Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Arkko
Request for Comments: 9048 V. Lehtovirta
Updates: 4187, 5448 V. Torvinen
Category: Informational Ericsson
ISSN: 2070-1721 P. Eronen
Independent
October 2021
Improved Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3GPP Mobile
Network Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA')
Abstract
The 3GPP mobile network Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) is an
authentication mechanism for devices wishing to access mobile
networks. RFC 4187 (EAP-AKA) made the use of this mechanism possible
within the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) framework. RFC
5448 (EAP-AKA') was an improved version of EAP-AKA.
This document is the most recent specification of EAP-AKA',
including, for instance, details about and references related to
operating EAP-AKA' in 5G networks.
EAP-AKA' differs from EAP-AKA by providing a key derivation function
that binds the keys derived within the method to the name of the
access network. The key derivation function has been defined in the
3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). EAP-AKA' allows its use
in EAP in an interoperable manner. EAP-AKA' also updates the
algorithm used in hash functions, as it employs SHA-256 / HMAC-
SHA-256 instead of SHA-1 / HMAC-SHA-1, which is used in EAP-AKA.
This version of the EAP-AKA' specification defines the protocol
behavior for both 4G and 5G deployments, whereas the previous version
defined protocol behavior for 4G deployments only. While EAP-AKA' as
defined in RFC 5448 is not obsolete, this document defines the most
recent and fully backwards-compatible specification of EAP-AKA'.
This document updates both RFCs 4187 and 5448.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are candidates for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9048.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Requirements Language
3. EAP-AKA'
3.1. AT_KDF_INPUT
3.2. AT_KDF
3.3. Key Derivation
3.4. Hash Functions
3.4.1. PRF'
3.4.2. AT_MAC
3.4.3. AT_CHECKCODE
3.5. Summary of Attributes for EAP-AKA'
4. Bidding Down Prevention for EAP-AKA
4.1. Summary of Attributes for EAP-AKA
5. Peer Identities
5.1. Username Types in EAP-AKA' Identities
5.2. Generating Pseudonyms and Fast Re-Authentication Identities
5.3. Identifier Usage in 5G
5.3.1. Key Derivation
5.3.2. EAP Identity Response and EAP-AKA' AT_IDENTITY
Attribute
6. Exported Parameters
7. Security Considerations
7.1. Privacy
7.2. Discovered Vulnerabilities
7.3. Pervasive Monitoring
7.4. Security Properties of Binding Network Names
8. IANA Considerations
8.1. Type Value
8.2. Attribute Type Values
8.3. Key Derivation Function Namespace
9. References
9.1. Normative References
9.2. Informative References
Appendix A. Changes from RFC 5448
Appendix B. Changes to RFC 4187
Appendix C. Importance of Explicit Negotiation
Appendix D. Test Vectors
Acknowledgments
Contributors
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
The 3GPP mobile network Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) is an
authentication mechanism for devices wishing to access mobile
networks. [RFC4187] (EAP-AKA) made the use of this mechanism
possible within the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
framework [RFC3748].
EAP-AKA' is an improved version of EAP-AKA. EAP-AKA' was defined in
RFC 5448 [RFC5448], and it updated EAP-AKA [RFC4187].
This document is the most recent specification of EAP-AKA',
including, for instance, details about and references related to
operating EAP-AKA' in 5G networks. This document does not obsolete
RFC 5448; however, this document is the most recent and fully
backwards-compatible specification.
EAP-AKA' is commonly implemented in mobile phones and network
equipment. It can be used for authentication to gain network access
via Wireless LAN networks and, with 5G, also directly to mobile
networks.
EAP-AKA' differs from EAP-AKA by providing a different key derivation
function. This function binds the keys derived within the method to
the name of the access network. This limits the effects of
compromised access network nodes and keys. EAP-AKA' also updates the
algorithm used for hash functions.
The EAP-AKA' method employs the derived keys CK' and IK' from the
3GPP specification [TS-3GPP.33.402] and updates the hash function
that is used to SHA-256 [FIPS.180-4] and HMAC to HMAC-SHA-256.
Otherwise, EAP-AKA' is equivalent to EAP-AKA. Given that a different
EAP method Type value is used for EAP-AKA and EAP-AKA', a mutually
supported method may be negotiated using the standard mechanisms in
EAP [RFC3748].
Note that any change of the key derivation must be unambiguous
to both sides in the protocol. That is, it must not be
possible to accidentally connect old equipment to new equipment
and get the key derivation wrong or to attempt to use incorrect
keys without getting a proper error message. See Appendix C
for further information.
Note also that choices in authentication protocols should be
secure against bidding down attacks that attempt to force the
participants to use the least secure function. See Section 4
for further information.
This specification makes the following changes from RFC 5448:
* Updates the reference that specifies how the Network Name field is
constructed in the protocol. This update ensures that EAP-AKA' is
compatible with 5G deployments. RFC 5448 referred to the Release
8 version of [TS-3GPP.24.302]. This document points to the first
5G version, Release 16.
* Specifies how EAP and EAP-AKA' use identifiers in 5G. Additional
identifiers are introduced in 5G, and for interoperability, it is
necessary that the right identifiers are used as inputs in the key
derivation. In addition, for identity privacy it is important
that when privacy-friendly identifiers in 5G are used, no
trackable, permanent identifiers are passed in EAP-AKA', either.
* Specifies session identifiers and other exported parameters, as
those were not specified in [RFC5448] despite requirements set
forward in [RFC5247] to do so. Also, while [RFC5247] specified
session identifiers for EAP-AKA, it only did so for the full
authentication case, not for the case of fast re-authentication.
* Updates the requirements on generating pseudonym usernames and
fast re-authentication identities to ensure identity privacy.
* Describes what has been learned about any vulnerabilities in AKA
or EAP-AKA'.
* Describes the privacy and pervasive monitoring considerations
related to EAP-AKA'.
* Adds summaries of the attributes.
Some of the updates are small. For instance, the reference update to
[TS-3GPP.24.302] does not change the 3GPP specification number, only
the version. But this reference is crucial for the correct
calculation of the keys that result from running the EAP-AKA' method,
so an RFC update pointing to the newest version was warranted.
Note: Any further updates in 3GPP specifications that affect,
for instance, key derivation is something that EAP-AKA'
implementations need to take into account. Upon such updates,
there will be a need to update both this specification and the
implementations.
It is an explicit non-goal of this specification to include any other
technical modifications, addition of new features, or other changes.
The EAP-AKA' base protocol is stable and needs to stay that way. If
there are any extensions or variants, those need to be proposed as
standalone extensions or even as different authentication methods.
The rest of this specification is structured as follows. Section 3
defines the EAP-AKA' method. Section 4 adds support to EAP-AKA to
prevent bidding down attacks from EAP-AKA'. Section 5 specifies
requirements regarding the use of peer identities, including how 5G
identifiers are used in the EAP-AKA' context. Section 6 specifies
which parameters EAP-AKA' exports out of the method. Section 7
explains the security differences between EAP-AKA and EAP-AKA'.
Section 8 describes the IANA considerations, and Appendix A and
Appendix B explain the updates to RFC 5448 (EAP-AKA') and RFC 4187
(EAP-AKA) that have been made in this specification. Appendix C
explains some of the design rationale for creating EAP-AKA'.
Finally, Appendix D provides test vectors.
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. EAP-AKA'
EAP-AKA' is an EAP method that follows the EAP-AKA specification
[RFC4187] in all respects except the following:
* It uses the Type code 0x32, not 0x17 (which is used by EAP-AKA).
* It carries the AT_KDF_INPUT attribute, as defined in Section 3.1,
to ensure that both the peer and server know the name of the
access network.
* It supports key derivation function negotiation via the AT_KDF
attribute (Section 3.2) to allow for future extensions.
* It calculates keys as defined in Section 3.3, not as defined in
EAP-AKA.
* It employs SHA-256 / HMAC-SHA-256 [FIPS.180-4], not SHA-1 / HMAC-
SHA-1 [RFC2104] (see Section 3.4).
Figure 1 shows an example of the authentication process. Each
message AKA'-Challenge and so on represents the corresponding message
from EAP-AKA, but with the EAP-AKA' Type code. The definition of
these messages, along with the definition of attributes AT_RAND,
AT_AUTN, AT_MAC, and AT_RES can be found in [RFC4187].
Peer Server
| EAP-Request/Identity |
|<-------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| EAP-Response/Identity |
| (Includes user's Network Access Identifier, NAI) |
|------------------------------------------------------->|
| +--------------------------------------------------+
| | Server determines the network name and ensures |
| | that the given access network is authorized to |
| | use the claimed name. The server then runs the |
| | AKA' algorithms generating RAND and AUTN, and |
| | derives session keys from CK' and IK'. RAND and |
| | AUTN are sent as AT_RAND and AT_AUTN attributes, |
| | whereas the network name is transported in the |
| | AT_KDF_INPUT attribute. AT_KDF signals the used |
| | key derivation function. The session keys are |
| | used in creating the AT_MAC attribute. |
| +--------------------------------------------------+
| EAP-Request/AKA'-Challenge |
| (AT_RAND, AT_AUTN, AT_KDF, AT_KDF_INPUT, AT_MAC)|
|<-------------------------------------------------------|
+------------------------------------------------------+ |
| The peer determines what the network name should be, | |
| based on, e.g., what access technology it is using. | |
| The peer also retrieves the network name sent by | |
| the network from the AT_KDF_INPUT attribute. The | |
| two names are compared for discrepancies, and if | |
| necessary, the authentication is aborted. Otherwise,| |
| the network name from AT_KDF_INPUT attribute is | |
| used in running the AKA' algorithms, verifying AUTN | |
| from AT_AUTN and MAC from AT_MAC attributes. The | |
| peer then generates RES. The peer also derives | |
| session keys from CK'/IK'. The AT_RES and AT_MAC | |
| attributes are constructed. | |
+------------------------------------------------------+ |
| EAP-Response/AKA'-Challenge |
| (AT_RES, AT_MAC) |
|------------------------------------------------------->|
| +--------------------------------------------------+
| | Server checks the RES and MAC values received |
| | in AT_RES and AT_MAC, respectively. Success |
| | requires both to be found correct. |
| +--------------------------------------------------+
| EAP-Success |
|<-------------------------------------------------------|
Figure 1: EAP-AKA' Authentication Process
EAP-AKA' can operate on the same credentials as EAP-AKA and employ
the same identities. However, EAP-AKA' employs different leading
characters than EAP-AKA for the conventions given in Section 4.1.1 of
[RFC4187] for usernames based on International Mobile Subscriber
Identifier (IMSI). For 4G networks, EAP-AKA' MUST use the leading
character "6" (ASCII 36 hexadecimal) instead of "0" for IMSI-based
permanent usernames. For 5G networks, the leading character "6" is
not used for IMSI-based permanent usernames. Identifier usage in 5G
is specified in Section 5.3. All other usage and processing of the
leading characters, usernames, and identities is as defined by EAP-
AKA [RFC4187]. For instance, the pseudonym and fast re-
authentication usernames need to be constructed so that the server
can recognize them. As an example, a pseudonym could begin with a
leading "7" character (ASCII 37 hexadecimal) and a fast re-
authentication username could begin with "8" (ASCII 38 hexadecimal).
Note that a server that implements only EAP-AKA may not recognize
these leading characters. According to Section 4.1.4 of [RFC4187],
such a server will re-request the identity via the EAP-Request/AKA-
Identity message, making obvious to the peer that EAP-AKA and
associated identity are expected.
3.1. AT_KDF_INPUT
The format of the AT_KDF_INPUT attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_KDF_INPUT | Length | Actual Network Name Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Network Name .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The fields are as follows:
AT_KDF_INPUT
This is set to 23.
Length
The length of the attribute, calculated as defined in [RFC4187],
Section 8.1.
Actual Network Name Length
This is a 2-byte actual length field, needed due to the
requirement that the previous field is expressed in multiples of 4
bytes per the usual EAP-AKA rules. The Actual Network Name Length
field provides the length of the network name in bytes.
Network Name
This field contains the network name of the access network for
which the authentication is being performed. The name does not
include any terminating null characters. Because the length of
the entire attribute must be a multiple of 4 bytes, the sender
pads the name with 1, 2, or 3 bytes of all zero bits when
necessary.
Only the server sends the AT_KDF_INPUT attribute. The value is sent
as specified in [TS-3GPP.24.302] for both non-3GPP access networks
and for 5G access networks. Per [TS-3GPP.33.402], the server always
verifies the authorization of a given access network to use a
particular name before sending it to the peer over EAP-AKA'. The
value of the AT_KDF_INPUT attribute from the server MUST be non-
empty, with a greater than zero length in the Actual Network Name
Length field. If the AT_KDF_INPUT attribute is empty, the peer
behaves as if AUTN had been incorrect and authentication fails. See
Section 3 and Figure 3 of [RFC4187] for an overview of how
authentication failures are handled.
In addition, the peer MAY check the received value against its own
understanding of the network name. Upon detecting a discrepancy, the
peer either warns the user and continues, or fails the authentication
process. More specifically, the peer SHOULD have a configurable
policy that it can follow under these circumstances. If the policy
indicates that it can continue, the peer SHOULD log a warning message
or display it to the user. If the peer chooses to proceed, it MUST
use the network name as received in the AT_KDF_INPUT attribute. If
the policy indicates that the authentication should fail, the peer
behaves as if AUTN had been incorrect and authentication fails.
The Network Name field contains a UTF-8 string. This string MUST be
constructed as specified in [TS-3GPP.24.302] for "Access Network
Identity". The string is structured as fields separated by colons
(:). The algorithms and mechanisms to construct the identity string
depend on the used access technology.
On the network side, the network name construction is a configuration
issue in an access network and an authorization check in the
authentication server. On the peer, the network name is constructed
based on the local observations. For instance, the peer knows which
access technology it is using on the link, it can see information in
a link-layer beacon, and so on. The construction rules specify how
this information maps to an access network name. Typically, the
network name consists of the name of the access technology or the
name of the access technology followed by some operator identifier
that was advertised in a link-layer beacon. In all cases,
[TS-3GPP.24.302] is the normative specification for the construction
in both the network and peer side. If the peer policy allows running
EAP-AKA' over an access technology for which that specification does
not provide network name construction rules, the peer SHOULD rely
only on the information from the AT_KDF_INPUT attribute and not
perform a comparison.
If a comparison of the locally determined network name and the one
received over EAP-AKA' is performed on the peer, it MUST be done as
follows. First, each name is broken down to the fields separated by
colons. If one of the names has more colons and fields than the
other one, the additional fields are ignored. The remaining
sequences of fields are compared, and they match only if they are
equal character by character. This algorithm allows a prefix match
where the peer would be able to match "", "FOO", and "FOO:BAR"
against the value "FOO:BAR" received from the server. This
capability is important in order to allow possible updates to the
specifications that dictate how the network names are constructed.
For instance, if a peer knows that it is running on access technology
"FOO", it can use the string "FOO" even if the server uses an
additional, more accurate description, e.g., "FOO:BAR", that contains
more information.
The allocation procedures in [TS-3GPP.24.302] ensure that conflicts
potentially arising from using the same name in different types of
networks are avoided. The specification also has detailed rules
about how a client can determine these based on information available
to the client, such as the type of protocol used to attach to the
network, beacons sent out by the network, and so on. Information
that the client cannot directly observe (such as the type or version
of the home network) is not used by this algorithm.
The AT_KDF_INPUT attribute MUST be sent and processed as explained
above when AT_KDF attribute has the value 1. Future definitions of
new AT_KDF values MUST define how this attribute is sent and
processed.
3.2. AT_KDF
AT_KDF is an attribute that the server uses to reference a specific
key derivation function. It offers a negotiation capability that can
be useful for future evolution of the key derivation functions.
The format of the AT_KDF attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_KDF | Length | Key Derivation Function |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The fields are as follows:
AT_KDF
This is set to 24.
Length
The length of the attribute, calculated as defined in [RFC4187],
Section 8.1. For AT_KDF, the Length field MUST be set to 1.
Key Derivation Function
An enumerated value representing the key derivation function that
the server (or peer) wishes to use. Value 1 represents the
default key derivation function for EAP-AKA', i.e., employing CK'
and IK' as defined in Section 3.3.
Servers MUST send one or more AT_KDF attributes in the EAP-Request/
AKA'-Challenge message. These attributes represent the desired
functions ordered by preference, the most preferred function being
the first attribute.
Upon receiving a set of these attributes, if the peer supports and is
willing to use the key derivation function indicated by the first
attribute, the function is taken into use without any further
negotiation. However, if the peer does not support this function or
is unwilling to use it, it does not process the received EAP-Request/
AKA'-Challenge in any way except by responding with the EAP-Response/
AKA'-Challenge message that contains only one attribute, AT_KDF with
the value set to the selected alternative. If there is no suitable
alternative, the peer behaves as if AUTN had been incorrect and
authentication fails (see Figure 3 of [RFC4187]). The peer fails the
authentication also if there are any duplicate values within the list
of AT_KDF attributes (except where the duplication is due to a
request to change the key derivation function; see below for further
information).
Upon receiving an EAP-Response/AKA'-Challenge with AT_KDF from the
peer, the server checks that the suggested AT_KDF value was one of
the alternatives in its offer. The first AT_KDF value in the message
from the server is not a valid alternative since the peer should have
accepted it without further negotiation. If the peer has replied
with the first AT_KDF value, the server behaves as if AT_MAC of the
response had been incorrect and fails the authentication. For an
overview of the failed authentication process in the server side, see
Section 3 and Figure 2 of [RFC4187]. Otherwise, the server re-sends
the EAP-Response/AKA'-Challenge message, but adds the selected
alternative to the beginning of the list of AT_KDF attributes and
retains the entire list following it. Note that this means that the
selected alternative appears twice in the set of AT_KDF values.
Responding to the peer's request to change the key derivation
function is the only legal situation where such duplication may
occur.
When the peer receives the new EAP-Request/AKA'-Challenge message, it
MUST check that the requested change, and only the requested change,
occurred in the list of AT_KDF attributes. If so, it continues with
processing the received EAP-Request/AKA'-Challenge as specified in
[RFC4187] and Section 3.1 of this document. If not, it behaves as if
AT_MAC had been incorrect and fails the authentication. If the peer
receives multiple EAP-Request/AKA'-Challenge messages with differing
AT_KDF attributes without having requested negotiation, the peer MUST
behave as if AT_MAC had been incorrect and fail the authentication.
Note that the peer may also request sequence number resynchronization
[RFC4187]. This happens after AT_KDF negotiation has already
completed. That is, the EAP-Request/AKA'-Challenge and, possibly,
the EAP-Response/AKA'-Challenge messages are exchanged first to
determine a mutually acceptable key derivation function, and only
then is the possible AKA'-Synchronization-Failure message sent. The
AKA'-Synchronization-Failure message is sent as a response to the
newly received EAP-Request/AKA'-Challenge, which is the last message
of the AT_KDF negotiation. Note that if the first proposed KDF is
acceptable, then the first EAP-Request/AKA'-Challenge message is also
the last message. The AKA'-Synchronization-Failure message MUST
contain the AUTS parameter as specified in [RFC4187] and a copy the
AT_KDF attributes as they appeared in the last message of the AT_KDF
negotiation. If the AT_KDF attributes are found to differ from their
earlier values, the peer and server MUST behave as if AT_MAC had been
incorrect and fail the authentication.
3.3. Key Derivation
Both the peer and server MUST derive the keys as follows.
AT_KDF parameter has the value 1
In this case, MK is derived and used as follows:
MK = PRF'(IK'|CK',"EAP-AKA'"|Identity)
K_encr = MK[0..127]
K_aut = MK[128..383]
K_re = MK[384..639]
MSK = MK[640..1151]
EMSK = MK[1152..1663]
Here [n..m] denotes the substring from bit n to m, including bits
n and m. PRF' is a new pseudorandom function specified in
Section 3.4. The first 1664 bits from its output are used for
K_encr (encryption key, 128 bits), K_aut (authentication key, 256
bits), K_re (re-authentication key, 256 bits), MSK (Master Session
Key, 512 bits), and EMSK (Extended Master Session Key, 512 bits).
These keys are used by the subsequent EAP-AKA' process. K_encr is
used by the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute, and K_aut by the AT_MAC
attribute. K_re is used later in this section. MSK and EMSK are
outputs from a successful EAP method run [RFC3748].
IK' and CK' are derived as specified in [TS-3GPP.33.402]. The
functions that derive IK' and CK' take the following parameters:
CK and IK produced by the AKA algorithm, and value of the Network
Name field comes from the AT_KDF_INPUT attribute (without length
or padding).
The value "EAP-AKA'" is an eight-characters-long ASCII string. It
is used as is, without any trailing NUL characters.
Identity is the peer identity as specified in Section 7 of
[RFC4187] and in Section 5.3.2 of in this document for the 5G
cases.
When the server creates an AKA challenge and corresponding AUTN,
CK, CK', IK, and IK' values, it MUST set the Authentication
Management Field (AMF) separation bit to 1 in the AKA algorithm
[TS-3GPP.33.102]. Similarly, the peer MUST check that the AMF
separation bit is set to 1. If the bit is not set to 1, the peer
behaves as if the AUTN had been incorrect and fails the
authentication.
On fast re-authentication, the following keys are calculated:
MK = PRF'(K_re,"EAP-AKA' re-auth"|Identity|counter|NONCE_S)
MSK = MK[0..511]
EMSK = MK[512..1023]
MSK and EMSK are the resulting 512-bit keys, taking the first 1024
bits from the result of PRF'. Note that K_encr and K_aut are not
re-derived on fast re-authentication. K_re is the re-
authentication key from the preceding full authentication and
stays unchanged over any fast re-authentication(s) that may happen
based on it. The value "EAP-AKA' re-auth" is a sixteen-
characters-long ASCII string, again represented without any
trailing NUL characters. Identity is the fast re-authentication
identity, counter is the value from the AT_COUNTER attribute,
NONCE_S is the nonce value from the AT_NONCE_S attribute, all as
specified in Section 7 of [RFC4187]. To prevent the use of
compromised keys in other places, it is forbidden to change the
network name when going from the full to the fast re-
authentication process. The peer SHOULD NOT attempt fast re-
authentication when it knows that the network name in the current
access network is different from the one in the initial, full
authentication. Upon seeing a re-authentication request with a
changed network name, the server SHOULD behave as if the re-
authentication identifier had been unrecognized, and fall back to
full authentication. The server observes the change in the name
by comparing where the fast re-authentication and full
authentication EAP transactions were received at the
Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) protocol
level.
AT_KDF has any other value
Future variations of key derivation functions may be defined, and
they will be represented by new values of AT_KDF. If the peer
does not recognize the value, it cannot calculate the keys and
behaves as explained in Section 3.2.
AT_KDF is missing
The peer behaves as if the AUTN had been incorrect and MUST fail
the authentication.
If the peer supports a given key derivation function but is unwilling
to perform it for policy reasons, it refuses to calculate the keys
and behaves as explained in Section 3.2.
3.4. Hash Functions
EAP-AKA' uses SHA-256 / HMAC-SHA-256, not SHA-1 / HMAC-SHA-1 (see
[FIPS.180-4] and [RFC2104]) as in EAP-AKA. This requires a change to
the pseudorandom function (PRF) as well as the AT_MAC and
AT_CHECKCODE attributes.
3.4.1. PRF'
The PRF' construction is the same one IKEv2 uses (see Section 2.13 of
[RFC7296]; the definition of this function has not changed since
[RFC4306], which was referenced by [RFC5448]). The function takes
two arguments. K is a 256-bit value and S is a byte string of
arbitrary length. PRF' is defined as follows:
PRF'(K,S) = T1 | T2 | T3 | T4 | ...
where:
T1 = HMAC-SHA-256 (K, S | 0x01)
T2 = HMAC-SHA-256 (K, T1 | S | 0x02)
T3 = HMAC-SHA-256 (K, T2 | S | 0x03)
T4 = HMAC-SHA-256 (K, T3 | S | 0x04)
...
PRF' produces as many bits of output as is needed. HMAC-SHA-256 is
the application of HMAC [RFC2104] to SHA-256.
3.4.2. AT_MAC
When used within EAP-AKA', the AT_MAC attribute is changed as
follows. The MAC algorithm is HMAC-SHA-256-128, a keyed hash value.
The HMAC-SHA-256-128 value is obtained from the 32-byte HMAC-SHA-256
value by truncating the output to the first 16 bytes. Hence, the
length of the MAC is 16 bytes.
Otherwise, the use of AT_MAC in EAP-AKA' follows Section 10.15 of
[RFC4187].
3.4.3. AT_CHECKCODE
When used within EAP-AKA', the AT_CHECKCODE attribute is changed as
follows. First, a 32-byte value is needed to accommodate a 256-bit
hash output:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_CHECKCODE | Length | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Checkcode (0 or 32 bytes) |
| |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Second, the checkcode is a hash value, calculated with SHA-256
[FIPS.180-4], over the data specified in Section 10.13 of [RFC4187].
3.5. Summary of Attributes for EAP-AKA'
Table 1 identifies which attributes may be found in which kinds of
messages, and in what quantity.
Messages are denoted with numbers as follows:
1 EAP-Request/AKA-Identity
2 EAP-Response/AKA-Identity
3 EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge
4 EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge
5 EAP-Request/AKA-Notification
6 EAP-Response/AKA-Notification
7 EAP-Response/AKA-Client-Error
8 EAP-Request/AKA-Reauthentication
9 EAP-Response/AKA-Reauthentication
10 EAP-Response/AKA-Authentication-Reject
11 EAP-Response/AKA-Synchronization-Failure
The column denoted with "E" indicates whether the attribute is a
nested attribute that MUST be included within AT_ENCR_DATA.
In addition, the numbered columns indicate the quantity of the
attribute within the message as follows:
"0" Indicates that the attribute MUST NOT be included in the
message.
"1" Indicates that the attribute MUST be included in the message.
"0-1" Indicates that the attribute is sometimes included in the
message
"0+" Indicates that zero or more copies of the attribute MAY be
included in the message.
"1+" Indicates that there MUST be at least one attribute in the
message but more than one MAY be included in the message.
"0*" Indicates that the attribute is not included in the message
in cases specified in this document, but MAY be included in
the future versions of the protocol.
The attribute table is shown below. The table is largely the same as
in the EAP-AKA attribute table ([RFC4187], Section 10.1), but changes
how many times AT_MAC may appear in an EAP-Response/AKA'-Challenge
message as it does not appear there when AT_KDF has to be sent from
the peer to the server. The table also adds the AT_KDF and
AT_KDF_INPUT attributes.
+======================+===+===+===+===+===+===+=+====+=====+==+==+=+
| Attribute |1 |2 |3 |4 |5 |6 |7|8 | 9 |10|11|E|
+======================+===+===+===+===+===+===+=+====+=====+==+==+=+
| AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ |0-1|0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0|0 | 0 |0 |0 |N|
+----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+----+-----+--+--+-+
| AT_ANY_ID_REQ |0-1|0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0|0 | 0 |0 |0 |N|
+----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+----+-----+--+--+-+
| AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ |0-1|0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0|0 | 0 |0 |0 |N|
+----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+----+-----+--+--+-+
| AT_IDENTITY |0 |0-1|0 |0 |0 |0 |0|0 | 0 |0 |0 |N|
+----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+----+-----+--+--+-+
| AT_RAND |0 |0 |1 |0 |0 |0 |0|0 | 0 |0 |0 |N|
+----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+----+-----+--+--+-+
| AT_AUTN |0 |0 |1 |0 |0 |0 |0|0 | 0 |0 |0 |N|
+----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+----+-----+--+--+-+
| AT_RES |0 |0 |0 |1 |0 |0 |0|0 | 0 |0 |0 |N|
+----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+----+-----+--+--+-+
| AT_AUTS |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0|0 | 0 |0 |1 |N|
+----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+----+-----+--+--+-+
| AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM |0 |0 |0-1|0 |0 |0 |0|0 | 0 |0 |0 |Y|
+----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+----+-----+--+--+-+
| AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID |0 |0 |0-1|0 |0 |0 |0|0-1 | 0 |0 |0 |Y|
+----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+----+-----+--+--+-+
| AT_IV |0 |0 |0-1|0* |0-1|0-1|0|1 | 1 |0 |0 |N|
+----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+----+-----+--+--+-+
| AT_ENCR_DATA |0 |0 |0-1|0* |0-1|0-1|0|1 | 1 |0 |0 |N|
+----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+----+-----+--+--+-+
| AT_PADDING |0 |0 |0-1|0* |0-1|0-1|0|0-1 | 0-1 |0 |0 |Y|
+----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+----+-----+--+--+-+
| AT_CHECKCODE |0 |0 |0-1|0-1|0 |0 |0|0-1 | 0-1 |0 |0 |N|
+----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+----+-----+--+--+-+
| AT_RESULT_IND |0 |0 |0-1|0-1|0 |0 |0|0-1 | 0-1 |0 |0 |N|
+----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+----+-----+--+--+-+
| AT_MAC |0 |0 |1 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0|1 | 1 |0 |0 |N|
+----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+----+-----+--+--+-+
| AT_COUNTER |0 |0 |0 |0 |0-1|0-1|0|1 | 1 |0 |0 |Y|
+----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+----+-----+--+--+-+
| AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0|0 | 0-1 |0 |0 |Y|
+----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+----+-----+--+--+-+
| AT_NONCE_S |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0|1 | 0 |0 |0 |Y|
+----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+----+-----+--+--+-+
| AT_NOTIFICATION |0 |0 |0 |0 |1 |0 |0|0 | 0 |0 |0 |N|
+----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+----+-----+--+--+-+
| AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |1|0 | 0 |0 |0 |N|
+----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+----+-----+--+--+-+
| AT_KDF |0 |0 |1+ |0+ |0 |0 |0|0 | 0 |0 |1+|N|
+----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+----+-----+--+--+-+
| AT_KDF_INPUT |0 |0 |1 |0 |0 |0 |0|0 | 0 |0 |0 |N|
+----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+----+-----+--+--+-+
Table 1: The Attribute Table
4. Bidding Down Prevention for EAP-AKA
As discussed in [RFC3748], negotiation of methods within EAP is
insecure. That is, a man-in-the-middle attacker may force the
endpoints to use a method that is not the strongest that they both
support. This is a problem, as we expect EAP-AKA and EAP-AKA' to be
negotiated via EAP.
In order to prevent such attacks, this RFC specifies a mechanism for
EAP-AKA that allows the endpoints to securely discover the
capabilities of each other. This mechanism comes in the form of the
AT_BIDDING attribute. This allows both endpoints to communicate
their desire and support for EAP-AKA' when exchanging EAP-AKA
messages. This attribute is not included in EAP-AKA' messages. It
is only included in EAP-AKA messages, which are protected with the
AT_MAC attribute. This approach is based on the assumption that EAP-
AKA' is always preferable (see Section 7). If during the EAP-AKA
authentication process it is discovered that both endpoints would
have been able to use EAP-AKA', the authentication process SHOULD be
aborted, as a bidding down attack may have happened.
The format of the AT_BIDDING attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_BIDDING | Length |D| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The fields are as follows:
AT_BIDDING
This is set to 136.
Length
The length of the attribute, calculated as defined in [RFC4187],
Section 8.1. For AT_BIDDING, the Length MUST be set to 1.
D
This bit is set to 1 if the sender supports EAP-AKA', is willing
to use it, and prefers it over EAP-AKA. Otherwise, it should be
set to zero.
Reserved
This field MUST be set to zero when sent and ignored on receipt.
The server sends this attribute in the EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge
message. If the peer supports EAP-AKA', it compares the received
value to its own capabilities. If it turns out that both the server
and peer would have been able to use EAP-AKA' and preferred it over
EAP-AKA, the peer behaves as if AUTN had been incorrect and fails the
authentication (see Figure 3 of [RFC4187]). A peer not supporting
EAP-AKA' will simply ignore this attribute. In all cases, the
attribute is protected by the integrity mechanisms of EAP-AKA, so it
cannot be removed by a man-in-the-middle attacker.
Note that we assume (Section 7) that EAP-AKA' is always stronger than
EAP-AKA. As a result, this specification does not provide protection
against bidding "down" attacks in the other direction, i.e.,
attackers forcing the endpoints to use EAP-AKA'.
4.1. Summary of Attributes for EAP-AKA
The appearance of the AT_BIDDING attribute in EAP-AKA exchanges is
shown below, using the notation from Section 3.5:
+============+===+===+===+===+===+===+===+===+===+====+====+===+
| Attribute | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | E |
+============+===+===+===+===+===+===+===+===+===+====+====+===+
| AT_BIDDING | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | N |
+------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+
Table 2: AT_BIDDING Attribute Appearance
5. Peer Identities
EAP-AKA' peer identities are as specified in [RFC4187], Section 4.1,
with the addition of some requirements specified in this section.
EAP-AKA' includes optional identity privacy support that can be used
to hide the cleartext permanent identity and thereby make the
subscriber's EAP exchanges untraceable to eavesdroppers. EAP-AKA'
can also use the privacy-friendly identifiers specified for 5G
networks.
The permanent identity is usually based on the IMSI. Exposing the
IMSI is undesirable because, as a permanent identity, it is easily
trackable. In addition, since IMSIs may be used in other contexts as
well, there would be additional opportunities for such tracking.
In EAP-AKA', identity privacy is based on temporary usernames or
pseudonym usernames. These are similar to, but separate from, the
Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identities (TMSI) that are used on
cellular networks.
5.1. Username Types in EAP-AKA' Identities
Section 4.1.1.3 of [RFC4187] specifies that there are three types of
usernames: permanent, pseudonym, and fast re-authentication
usernames. This specification extends this definition as follows.
There are four types of usernames:
(1) Regular usernames. These are external names given to EAP-AKA'
peers. The regular usernames are further subdivided into to
categories:
(a) Permanent usernames, for instance, IMSI-based usernames.
(b) Privacy-friendly temporary usernames, for instance, 5G GUTI
(5G Globally Unique Temporary Identifier) or 5G privacy
identifiers (see Section 5.3.2) such as SUCI (Subscription
Concealed Identifier).
(2) EAP-AKA' pseudonym usernames. For example,
2s7ah6n9q@example.com might be a valid pseudonym identity. In
this example, 2s7ah6n9q is the pseudonym username.
(3) EAP-AKA' fast re-authentication usernames. For example,
43953754@example.com might be a valid fast re-authentication
identity and 43953754 the fast re-authentication username.
The permanent, privacy-friendly temporary, and pseudonym usernames
are only used with full authentication, and fast re-authentication
usernames only with fast re-authentication. Unlike permanent
usernames and pseudonym usernames, privacy-friendly temporary
usernames and fast re-authentication usernames are one-time
identifiers, which are not reused across EAP exchanges.
5.2. Generating Pseudonyms and Fast Re-Authentication Identities
This section provides some additional guidance to implementations for
producing secure pseudonyms and fast re-authentication identities.
It does not impact backwards compatibility because each server
consumes only the identities that it generates itself. However,
adherence to the guidance will provide better security.
As specified by [RFC4187], Section 4.1.1.7, pseudonym usernames and
fast re-authentication identities are generated by the EAP server in
an implementation-dependent manner. RFC 4187 provides some general
requirements on how these identities are transported, how they map to
the NAI syntax, how they are distinguished from each other, and so
on.
However, to enhance privacy, some additional requirements need to be
applied.
The pseudonym usernames and fast re-authentication identities MUST be
generated in a cryptographically secure way so that it is
computationally infeasible for an attacker to differentiate two
identities belonging to the same user from two identities belonging
to different users. This can be achieved, for instance, by using
random or pseudorandom identifiers such as random byte strings or
ciphertexts. See also [RFC4086] for guidance on random number
generation.
Note that the pseudonym and fast re-authentication usernames also
MUST NOT include substrings that can be used to relate the username
to a particular entity or a particular permanent identity. For
instance, the usernames cannot include any subscriber-identifying
part of an IMSI or other permanent identifier. Similarly, no part of
the username can be formed by a fixed mapping that stays the same
across multiple different pseudonyms or fast re-authentication
identities for the same subscriber.
When the identifier used to identify a subscriber in an EAP-AKA'
authentication exchange is a privacy-friendly identifier that is used
only once, the EAP-AKA' peer MUST NOT use a pseudonym provided in
that authentication exchange in subsequent exchanges more than once.
To ensure that this does not happen, the EAP-AKA' server MAY decline
to provide a pseudonym in such authentication exchanges. An
important case where such privacy-friendly identifiers are used is in
5G networks (see Section 5.3).
5.3. Identifier Usage in 5G
In EAP-AKA', the peer identity may be communicated to the server in
one of three ways:
* As a part of link-layer establishment procedures, externally to
EAP.
* With the EAP-Response/Identity message in the beginning of the EAP
exchange, but before the selection of EAP-AKA'.
* Transmitted from the peer to the server using EAP-AKA' messages
instead of EAP-Response/Identity. In this case, the server
includes an identity-requesting attribute (AT_ANY_ID_REQ,
AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ, or AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ) in the EAP-Request/
AKA-Identity message, and the peer includes the AT_IDENTITY
attribute, which contains the peer's identity, in the EAP-
Response/AKA-Identity message.
The identity carried above may be a permanent identity, privacy-
friendly identity, pseudonym identity, or fast re-authentication
identity as defined in Section 5.1.
5G supports the concept of privacy identifiers, and it is important
for interoperability that the right type of identifier is used.
5G defines the SUbscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI) and
SUbscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI) [TS-3GPP.23.501]
[TS-3GPP.33.501] [TS-3GPP.23.003]. SUPI is globally unique and
allocated to each subscriber. However, it is only used internally in
the 5G network and is privacy sensitive. The SUCI is a privacy-
preserving identifier containing the concealed SUPI, using public key
cryptography to encrypt the SUPI.
Given the choice between these two types of identifiers, EAP-AKA'
ensures interoperability as follows:
* Where identifiers are used within EAP-AKA' (such as key
derivation) determine the exact values of the identity to be used,
to avoid ambiguity (see Section 5.3.1).
* Where identifiers are carried within EAP-AKA' packets (such as in
the AT_IDENTITY attribute) determine which identifiers should be
filled in (see Section 5.3.2).
In 5G, the normal mode of operation is that identifiers are only
transmitted outside EAP. However, in a system involving terminals
from many generations and several connectivity options via 5G and
other mechanisms, implementations and the EAP-AKA' specification need
to prepare for many different situations, including sometimes having
to communicate identities within EAP.
The following sections clarify which identifiers are used and how.
5.3.1. Key Derivation
In EAP-AKA', the peer identity is used in the key derivation formula
found in Section 3.3.
The identity needs to be represented in exactly the correct format
for the key derivation formula to produce correct results.
If the AT_KDF_INPUT parameter contains the prefix "5G:", the AT_KDF
parameter has the value 1, and this authentication is not a fast re-
authentication, then the peer identity used in the key derivation
MUST be as specified in Annex F.3 of [TS-3GPP.33.501] and Clause 2.2
of [TS-3GPP.23.003]. This is in contrast to [RFC5448], which uses
the identity as communicated in EAP and represented as a NAI. Also,
in contrast to [RFC5448], in 5G EAP-AKA' does not use the "0" nor the
"6" prefix in front of the identifier.
For an example of the format of the identity, see Clause 2.2 of
[TS-3GPP.23.003].
In all other cases, the following applies:
The identity used in the key derivation formula MUST be exactly
the one sent in the EAP-AKA' AT_IDENTITY attribute, if one was
sent, regardless of the kind of identity that it may have been.
If no AT_IDENTITY was sent, the identity MUST be exactly the
one sent in the generic EAP Identity exchange, if one was made.
If no identity was communicated inside EAP, then the identity
is the one communicated outside EAP in link-layer messaging.
In this case, the used identity MUST be the identity most
recently communicated by the peer to the network, again
regardless of what type of identity it may have been.
5.3.2. EAP Identity Response and EAP-AKA' AT_IDENTITY Attribute
The EAP authentication option is only available in 5G when the new 5G
core network is also in use. However, in other networks, an EAP-AKA'
peer may be connecting to other types of networks and existing
equipment.
When the EAP server is in a 5G network, the 5G procedures for EAP-
AKA' apply. [TS-3GPP.33.501] specifies when the EAP server is in a
5G network.
Note: Currently, the following conditions are specified: when
the EAP peer uses the 5G Non-Access Stratum (NAS) protocol
[TS-3GPP.24.501] or when the EAP peer attaches to a network
that advertises 5G connectivity without NAS [TS-3GPP.23.501].
Possible future conditions may also be specified by 3GPP.
When the 5G procedures for EAP-AKA' apply, EAP identity exchanges are
generally not used as the identity is already made available on
previous link-layer exchanges.
In this situation, the EAP Identity Response and EAP-AKA' AT_IDENTITY
attribute are handled as specified in Annex F.2 of [TS-3GPP.33.501].
When used in EAP-AKA', the format of the SUCI MUST be as specified in
[TS-3GPP.23.003], Section 28.7.3, with the semantics defined in
[TS-3GPP.23.003], Section 2.2B. Also, in contrast to [RFC5448], in
5G EAP-AKA' does not use the "0" nor the "6" prefix in front of the
identifier.
For an example of an IMSI in NAI format, see [TS-3GPP.23.003],
Section 28.7.3.
Otherwise, the peer SHOULD employ an IMSI, SUPI, or NAI [RFC7542] as
it is configured to use.
6. Exported Parameters
When not using fast re-authentication, the EAP-AKA' Session-Id is the
concatenation of the EAP-AKA' Type value (0x32, one byte) with the
contents of the RAND field from the AT_RAND attribute followed by the
contents of the AUTN field in the AT_AUTN attribute:
Session-Id = 0x32 || RAND || AUTN
When using fast re-authentication, the EAP-AKA' Session-Id is the
concatenation of the EAP-AKA' Type value (0x32) with the contents of
the NONCE_S field from the AT_NONCE_S attribute followed by the
contents of the MAC field from the AT_MAC attribute from the EAP-
Request/AKA-Reauthentication:
Session-Id = 0x32 || NONCE_S || MAC
The Peer-Id is the contents of the Identity field from the
AT_IDENTITY attribute, using only the Actual Identity Length bytes
from the beginning. Note that the contents are used as they are
transmitted, regardless of whether the transmitted identity was a
permanent, pseudonym, or fast EAP re-authentication identity. If no
AT_IDENTITY attribute was exchanged, the exported Peer-Id is the
identity provided from the EAP Identity Response packet. If no EAP
Identity Response was provided either, the exported Peer-Id is the
null string (zero length).
The Server-Id is the null string (zero length).
7. Security Considerations
A summary of the security properties of EAP-AKA' follows. These
properties are very similar to those in EAP-AKA. We assume that HMAC
SHA-256 is at least as secure as HMAC SHA-1 (see also [RFC6194]).
This is called the SHA-256 assumption in the remainder of this
section. Under this assumption, EAP-AKA' is at least as secure as
EAP-AKA.
If the AT_KDF attribute has value 1, then the security properties of
EAP-AKA' are as follows:
Protected ciphersuite negotiation
EAP-AKA' has no ciphersuite negotiation mechanisms. It does have
a negotiation mechanism for selecting the key derivation
functions. This mechanism is secure against bidding down attacks
from EAP-AKA' to EAP-AKA. The negotiation mechanism allows
changing the offered key derivation function, but the change is
visible in the final EAP-Request/AKA'-Challenge message that the
server sends to the peer. This message is authenticated via the
AT_MAC attribute, and carries both the chosen alternative and the
initially offered list. The peer refuses to accept a change it
did not initiate. As a result, both parties are aware that a
change is being made and what the original offer was.
Per assumptions in Section 4, there is no protection against
bidding down attacks from EAP-AKA to EAP-AKA' should EAP-AKA'
somehow be considered less secure some day than EAP-AKA. Such
protection was not provided in RFC 5448 implementations and
consequently neither does this specification provide it. If such
support is needed, it would have to be added as a separate new
feature.
In general, it is expected that the current negotiation
capabilities in EAP-AKA' are sufficient for some types of
extensions, including adding Perfect Forward Secrecy [EMU-AKA-PFS]
and perhaps others. However, some larger changes may require a
new EAP method type, which is how EAP-AKA' itself happened. One
example of such change would be the introduction of new
algorithms.
Mutual authentication
Under the SHA-256 assumption, the properties of EAP-AKA' are at
least as good as those of EAP-AKA in this respect. Refer to
[RFC4187], Section 12, for further details.
Integrity protection
Under the SHA-256 assumption, the properties of EAP-AKA' are at
least as good (most likely better) as those of EAP-AKA in this
respect. Refer to [RFC4187], Section 12, for further details.
The only difference is that a stronger hash algorithm and keyed
MAC, SHA-256 / HMAC-SHA-256, is used instead of SHA-1 / HMAC-SHA-
1.
Replay protection
Under the SHA-256 assumption, the properties of EAP-AKA' are at
least as good as those of EAP-AKA in this respect. Refer to
[RFC4187], Section 12, for further details.
Confidentiality
The properties of EAP-AKA' are exactly the same as those of EAP-
AKA in this respect. Refer to [RFC4187], Section 12, for further
details.
Key derivation
EAP-AKA' supports key derivation with an effective key strength
against brute-force attacks equal to the minimum of the length of
the derived keys and the length of the AKA base key, i.e., 128
bits or more. The key hierarchy is specified in Section 3.3.
The Transient EAP Keys used to protect EAP-AKA packets (K_encr,
K_aut, K_re), the MSK, and the EMSK are cryptographically
separate. If we make the assumption that SHA-256 behaves as a
pseudorandom function, an attacker is incapable of deriving any
non-trivial information about any of these keys based on the other
keys. An attacker also cannot calculate the pre-shared secret
from IK, CK, IK', CK', K_encr, K_aut, K_re, MSK, or EMSK by any
practically feasible means.
EAP-AKA' adds an additional layer of key derivation functions
within itself to protect against the use of compromised keys.
This is discussed further in Section 7.4.
EAP-AKA' uses a pseudorandom function modeled after the one used
in IKEv2 [RFC7296] together with SHA-256.
Key strength
See above.
Dictionary attack resistance
Under the SHA-256 assumption, the properties of EAP-AKA' are at
least as good as those of EAP-AKA in this respect. Refer to
[RFC4187], Section 12, for further details.
Fast reconnect
Under the SHA-256 assumption, the properties of EAP-AKA' are at
least as good as those of EAP-AKA in this respect. Refer to
[RFC4187], Section 12, for further details. Note that
implementations MUST prevent performing a fast reconnect across
method types.
Cryptographic binding
Note that this term refers to a very specific form of binding,
something that is performed between two layers of authentication.
It is not the same as the binding to a particular network name.
The properties of EAP-AKA' are exactly the same as those of EAP-
AKA in this respect, i.e., as it is not a tunnel method, this
property is not applicable to it. Refer to [RFC4187], Section 12,
for further details.
Session independence
The properties of EAP-AKA' are exactly the same as those of EAP-
AKA in this respect. Refer to [RFC4187], Section 12, for further
details.
Fragmentation
The properties of EAP-AKA' are exactly the same as those of EAP-
AKA in this respect. Refer to [RFC4187], Section 12, for further
details.
Channel binding
EAP-AKA', like EAP-AKA, does not provide channel bindings as
they're defined in [RFC3748] and [RFC5247]. New skippable
attributes can be used to add channel binding support in the
future, if required.
However, including the Network Name field in the AKA' algorithms
(which are also used for other purposes than EAP-AKA') provides a
form of cryptographic separation between different network names,
which resembles channel bindings. However, the network name does
not typically identify the EAP (pass-through) authenticator. See
Section 7.4 for more discussion.
7.1. Privacy
[RFC6973] suggests that the privacy considerations of IETF protocols
be documented.
The confidentiality properties of EAP-AKA' itself have been discussed
above under "Confidentiality" (Section 7).
EAP-AKA' uses several different types of identifiers to identify the
authenticating peer. It is strongly RECOMMENDED to use the privacy-
friendly temporary or hidden identifiers, i.e., the 5G GUTI or SUCI,
pseudonym usernames, and fast re-authentication usernames. The use
of permanent identifiers such as the IMSI or SUPI may lead to an
ability to track the peer and/or user associated with the peer. The
use of permanent identifiers such as the IMSI or SUPI is strongly NOT
RECOMMENDED.
As discussed in Section 5.3, when authenticating to a 5G network,
only the SUCI identifier is normally used. The use of EAP-AKA'
pseudonyms in this situation is at best limited because the SUCI
already provides a stronger mechanism. In fact, reusing the same
pseudonym multiple times will result in a tracking opportunity for
observers that see the pseudonym pass by. To avoid this, the peer
and server need to follow the guidelines given in Section 5.2.
When authenticating to a 5G network, per Section 5.3.1, both the EAP-
AKA' peer and server need to employ the permanent identifier SUPI as
an input to key derivation. However, this use of the SUPI is only
internal. As such, the SUPI need not be communicated in EAP
messages. Therefore, SUPI MUST NOT be communicated in EAP-AKA' when
authenticating to a 5G network.
While the use of SUCI in 5G networks generally provides identity
privacy, this is not true if the null-scheme encryption is used to
construct the SUCI (see [TS-3GPP.33.501], Annex C). The use of this
scheme makes the use of SUCI equivalent to the use of SUPI or IMSI.
The use of the null scheme is NOT RECOMMENDED where identity privacy
is important.
The use of fast re-authentication identities when authenticating to a
5G network does not have the same problems as the use of pseudonyms,
as long as the 5G authentication server generates the fast re-
authentication identifiers in a proper manner specified in
Section 5.2.
Outside 5G, the peer can freely choose between the use of permanent,
pseudonym, or fast re-authentication identifiers:
* A peer that has not yet performed any EAP-AKA' exchanges does not
typically have a pseudonym available. If the peer does not have a
pseudonym available, then the privacy mechanism cannot be used,
and the permanent identity will have to be sent in the clear.
The terminal SHOULD store the pseudonym in nonvolatile memory so
that it can be maintained across reboots. An active attacker that
impersonates the network may use the AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ attribute
([RFC4187], Section 4.1.2) to learn the subscriber's IMSI.
However, as discussed in [RFC4187], Section 4.1.2, the terminal
can refuse to send the cleartext permanent identity if it believes
that the network should be able to recognize the pseudonym.
* When pseudonyms and fast re-authentication identities are used,
the peer relies on the properly created identifiers by the server.
It is essential that an attacker cannot link a privacy-friendly
identifier to the user in any way or determine that two
identifiers belong to the same user as outlined in Section 5.2.
The pseudonym usernames and fast re-authentication identities MUST
NOT be used for other purposes (e.g., in other protocols).
If the peer and server cannot guarantee that SUCI can be used or that
pseudonyms will be available, generated properly, and maintained
reliably, and identity privacy is required, then additional
protection from an external security mechanism such as tunneled EAP
methods like Tunneled Transport Layer Security (TTLS) [RFC5281] or
Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP) [RFC7170] may be
used. The benefits and the security considerations of using an
external security mechanism with EAP-AKA are beyond the scope of this
document.
Finally, as with other EAP methods, even when privacy-friendly
identifiers or EAP tunneling is used, typically the domain part of an
identifier (e.g., the home operator) is visible to external parties.
7.2. Discovered Vulnerabilities
There have been no published attacks that violate the primary secrecy
or authentication properties defined for Authentication and Key
Agreement (AKA) under the originally assumed trust model. The same
is true of EAP-AKA'.
However, there have been attacks when a different trust model is in
use, with characteristics not originally provided by the design, or
when participants in the protocol leak information to outsiders on
purpose, and there have been some privacy-related attacks.
For instance, the original AKA protocol does not prevent an insider
supplying keys to a third party, e.g., as described by Mjølsnes and
Tsay in [MT2012] where a serving network lets an authentication run
succeed, but then it misuses the session keys to send traffic on the
authenticated user's behalf. This particular attack is not different
from any on-path entity (such as a router) pretending to send
traffic, but the general issue of insider attacks can be a problem,
particularly in a large group of collaborating operators.
Another class of attacks is the use of tunneling of traffic from one
place to another, e.g., as done by Zhang and Fang in [ZF2005] to
leverage security policy differences between different operator
networks, for instance. To gain something in such an attack, the
attacker needs to trick the user into believing it is in another
location. If policies between locations differ, for instance, if
payload traffic is not required to be encrypted in some location, the
attacker may trick the user into opening a vulnerability. As an
authentication mechanism, EAP-AKA' is not directly affected by most
of these attacks. EAP-AKA' network name binding can also help
alleviate some of the attacks. In any case, it is recommended that
EAP-AKA' configuration not be dependent on the location of request
origin, unless the location information can be cryptographically
confirmed, e.g., with the network name binding.
Zhang and Fang also looked at denial-of-service attacks [ZF2005]. A
serving network may request large numbers of authentication runs for
a particular subscriber from a home network. While the
resynchronization process can help recover from this, eventually it
is possible to exhaust the sequence number space and render the
subscriber's card unusable. This attack is possible for both
original AKA and EAP-AKA'. However, it requires the collaboration of
a serving network in an attack. It is recommended that EAP-AKA'
implementations provide the means to track, detect, and limit
excessive authentication attempts to combat this problem.
There have also been attacks related to the use of AKA without the
generated session keys (e.g., [BT2013]). Some of those attacks
relate to the use of HTTP Digest AKAv1 [RFC3310], which was
originally vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. This has since
been corrected in [RFC4169]. The EAP-AKA' protocol uses session keys
and provides channel binding, and as such, it is resistant to the
above attacks except where the protocol participants leak information
to outsiders.
Basin, et al. [Basin2018] have performed formal analysis and
concluded that the AKA protocol would have benefited from additional
security requirements such as key confirmation.
In the context of pervasive monitoring revelations, there were also
reports of compromised long-term pre-shared keys used in SIM and AKA
[Heist2015]. While no protocol can survive the theft of key material
associated with its credentials, there are some things that alleviate
the impacts in such situations. These are discussed further in
Section 7.3.
Arapinis, et al. [Arapinis2012] describe an attack that uses the AKA
resynchronization protocol to attempt to detect whether a particular
subscriber is in a given area. This attack depends on the attacker
setting up a false base station in the given area and on the
subscriber performing at least one authentication between the time
the attack is set up and run.
Borgaonkar, et al. discovered that the AKA resynchronization protocol
may also be used to predict the authentication frequency of a
subscriber if a non-time-based sequence number (SQN) generation
scheme is used [Borgaonkar2018]. The attacker can force the reuse of
the keystream that is used to protect the SQN in the AKA
resynchronization protocol. The attacker then guesses the
authentication frequency based on the lowest bits of two XORed SQNs.
The researchers' concern was that the authentication frequency would
reveal some information about the phone usage behavior, e.g., number
of phone calls made or number of SMS messages sent. There are a
number of possible triggers for authentication, so such an
information leak is not direct, but it can be a concern. The impact
of the attack differs depending on whether the SQN generation scheme
that is used is time-based or not.
Similar attacks are possible outside AKA in the cellular paging
protocols where the attacker can simply send application-layer data,
send short messages, or make phone calls to the intended victim and
observe the air interface (e.g., [Kune2012] and [Shaik2016]).
Hussain, et al. demonstrated a slightly more sophisticated version of
the attack that exploits the fact that the 4G paging protocol uses
the IMSI to calculate the paging timeslot [Hussain2019]. As this
attack is outside AKA, it does not impact EAP-AKA'.
Finally, bad implementations of EAP-AKA' may not produce pseudonym
usernames or fast re-authentication identities in a manner that is
sufficiently secure. While it is not a problem with the protocol
itself, following the recommendations in Section 5.2 can mitigate
this concern.
7.3. Pervasive Monitoring
As required by [RFC7258], work on IETF protocols needs to consider
the effects of pervasive monitoring and mitigate them when possible.
As described in Section 7.2, after the publication of RFC 5448, new
information has come to light regarding the use of pervasive
monitoring techniques against many security technologies, including
AKA-based authentication.
For AKA, these attacks relate to theft of the long-term, shared-
secret key material stored on the cards. Such attacks are
conceivable, for instance, during the manufacturing process of cards,
through coercion of the card manufacturers, or during the transfer of
cards and associated information to an operator. Since the
publication of reports about such attacks, manufacturing and
provisioning processes have gained much scrutiny and have improved.
In particular, it is crucial that manufacturers limit access to the
secret information and the cards only to necessary systems and
personnel. It is also crucial that secure mechanisms be used to
store and communicate the secrets between the manufacturer and the
operator that adopts those cards for their customers.
Beyond these operational considerations, there are also technical
means to improve resistance to these attacks. One approach is to
provide Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). This would prevent any
passive attacks merely based on the long-term secrets and observation
of traffic. Such a mechanism can be defined as a backwards-
compatible extension of EAP-AKA' and is pursued separately from this
specification [EMU-AKA-PFS]. Alternatively, EAP-AKA' authentication
can be run inside a PFS-capable, tunneled authentication method. In
any case, the use of some PFS-capable mechanism is recommended.
7.4. Security Properties of Binding Network Names
The ability of EAP-AKA' to bind the network name into the used keys
provides some additional protection against key leakage to
inappropriate parties. The keys used in the protocol are specific to
a particular network name. If key leakage occurs due to an accident,
access node compromise, or another attack, the leaked keys are only
useful when providing access with that name. For instance, a
malicious access point cannot claim to be network Y if it has stolen
keys from network X. Obviously, if an access point is compromised,
the malicious node can still represent the compromised node. As a
result, neither EAP-AKA' nor any other extension can prevent such
attacks; however, the binding to a particular name limits the
attacker's choices, allows better tracking of attacks, makes it
possible to identify compromised networks, and applies good
cryptographic hygiene.
The server receives the EAP transaction from a given access network,
and verifies that the claim from the access network corresponds to
the name that this access network should be using. It becomes
impossible for an access network to claim over AAA that it is another
access network. In addition, if the peer checks that the information
it has received locally over the network-access link-layer matches
with the information the server has given it via EAP-AKA', it becomes
impossible for the access network to tell one story to the AAA
network and another one to the peer. These checks prevent some
"lying NAS" (Network Access Server) attacks. For instance, a roaming
partner, R, might claim that it is the home network H in an effort to
lure peers to connect to itself. Such an attack would be beneficial
for the roaming partner if it can attract more users, and damaging
for the users if their access costs in R are higher than those in
other alternative networks, such as H.
Any attacker who gets hold of the keys CK and IK, produced by the AKA
algorithm, can compute the keys CK' and IK' and, hence, the Master
Key (MK) according to the rules in Section 3.3. The attacker could
then act as a lying NAS. In 3GPP systems in general, the keys CK and
IK have been distributed to, for instance, nodes in a visited access
network where they may be vulnerable. In order to reduce this risk,
the AKA algorithm MUST be computed with the AMF separation bit set to
1, and the peer MUST check that this is indeed the case whenever it
runs EAP-AKA'. Furthermore, [TS-3GPP.33.402] requires that no CK or
IK keys computed in this way ever leave the home subscriber system.
The additional security benefits obtained from the binding depend
obviously on the way names are assigned to different access networks.
This is specified in [TS-3GPP.24.302]. See also [TS-3GPP.23.003].
Ideally, the names allow separating each different access technology,
each different access network, and each different NAS within a
domain. If this is not possible, the full benefits may not be
achieved. For instance, if the names identify just an access
technology, use of compromised keys in a different technology can be
prevented, but it is not possible to prevent their use by other
domains or devices using the same technology.
8. IANA Considerations
IANA has updated the "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
Registry" and the "EAP-AKA and EAP-SIM Parameters" registry so that
entries that pointed to RFC 5448 now point to this RFC instead.
8.1. Type Value
IANA has updated the reference for EAP-AKA' (0x32) in the "Method
Types" subregistry under the "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) Registry" to point to this document. Per Section 6.2 of
[RFC3748], this allocation can be made with Specification Required
[RFC8126].
8.2. Attribute Type Values
EAP-AKA' shares its attribute space and subtypes with EAP-SIM
[RFC4186] and EAP-AKA [RFC4187]. No new registries are needed.
IANA has updated the reference for AT_KDF_INPUT (23) and AT_KDF (24)
in the "Attribute Types (Non-Skippable Attributes 0-127)" subregistry
under the "EAP-AKA and EAP-SIM Parameters" registry to point to this
document. AT_KDF_INPUT and AT_KDF are defined in Sections 3.1 and
3.2, respectively, of this document.
IANA has also updated the reference for AT_BIDDING (136) in the
"Attribute Types (Skippable Attributes 128-255)" subregistry of the
"EAP-AKA and EAP-SIM Parameters" registry to point to this document.
AT_BIDDING is defined in Section 4.
8.3. Key Derivation Function Namespace
IANA has updated the reference for the "EAP-AKA' AT_KDF Key
Derivation Function Values" subregistry to point to this document.
This subregistry appears under the "EAP-AKA and EAP-SIM Parameters"
registry. The references for following entries have also been
updated to point to this document. New values can be created through
the Specification Required policy [RFC8126].
+=======+=======================+===========+
| Value | Description | Reference |
+=======+=======================+===========+
| 0 | Reserved | RFC 9048 |
+-------+-----------------------+-----------+
| 1 | EAP-AKA' with CK'/IK' | RFC 9048 |
+-------+-----------------------+-----------+
Table 3: EAP-AKA' AT_KDF Key Derivation
Function Values
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[FIPS.180-4]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-4,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4, August 2015,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf>.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3748>.
[RFC4187] Arkko, J. and H. Haverinen, "Extensible Authentication
Protocol Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key
Agreement (EAP-AKA)", RFC 4187, DOI 10.17487/RFC4187,
January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4187>.
[RFC7542] DeKok, A., "The Network Access Identifier", RFC 7542,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7542, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7542>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[TS-3GPP.23.003]
3GPP, "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical
Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Numbering,
addressing and identification (Release 16)", Version
16.7.0, 3GPP Technical Specification 23.003, June 2021.
[TS-3GPP.23.501]
3GPP, "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical
Specification Group Services and System Aspects; System
architecture for the 5G System (5GS); (Release 16)",
Version 16.9.0, 3GPP Technical Specification 23.501, June
2021.
[TS-3GPP.24.302]
3GPP, "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical
Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Access to
the 3GPP Evolved Packet Core (EPC) via non-3GPP access
networks; Stage 3; (Release 16)", Version 16.4.0, 3GPP
Technical Specification 24.302, July 2020.
[TS-3GPP.24.501]
3GPP, "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical
Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Non-
Access-Stratum (NAS) protocol for 5G System (5GS); Stage
3; (Release 16)", Version 16.9.0, 3GPP Draft Technical
Specification 24.501, June 2021.
[TS-3GPP.33.102]
3GPP, "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical
Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G
Security; Security architecture (Release 16)", Version
16.0.0, 3GPP Technical Specification 33.102, July 2020.
[TS-3GPP.33.402]
3GPP, "3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE); Security
aspects of non-3GPP accesses (Release 16)", Version
16.0.0, 3GPP Technical Specification 33.402, July 2020.
[TS-3GPP.33.501]
3GPP, "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical
Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G
Security; Security architecture and procedures for 5G
System (Release 16)", Version 16.7.1, 3GPP Technical
Specification 33.501, July 2021.
9.2. Informative References
[Arapinis2012]
Arapinis, M., Mancini, L., Ritter, E., Ryan, M., Golde,
N., Redon, R., and R. Borgaonkar, "New Privacy Issues in
Mobile Telephony: Fix and Verification", in CCS '12:
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, Raleigh, North Carolina, USA,
DOI 10.1145/2382196.2382221, October 2012,
<https://doi.org/10.1145/2382196.2382221>.
[Basin2018]
Basin, D., Dreier, J., Hirschi, L., RadomiroviÄ, S.,
Sasse, R., and V. Stettler, "A Formal Analysis of 5G
Authentication", arXiv:1806.10360,
DOI 10.1145/3243734.3243846, August 2018,
<https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243846>.
[Borgaonkar2018]
Borgaonkar, R., Hirschi, L., Park, S., and A. Shaik, "New
Privacy Threat on 3G, 4G, and Upcoming 5G AKA Protocols",
in IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2018.
[BT2013] Beekman, J. G. and C. Thompson, "Breaking Cell Phone
Authentication: Vulnerabilities in AKA, IMS and Android",
in 7th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies, WOOT
'13, August 2013.
[EMU-AKA-PFS]
Arkko, J., Norrman, K., and V. Torvinen, "Perfect-Forward
Secrecy for the Extensible Authentication Protocol Method
for Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA' PFS)", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-emu-aka-pfs-05, 30
October 2020, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-emu-aka-pfs-05>.
[FIPS.180-1]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-1,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-1, April 1995,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/180/1/
archive/1995-04-17>.
[FIPS.180-2]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-2, August 2002,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/180/2/
archive/2002-08-01>.
[Heist2015]
Scahill, J. and J. Begley, "How Spies Stole the Keys to
the Encryption Castle", February 2015,
<https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/19/great-sim-
heist/>.
[Hussain2019]
Hussain, S., Echeverria, M., Chowdhury, O., Li, N., and E.
Bertino, "Privacy Attacks to the 4G and 5G Cellular Paging
Protocols Using Side Channel Information", in the
proceedings of NDSS '19, held 24-27 February, 2019, San
Diego, California, 2019.
[Kune2012] Kune, D., Koelndorfer, J., Hopper, N., and Y. Kim,
"Location Leaks on the GSM Air Interface", in the
proceedings of NDSS '12, held 5-8 February, 2012, San
Diego, California, 2012.
[MT2012] Mjølsnes, S. F. and J-K. Tsay, "A Vulnerability in the
UMTS and LTE Authentication and Key Agreement Protocols",
in Computer Network Security, Proceedings of the 6th
International Conference on Mathematical Methods, Models
and Architectures for Computer Network Security, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 7531, pp. 65-76,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-33704-8_6, October 2012,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33704-8_6>.
[RFC3310] Niemi, A., Arkko, J., and V. Torvinen, "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP) Digest Authentication Using Authentication
and Key Agreement (AKA)", RFC 3310, DOI 10.17487/RFC3310,
September 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3310>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC4169] Torvinen, V., Arkko, J., and M. Naslund, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Digest Authentication Using
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) Version-2",
RFC 4169, DOI 10.17487/RFC4169, November 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4169>.
[RFC4186] Haverinen, H., Ed. and J. Salowey, Ed., "Extensible
Authentication Protocol Method for Global System for
Mobile Communications (GSM) Subscriber Identity Modules
(EAP-SIM)", RFC 4186, DOI 10.17487/RFC4186, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4186>.
[RFC4284] Adrangi, F., Lortz, V., Bari, F., and P. Eronen, "Identity
Selection Hints for the Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 4284, DOI 10.17487/RFC4284, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4284>.
[RFC4306] Kaufman, C., Ed., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2)
Protocol", RFC 4306, DOI 10.17487/RFC4306, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4306>.
[RFC5113] Arkko, J., Aboba, B., Korhonen, J., Ed., and F. Bari,
"Network Discovery and Selection Problem", RFC 5113,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5113, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5113>.
[RFC5247] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework",
RFC 5247, DOI 10.17487/RFC5247, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5247>.
[RFC5281] Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "Extensible Authentication
Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security Authenticated
Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0)", RFC 5281,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5281, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5281>.
[RFC5448] Arkko, J., Lehtovirta, V., and P. Eronen, "Improved
Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3rd
Generation Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA')",
RFC 5448, DOI 10.17487/RFC5448, May 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5448>.
[RFC6194] Polk, T., Chen, L., Turner, S., and P. Hoffman, "Security
Considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-1 Message-Digest
Algorithms", RFC 6194, DOI 10.17487/RFC6194, March 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6194>.
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
[RFC7170] Zhou, H., Cam-Winget, N., Salowey, J., and S. Hanna,
"Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP) Version
1", RFC 7170, DOI 10.17487/RFC7170, May 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7170>.
[RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[Shaik2016]
Shaik, A., Seifert, J., Borgaonkar, R., Asokan, N., and V.
Niemi, "Practical attacks against Privacy and Availability
in 4G/LTE Mobile Communication Systems", in the
proceedings of NDSS '16 held 21-24 February, 2016, San
Diego, California, 2012.
[TS-3GPP.35.208]
3GPP, "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical
Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G
Security; Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set: An
example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key
generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*;
Document 4: Design Conformance Test Data (Release 14)",
Version 16.0.0, 3GPP Technical Specification 35.208, July
2020.
[ZF2005] Zhang, M. and Y. Fang, "Security analysis and enhancements
of 3GPP authentication and key agreement protocol", IEEE
Transactions on Wireless Communications, Vol. 4, No. 2,
DOI 10.1109/TWC.2004.842941, March 2005,
<https://doi.org/10.1109/TWC.2004.842941>.
Appendix A. Changes from RFC 5448
The change from RFC 5448 was to refer to a newer version of
[TS-3GPP.24.302]. This RFC includes an updated definition of the
Network Name field to include 5G.
Identifier usage for 5G has been specified in Section 5.3. Also, the
requirements for generating pseudonym usernames and fast re-
authentication identities have been updated from the original
definition in RFC 5448, which referenced RFC 4187. See Section 5.
Exported parameters for EAP-AKA' have been defined in Section 6, as
required by [RFC5247], including the definition of those parameters
for both full authentication and fast re-authentication.
The security, privacy, and pervasive monitoring considerations have
been updated or added. See Section 7.
The references to [RFC2119], [RFC4306], [RFC7296], [FIPS.180-1] and
[FIPS.180-2] have been updated to their most recent versions, and
language in this document has been changed accordingly. However,
these are merely reference updates to newer specifications; the
actual protocol functions are the same as defined in the earlier
RFCs.
Similarly, references to all 3GPP technical specifications have been
updated to their 5G versions (Release 16) or otherwise most recent
version when there has not been a 5G-related update.
Finally, a number of clarifications have been made, including a
summary of where attributes may appear.
Appendix B. Changes to RFC 4187
In addition to specifying EAP-AKA', this document also mandates a
change to another EAP method -- EAP-AKA that was defined in RFC 4187.
This change was already mandated in RFC 5448 but repeated here to
ensure that the latest EAP-AKA' specification contains the
instructions about the necessary bidding down prevention feature in
EAP-AKA as well.
The changes to RFC 4187 relate only to the bidding down prevention
support defined in Section 4. In particular, this document does not
change how the Master Key (MK) is calculated or any other aspect of
EAP-AKA. The provisions in this specification for EAP-AKA' do not
apply to EAP-AKA, outside of Section 4.
Appendix C. Importance of Explicit Negotiation
Choosing between the traditional and revised AKA key derivation
functions is easy when their use is unambiguously tied to a
particular radio access network, e.g., Long Term Evolution (LTE) as
defined by 3GPP or evolved High Rate Packet Data (eHRPD) as defined
by 3GPP2. There is no possibility for interoperability problems if
this radio access network is always used in conjunction with new
protocols that cannot be mixed with the old ones; clients will always
know whether they are connecting to the old or new system.
However, using the new key derivation functions over EAP introduces
several degrees of separation, making the choice of the correct key
derivation functions much harder. Many different types of networks
employ EAP. Most of these networks have no means to carry any
information about what is expected from the authentication process.
EAP itself is severely limited in carrying any additional
information, as noted in [RFC4284] and [RFC5113]. Even if these
networks or EAP were extended to carry additional information, it
would not affect millions of deployed access networks and clients
attaching to them.
Simply changing the key derivation functions that EAP-AKA [RFC4187]
uses would cause interoperability problems with all of the existing
implementations. Perhaps it would be possible to employ strict
separation into domain names that should be used by the new clients
and networks. Only these new devices would then employ the new key
derivation function. While this can be made to work for specific
cases, it would be an extremely brittle mechanism, ripe to result in
problems whenever client configuration, routing of authentication
requests, or server configuration does not match expectations. It
also does not help to assume that the EAP client and server are
running a particular release of 3GPP network specifications. Network
vendors often provide features from future releases early or do not
provide all features of the current release. And obviously, there
are many EAP and even some EAP-AKA implementations that are not
bundled with the 3GPP network offerings. In general, these
approaches are expected to lead to hard-to-diagnose problems and
increased support calls.
Appendix D. Test Vectors
Test vectors are provided below for four different cases. The test
vectors may be useful for testing implementations. In the first two
cases, we employ the MILENAGE algorithm and the algorithm
configuration parameters (the subscriber key K and operator algorithm
variant configuration value OP) from test set 19 in [TS-3GPP.35.208].
The last two cases use artificial values as the output of AKA, which
are useful only for testing the computation of values within EAP-
AKA', not AKA itself.
Case 1
The parameters for the AKA run are as follows:
Identity: "0555444333222111"
Network name: "WLAN"
RAND: 81e9 2b6c 0ee0 e12e bceb a8d9 2a99 dfa5
AUTN: bb52 e91c 747a c3ab 2a5c 23d1 5ee3 51d5
IK: 9744 871a d32b f9bb d1dd 5ce5 4e3e 2e5a
CK: 5349 fbe0 9864 9f94 8f5d 2e97 3a81 c00f
RES: 28d7 b0f2 a2ec 3de5
Then the derived keys are generated as follows:
CK': 0093 962d 0dd8 4aa5 684b 045c 9edf fa04
IK': ccfc 230c a74f cc96 c0a5 d611 64f5 a76c
K_encr: 766f a0a6 c317 174b 812d 52fb cd11 a179
K_aut: 0842 ea72 2ff6 835b fa20 3249 9fc3 ec23
c2f0 e388 b4f0 7543 ffc6 77f1 696d 71ea
K_re: cf83 aa8b c7e0 aced 892a cc98 e76a 9b20
95b5 58c7 795c 7094 715c b339 3aa7 d17a
MSK: 67c4 2d9a a56c 1b79 e295 e345 9fc3 d187
d42b e0bf 818d 3070 e362 c5e9 67a4 d544
e8ec fe19 358a b303 9aff 03b7 c930 588c
055b abee 58a0 2650 b067 ec4e 9347 c75a
EMSK: f861 703c d775 590e 16c7 679e a387 4ada
8663 11de 2907 64d7 60cf 76df 647e a01c
313f 6992 4bdd 7650 ca9b ac14 1ea0 75c4
ef9e 8029 c0e2 90cd bad5 638b 63bc 23fb
Case 2
The parameters for the AKA run are as follows:
Identity: "0555444333222111"
Network name: "HRPD"
RAND: 81e9 2b6c 0ee0 e12e bceb a8d9 2a99 dfa5
AUTN: bb52 e91c 747a c3ab 2a5c 23d1 5ee3 51d5
IK: 9744 871a d32b f9bb d1dd 5ce5 4e3e 2e5a
CK: 5349 fbe0 9864 9f94 8f5d 2e97 3a81 c00f
RES: 28d7 b0f2 a2ec 3de5
Then the derived keys are generated as follows:
CK': 3820 f027 7fa5 f777 32b1 fb1d 90c1 a0da
IK': db94 a0ab 557e f6c9 ab48 619c a05b 9a9f
K_encr: 05ad 73ac 915f ce89 ac77 e152 0d82 187b
K_aut: 5b4a caef 62c6 ebb8 882b 2f3d 534c 4b35
2773 37a0 0184 f20f f25d 224c 04be 2afd
K_re: 3f90 bf5c 6e5e f325 ff04 eb5e f653 9fa8
cca8 3981 94fb d00b e425 b3f4 0dba 10ac
MSK: 87b3 2157 0117 cd6c 95ab 6c43 6fb5 073f
f15c f855 05d2 bc5b b735 5fc2 1ea8 a757
57e8 f86a 2b13 8002 e057 5291 3bb4 3b82
f868 a961 17e9 1a2d 95f5 2667 7d57 2900
EMSK: c891 d5f2 0f14 8a10 0755 3e2d ea55 5c9c
b672 e967 5f4a 66b4 bafa 0273 79f9 3aee
539a 5979 d0a0 042b 9d2a e28b ed3b 17a3
1dc8 ab75 072b 80bd 0c1d a612 466e 402c
Case 3
The parameters for the AKA run are as follows:
Identity: "0555444333222111"
Network name: "WLAN"
RAND: e0e0 e0e0 e0e0 e0e0 e0e0 e0e0 e0e0 e0e0
AUTN: a0a0 a0a0 a0a0 a0a0 a0a0 a0a0 a0a0 a0a0
IK: b0b0 b0b0 b0b0 b0b0 b0b0 b0b0 b0b0 b0b0
CK: c0c0 c0c0 c0c0 c0c0 c0c0 c0c0 c0c0 c0c0
RES: d0d0 d0d0 d0d0 d0d0 d0d0 d0d0 d0d0 d0d0
Then the derived keys are generated as follows:
CK': cd4c 8e5c 68f5 7dd1 d7d7 dfd0 c538 e577
IK': 3ece 6b70 5dbb f7df c459 a112 80c6 5524
K_encr: 897d 302f a284 7416 488c 28e2 0dcb 7be4
K_aut: c407 00e7 7224 83ae 3dc7 139e b0b8 8bb5
58cb 3081 eccd 057f 9207 d128 6ee7 dd53
K_re: 0a59 1a22 dd8b 5b1c f29e 3d50 8c91 dbbd
b4ae e230 5189 2c42 b6a2 de66 ea50 4473
MSK: 9f7d ca9e 37bb 2202 9ed9 86e7 cd09 d4a7
0d1a c76d 9553 5c5c ac40 a750 4699 bb89
61a2 9ef6 f3e9 0f18 3de5 861a d1be dc81
ce99 1639 1b40 1aa0 06c9 8785 a575 6df7
EMSK: 724d e00b db9e 5681 87be 3fe7 4611 4557
d501 8779 537e e37f 4d3c 6c73 8cb9 7b9d
c651 bc19 bfad c344 ffe2 b52c a78b d831
6b51 dacc 5f2b 1440 cb95 1552 1cc7 ba23
Case 4
The parameters for the AKA run are as follows:
Identity: "0555444333222111"
Network name: "HRPD"
RAND: e0e0 e0e0 e0e0 e0e0 e0e0 e0e0 e0e0 e0e0
AUTN: a0a0 a0a0 a0a0 a0a0 a0a0 a0a0 a0a0 a0a0
IK: b0b0 b0b0 b0b0 b0b0 b0b0 b0b0 b0b0 b0b0
CK: c0c0 c0c0 c0c0 c0c0 c0c0 c0c0 c0c0 c0c0
RES: d0d0 d0d0 d0d0 d0d0 d0d0 d0d0 d0d0 d0d0
Then the derived keys are generated as follows:
CK': 8310 a71c e6f7 5488 9613 da8f 64d5 fb46
IK': 5adf 1436 0ae8 3819 2db2 3f6f cb7f 8c76
K_encr: 745e 7439 ba23 8f50 fcac 4d15 d47c d1d9
K_aut: 3e1d 2aa4 e677 025c fd86 2a4b e183 61a1
3a64 5765 5714 63df 833a 9759 e809 9879
K_re: 99da 835e 2ae8 2462 576f e651 6fad 1f80
2f0f a119 1655 dd0a 273d a96d 04e0 fcd3
MSK: c6d3 a6e0 ceea 951e b20d 74f3 2c30 61d0
680a 04b0 b086 ee87 00ac e3e0 b95f a026
83c2 87be ee44 4322 94ff 98af 26d2 cc78
3bac e75c 4b0a f7fd feb5 511b a8e4 cbd0
EMSK: 7fb5 6813 838a dafa 99d1 40c2 f198 f6da
cebf b6af ee44 4961 1054 02b5 08c7 f363
352c b291 9644 b504 63e6 a693 5415 0147
ae09 cbc5 4b8a 651d 8787 a689 3ed8 536d
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Guenther Horn, Joe Salowey, Mats
Naslund, Adrian Escott, Brian Rosenberg, Laksminath Dondeti, Ahmad
Muhanna, Stefan Rommer, Miguel Garcia, Jan Kall, Ankur Agarwal, Jouni
Malinen, John Mattsson, Jesus De Gregorio, Brian Weis, Russ Housley,
Alfred Hoenes, Anand Palanigounder, Michael Richardson, Roman
Danyliw, Dan Romascanu, Kyle Rose, Benjamin Kaduk, Alissa Cooper,
Erik Kline, Murray Kucherawy, Robert Wilton, Warren Kumari, Andreas
Kunz, Marcus Wong, Kalle Jarvinen, Daniel Migault, and Mohit Sethi
for their in-depth reviews and interesting discussions in this
problem space.
Contributors
The test vectors in Appendix D were provided by Yogendra Pal and
Jouni Malinen, based on two independent implementations of this
specification.
Jouni Malinen provided suggested text for Section 6. John Mattsson
provided much of the text for Section 7.1. Karl Norrman was the
source of much of the information in Section 7.2.
Authors' Addresses
Jari Arkko
Ericsson
FI-02420 Jorvas
Finland
Email: jari.arkko@piuha.net
Vesa Lehtovirta
Ericsson
FI-02420 Jorvas
Finland
Email: vesa.lehtovirta@ericsson.com
Vesa Torvinen
Ericsson
FI-02420 Jorvas
Finland
Email: vesa.torvinen@ericsson.com
Pasi Eronen
Independent
Finland
Email: pe@iki.fi
