.680]. It includes definitions imported from [RFC5280] and
[RFC5912].
TrustAnchorInfoModule
{ joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) modules(0) 33 }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
Certificate, Name, SubjectPublicKeyInfo, TBSCertificate
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 -- from [RFC5912]
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}
CertificatePolicies, KeyIdentifier, NameConstraints
FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 -- from [RFC5912]
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}
Extensions{}
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- from [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) } ;
TrustAnchorInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version TrustAnchorInfoVersion DEFAULT v1,
pubKey SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
keyId KeyIdentifier,
taTitle TrustAnchorTitle OPTIONAL,
certPath CertPathControls OPTIONAL,
exts [1] EXPLICIT Extensions {{...}} OPTIONAL,
taTitleLangTag [2] UTF8String OPTIONAL }
TrustAnchorInfoVersion ::= INTEGER { v1(1) }
TrustAnchorTitle ::= UTF8String (SIZE (1..64))
CertPathControls ::= SEQUENCE {
taName Name,
certificate [0] Certificate OPTIONAL,
policySet [1] CertificatePolicies OPTIONAL,
Housley, et al. Standards Track [Page 11]RFC 5914 TAF June 2010
policyFlags [2] CertPolicyFlags OPTIONAL,
nameConstr [3] NameConstraints OPTIONAL,
pathLenConstraint[4] INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL}
CertPolicyFlags ::= BIT STRING {
inhibitPolicyMapping (0),
requireExplicitPolicy (1),
inhibitAnyPolicy (2) }
TrustAnchorList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF TrustAnchorChoice
TrustAnchorChoice ::= CHOICE {
certificate Certificate,
tbsCert [1] EXPLICIT TBSCertificate,
taInfo [2] EXPLICIT TrustAnchorInfo }
id-ct-trustAnchorList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
id-smime(16) id-ct(1) 34 }
PKCS7-CONTENT-TYPE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
trust-anchor-list PKCS7-CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ TrustAnchorList IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-trustAnchorList }
END
A.2. ASN.1 Module Using 1988 Syntax
Appendix A.2 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the
structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
[X.680].
A.2.1. ASN.1 Module
TrustAnchorInfoModule-88
{ joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) modules(0) 37 }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
Certificate, Name, Extensions,
SubjectPublicKeyInfo, TBSCertificate
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 -- from [RFC5280]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
Housley, et al. Standards Track [Page 12]RFC 5914 TAF June 2010
id-pkix1-explicit(18) }
CertificatePolicies, KeyIdentifier, NameConstraints
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 -- [RFC5280]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-implicit(19) }
;
TrustAnchorInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version TrustAnchorInfoVersion DEFAULT v1,
pubKey SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
keyId KeyIdentifier,
taTitle TrustAnchorTitle OPTIONAL,
certPath CertPathControls OPTIONAL,
exts [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL,
taTitleLangTag [2] UTF8String OPTIONAL }
TrustAnchorInfoVersion ::= INTEGER { v1(1) }
TrustAnchorTitle ::= UTF8String (SIZE (1..64))
CertPathControls ::= SEQUENCE {
taName Name,
certificate [0] Certificate OPTIONAL,
policySet [1] CertificatePolicies OPTIONAL,
policyFlags [2] CertPolicyFlags OPTIONAL,
nameConstr [3] NameConstraints OPTIONAL,
pathLenConstraint[4] INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL}
CertPolicyFlags ::= BIT STRING {
inhibitPolicyMapping (0),
requireExplicitPolicy (1),
inhibitAnyPolicy (2) }
TrustAnchorList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF TrustAnchorChoice
TrustAnchorChoice ::= CHOICE {
certificate Certificate,
tbsCert [1] EXPLICIT TBSCertificate,
taInfo [2] EXPLICIT TrustAnchorInfo }
id-ct-trustAnchorList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
id-smime(16) id-ct(1) 34 }
END
Housley, et al. Standards Track [Page 13]RFC 5914 TAF June 2010
Authors' Addresses
Russ Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
918 Spring Knoll Drive
Herndon, VA 20170
EMail: housley@vigilsec.com
Sam Ashmore
National Security Agency
Suite 6751
9800 Savage Road
Fort Meade, MD 20755
EMail: srashmo@radium.ncsc.mil
Carl Wallace
Cygnacom Solutions
Suite 5400
7925 Jones Branch Drive
McLean, VA 22102
EMail: cwallace@cygnacom.com
Housley, et al. Standards Track [Page 14]
