Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Bush
Request for Comments: 9092 IIJ & Arrcus
Category: Standards Track M. Candela
ISSN: 2070-1721 NTT
W. Kumari
Google
R. Housley
Vigil Security
July 2021
Finding and Using Geofeed Data
Abstract
This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy
Specification Language inetnum: class to refer specifically to
geofeed data comma-separated values (CSV) files and describes an
optional scheme that uses the Routing Public Key Infrastructure to
authenticate the geofeed data CSV files.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9092.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1.1. Requirements Language
2. Geofeed Files
3. inetnum: Class
4. Authenticating Geofeed Data
5. Operational Considerations
6. Privacy Considerations
7. Security Considerations
8. IANA Considerations
9. References
9.1. Normative References
9.2. Informative References
Appendix A. Example
Acknowledgments
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
Providers of Internet content and other services may wish to
customize those services based on the geographic location of the user
of the service. This is often done using the source IP address used
to contact the service. Also, infrastructure and other services
might wish to publish the locale of their services. [RFC8805]
defines geofeed, a syntax to associate geographic locales with IP
addresses, but it does not specify how to find the relevant geofeed
data given an IP address.
This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy
Specification Language (RPSL) [RFC2725] inetnum: class to refer
specifically to geofeed data CSV files and how to prudently use them.
In all places inetnum: is used, inet6num: should also be assumed
[RFC4012].
The reader may find [INETNUM] and [INET6NUM] informative, and
certainly more verbose, descriptions of the inetnum: database
classes.
An optional utterly awesome but slightly complex means for
authenticating geofeed data is also defined.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Geofeed Files
Geofeed files are described in [RFC8805]. They provide a facility
for an IP address resource "owner" to associate those IP addresses to
geographic locales.
Content providers and other parties who wish to locate an IP address
to a geographic locale need to find the relevant geofeed data. In
Section 3, this document specifies how to find the relevant geofeed
[RFC8805] file given an IP address.
Geofeed data for large providers with significant horizontal scale
and high granularity can be quite large. The size of a file can be
even larger if an unsigned geofeed file combines data for many
prefixes, if dual IPv4/IPv6 spaces are represented, etc.
Geofeed data do have privacy considerations (see Section 6); this
process makes bulk access to those data easier.
This document also suggests an optional signature to strongly
authenticate the data in the geofeed files.
3. inetnum: Class
The original RPSL specifications starting with [RIPE81], [RIPE181],
and a trail of subsequent documents were written by the RIPE
community. The IETF standardized RPSL in [RFC2622] and [RFC4012].
Since then, it has been modified and extensively enhanced in the
Regional Internet Registry (RIR) community, mostly by RIPE [RIPE-DB].
Currently, change control effectively lies in the operator community.
The RPSL, and [RFC2725] and [RFC4012] used by the Regional Internet
Registries (RIRs), specify the inetnum: database class. Each of
these objects describes an IP address range and its attributes. The
inetnum: objects form a hierarchy ordered on the address space.
Ideally, RPSL would be augmented to define a new RPSL geofeed:
attribute in the inetnum: class. Until such time, this document
defines the syntax of a Geofeed remarks: attribute, which contains an
HTTPS URL of a geofeed file. The format of the inetnum: geofeed
remarks: attribute MUST be as in this example, "remarks: Geofeed ",
where the token "Geofeed " MUST be case sensitive, followed by a URL
that will vary, but it MUST refer only to a single geofeed [RFC8805]
file.
inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example
remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed.csv
While we leave global agreement of RPSL modification to the relevant
parties, we specify that a proper geofeed: attribute in the inetnum:
class MUST be "geofeed:" and MUST be followed by a single URL that
will vary, but it MUST refer only to a single geofeed [RFC8805] file.
inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example
geofeed: https://example.com/geofeed.csv
Registries MAY, for the interim, provide a mix of the remarks:
attribute form and the geofeed: attribute form.
The URL uses HTTPS, so the WebPKI provides authentication, integrity,
and confidentiality for the fetched geofeed file. However, the
WebPKI can not provide authentication of IP address space assignment.
In contrast, the RPKI (see [RFC6481]) can be used to authenticate IP
space assignment; see optional authentication in Section 4.
Until all producers of inetnum: objects, i.e., the RIRs, state that
they have migrated to supporting a geofeed: attribute, consumers
looking at inetnum: objects to find geofeed URLs MUST be able to
consume both the remarks: and geofeed: forms. The migration not only
implies that the RIRs support the geofeed: attribute, but that all
registrants have migrated any inetnum: objects from remarks: to
geofeed: attributes.
Any particular inetnum: object MUST have, at most, one geofeed
reference, whether a remarks: or a proper geofeed: attribute when it
is implemented. If there is more than one, all are ignored.
If a geofeed CSV file describes multiple disjoint ranges of IP
address space, there are likely to be geofeed references from
multiple inetnum: objects. Files with geofeed references from
multiple inetnum: objects are not compatible with the signing
procedure in Section 4.
When geofeed references are provided by multiple inetnum: objects
that have identical address ranges, then the geofeed reference on the
inetnum: with the most recent last-modified: attribute SHOULD be
preferred.
As inetnum: objects form a hierarchy, geofeed references SHOULD be at
the lowest applicable inetnum: object covering the relevant address
ranges in the referenced geofeed file. When fetching, the most
specific inetnum: object with a geofeed reference MUST be used.
It is significant that geofeed data may have finer granularity than
the inetnum: that refers to them. For example, an INETNUM object for
an address range P could refer to a geofeed file in which P has been
subdivided into one or more longer prefixes.
Currently, the registry data published by ARIN are not the same RPSL
as that of the other registries (see [RFC7485] for a survey of the
WHOIS Tower of Babel); therefore, when fetching from ARIN via FTP
[RFC0959], WHOIS [RFC3912], the Registration Data Access Protocol
(RDAP) [RFC9082], etc., the "NetRange" attribute/key MUST be treated
as "inetnum", and the "Comment" attribute MUST be treated as
"remarks".
4. Authenticating Geofeed Data
The question arises whether a particular geofeed [RFC8805] data set
is valid, i.e., is authorized by the "owner" of the IP address space
and is authoritative in some sense. The inetnum: that points to the
geofeed [RFC8805] file provides some assurance. Unfortunately, the
RPSL in many repositories is weakly authenticated at best. An
approach where RPSL was signed per [RFC7909] would be good, except it
would have to be deployed by all RPSL registries, and there is a fair
number of them.
A single optional authenticator MAY be appended to a geofeed
[RFC8805] file. It is a digest of the main body of the file signed
by the private key of the relevant RPKI certificate for a covering
address range. One needs a format that bundles the relevant RPKI
certificate with the signature of the geofeed text.
The canonicalization procedure converts the data from their internal
character representation to the UTF-8 [RFC3629] character encoding,
and the <CRLF> sequence MUST be used to denote the end of a line of
text. A blank line is represented solely by the <CRLF> sequence.
For robustness, any non-printable characters MUST NOT be changed by
canonicalization. Trailing blank lines MUST NOT appear at the end of
the file. That is, the file must not end with multiple consecutive
<CRLF> sequences. Any end-of-file marker used by an operating system
is not considered to be part of the file content. When present, such
end-of-file markers MUST NOT be processed by the digital signature
algorithm.
Should the authenticator be syntactically incorrect per the above,
the authenticator is invalid.
Borrowing detached signatures from [RFC5485], after file
canonicalization, the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652]
would be used to create a detached DER-encoded signature that is then
padded BASE64 encoded (as per Section 4 of [RFC4648]) and line
wrapped to 72 or fewer characters. The same digest algorithm MUST be
used for calculating the message digest on content being signed,
which is the geofeed file, and for calculating the message digest on
the SignerInfo SignedAttributes [RFC8933]. The message digest
algorithm identifier MUST appear in both the SignedData
DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers and the SignerInfo
DigestAlgorithmIdentifier [RFC5652].
The address range of the signing certificate MUST cover all prefixes
in the geofeed file it signs.
An address range A "covers" address range B if the range of B is
identical to or a subset of A. "Address range" is used here because
inetnum: objects and RPKI certificates need not align on Classless
Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) [RFC4632] prefix boundaries, while those
of the CSV lines in a geofeed file do.
As the signer specifies the covered RPKI resources relevant to the
signature, the RPKI certificate covering the inetnum: object's
address range is included in the [RFC5652] CMS SignedData
certificates field.
Identifying the private key associated with the certificate and
getting the department that controls the private key (which might be
trapped in a Hardware Security Module (HSM)) to sign the CMS blob is
left as an exercise for the implementor. On the other hand,
verifying the signature requires no complexity; the certificate,
which can be validated in the public RPKI, has the needed public key.
The trust anchors for the RIRs are expected to already be available
to the party performing signature validation. Validation of the CMS
signature on the geofeed file involves:
1. Obtaining the signer's certificate from the CMS SignedData
CertificateSet [RFC5652]. The certificate SubjectKeyIdentifier
extension [RFC5280] MUST match the SubjectKeyIdentifier in the
CMS SignerInfo SignerIdentifier [RFC5652]. If the key
identifiers do not match, then validation MUST fail.
Validation of the signer's certificate MUST ensure that it is
part of the current [RFC6486] manifest and that the resources are
covered by the RPKI certificate.
2. Constructing the certification path for the signer's certificate.
All of the needed certificates are expected to be readily
available in the RPKI repository. The certification path MUST be
valid according to the validation algorithm in [RFC5280] and the
additional checks specified in [RFC3779] associated with the IP
Address Delegation certificate extension and the Autonomous
System Identifier Delegation certificate extension. If
certification path validation is unsuccessful, then validation
MUST fail.
3. Validating the CMS SignedData as specified in [RFC5652] using the
public key from the validated signer's certificate. If the
signature validation is unsuccessful, then validation MUST fail.
4. Verifying that the IP Address Delegation certificate extension
[RFC3779] covers all of the address ranges of the geofeed file.
If all of the address ranges are not covered, then validation
MUST fail.
All of these steps MUST be successful to consider the geofeed file
signature as valid.
As the signer specifies the covered RPKI resources relevant to the
signature, the RPKI certificate covering the inetnum: object's
address range is included in the CMS SignedData certificates field
[RFC5652].
Identifying the private key associated with the certificate and
getting the department with the Hardware Security Module (HSM) to
sign the CMS blob is left as an exercise for the implementor. On the
other hand, verifying the signature requires no complexity; the
certificate, which can be validated in the public RPKI, has the
needed public key.
The appendix MUST be hidden as a series of "#" comments at the end of
the geofeed file. The following is a cryptographically incorrect,
albeit simple, example. A correct and full example is in Appendix A.
# RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0 - 192.0.2.255
# MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ
# IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu
...
# imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa
# O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk=
# End Signature: 192.0.2.0 - 192.0.2.255
The signature does not cover the signature lines.
The bracketing "# RPKI Signature:" and "# End Signature:" MUST be
present following the model as shown. Their IP address range MUST
match that of the inetnum: URL followed to the file.
[RPKI-RSC] describes and provides code for a CMS profile for a
general purpose listing of checksums (a "checklist") for use with the
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). It provides usable,
albeit complex, code to sign geofeed files.
[RPKI-RTA] describes a CMS profile for a general purpose Resource
Tagged Attestation (RTA) based on the RPKI. While this is expected
to become applicable in the long run, for the purposes of this
document, a self-signed root trust anchor is used.
5. Operational Considerations
To create the needed inetnum: objects, an operator wishing to
register the location of their geofeed file needs to coordinate with
their Regional Internet Registry (RIR) or National Internet Registry
(NIR) and/or any provider Local Internet Registry (LIR) that has
assigned address ranges to them. RIRs/NIRs provide means for
assignees to create and maintain inetnum: objects. They also provide
means of assigning or sub-assigning IP address resources and allowing
the assignee to create WHOIS data, including inetnum: objects,
thereby referring to geofeed files.
The geofeed files MUST be published via and fetched using HTTPS
[RFC2818].
When using data from a geofeed file, one MUST ignore data outside the
referring inetnum: object's inetnum: attribute address range.
If and only if the geofeed file is not signed per Section 4, then
multiple inetnum: objects MAY refer to the same geofeed file, and the
consumer MUST use only lines in the geofeed file where the prefix is
covered by the address range of the inetnum: object's URL it has
followed.
If the geofeed file is signed, and the signer's certificate changes,
the signature in the geofeed file MUST be updated.
It is good key hygiene to use a given key for only one purpose. To
dedicate a signing private key for signing a geofeed file, an RPKI
Certification Authority (CA) may issue a subordinate certificate
exclusively for the purpose shown in Appendix A.
To minimize the load on RIR WHOIS [RFC3912] services, use of the
RIR's FTP [RFC0959] services SHOULD be used for large-scale access to
gather geofeed URLs. This also provides bulk access instead of
fetching by brute-force search through the IP space.
Currently, geolocation providers have bulk WHOIS data access at all
the RIRs. An anonymized version of such data is openly available for
all RIRs except ARIN, which requires an authorization. However, for
users without such authorization, the same result can be achieved
with extra RDAP effort. There is open-source code to pass over such
data across all RIRs, collect all geofeed references, and process
them [GEOFEED-FINDER].
To prevent undue load on RPSL and geofeed servers, entity-fetching
geofeed data using these mechanisms MUST NOT do frequent real-time
lookups. Section 3.4 of [RFC8805] suggests use of the HTTP Expires
header [RFC7234] to signal when geofeed data should be refetched. As
the data change very infrequently, in the absence of such an HTTP
Header signal, collectors SHOULD NOT fetch more frequently than
weekly. It would be polite not to fetch at magic times such as
midnight UTC, the first of the month, etc., because too many others
are likely to do the same.
6. Privacy Considerations
[RFC8805] geofeed data may reveal the approximate location of an IP
address, which might in turn reveal the approximate location of an
individual user. Unfortunately, [RFC8805] provides no privacy
guidance on avoiding or ameliorating possible damage due to this
exposure of the user. In publishing pointers to geofeed files as
described in this document, the operator should be aware of this
exposure in geofeed data and be cautious. All the privacy
considerations of Section 4 of [RFC8805] apply to this document.
Where [RFC8805] provided the ability to publish location data, this
document makes bulk access to those data readily available. This is
a goal, not an accident.
7. Security Considerations
It is generally prudent for a consumer of geofeed data to also use
other sources to cross validate the data. All the security
considerations of [RFC8805] apply here as well.
As mentioned in Section 4, many RPSL repositories have weak, if any,
authentication. This allows spoofing of inetnum: objects pointing to
malicious geofeed files. Section 4 suggests an unfortunately complex
method for stronger authentication based on the RPKI.
For example, if an inetnum: for a wide address range (e.g., a /16)
points to an RPKI-signed geofeed file, a customer or attacker could
publish an unsigned equal or narrower (e.g., a /24) inetnum: in a
WHOIS registry that has weak authorization, abusing the rule that the
most-specific inetnum: object with a geofeed reference MUST be used.
If signatures were mandatory, the above attack would be stymied, but
of course that is not happening anytime soon.
The RPSL providers have had to throttle fetching from their servers
due to too-frequent queries. Usually, they throttle by the querying
IP address or block. Similar defenses will likely need to be
deployed by geofeed file servers.
8. IANA Considerations
IANA has registered object identifiers for one content type in the
"SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)"
registry as follows:
+=========+==========================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+==========================+============+
| 47 | id-ct-geofeedCSVwithCRLF | RFC 9092 |
+---------+--------------------------+------------+
Table 1
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2622] Alaettinoglu, C., Villamizar, C., Gerich, E., Kessens, D.,
Meyer, D., Bates, T., Karrenberg, D., and M. Terpstra,
"Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL)", RFC 2622,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2622, June 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2622>.
[RFC2725] Villamizar, C., Alaettinoglu, C., Meyer, D., and S.
Murphy, "Routing Policy System Security", RFC 2725,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2725, December 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2725>.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
[RFC4012] Blunk, L., Damas, J., Parent, F., and A. Robachevsky,
"Routing Policy Specification Language next generation
(RPSLng)", RFC 4012, DOI 10.17487/RFC4012, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4012>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8805] Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W.
Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation
Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8805>.
[RFC8933] Housley, R., "Update to the Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS) for Algorithm Identifier Protection", RFC 8933,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8933, October 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8933>.
9.2. Informative References
[GEOFEED-FINDER]
"geofeed-finder", commit 5f557a4, June 2021,
<https://github.com/massimocandela/geofeed-finder>.
[INET6NUM] RIPE NCC, "Description of the INET6NUM Object", October
2019, <https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-
asns/db/support/documentation/ripe-database-documentation/
rpsl-object-types/4-2-descriptions-of-primary-
objects/4-2-3-description-of-the-inet6num-object>.
[INETNUM] RIPE NCC, "Description of the INETNUM Object", June 2020,
<https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-
asns/db/support/documentation/ripe-database-documentation/
rpsl-object-types/4-2-descriptions-of-primary-
objects/4-2-4-description-of-the-inetnum-object>.
[RFC0959] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol",
STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, October 1985,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc959>.
[RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3912, September 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3912>.
[RFC4632] Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
(CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, DOI 10.17487/RFC4632, August
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4632>.
[RFC5485] Housley, R., "Digital Signatures on Internet-Draft
Documents", RFC 5485, DOI 10.17487/RFC5485, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5485>.
[RFC7234] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching",
RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7234>.
[RFC7485] Zhou, L., Kong, N., Shen, S., Sheng, S., and A. Servin,
"Inventory and Analysis of WHOIS Registration Objects",
RFC 7485, DOI 10.17487/RFC7485, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7485>.
[RFC7909] Kisteleki, R. and B. Haberman, "Securing Routing Policy
Specification Language (RPSL) Objects with Resource Public
Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Signatures", RFC 7909,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7909, June 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7909>.
[RFC9082] Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "Registration Data Access
Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", STD 95, RFC 9082,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9082, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9082>.
[RIPE-DB] RIPE NCC, "RIPE Database Documentation",
<https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-
asns/db/support/documentation/ripe-database-
documentation>.
[RIPE181] RIPE NCC, "Representation Of IP Routing Policies In A
Routing Registry", October 1994,
<https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-181>.
[RIPE81] RIPE NCC, "Representation Of IP Routing Policies In The
RIPE Database", February 1993,
<https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-081>.
[RPKI-RSC] Snijders, J., Harrison, T., and B. Maddison, "Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) object profile for Signed
Checklist (RSC)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc-04, 31 May 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-
rpki-rsc-04>.
[RPKI-RTA] Michaelson, G. G., Huston, G., Harrison, T., Bruijnzeels,
T., and M. Hoffmann, "A profile for Resource Tagged
Attestations (RTAs)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta-00, 21 January 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-
rpki-rta-00>.
Appendix A. Example
This appendix provides an example that includes a trust anchor, a CA
certificate subordinate to the trust anchor, an end-entity
certificate subordinate to the CA for signing the geofeed, and a
detached signature.
The trust anchor is represented by a self-signed certificate. As
usual in the RPKI, the trust anchor has authority over all IPv4
address blocks, all IPv6 address blocks, and all Autonomous System
(AS) numbers.
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
The CA certificate is issued by the trust anchor. This certificate
grants authority over one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24) and two
AS numbers (64496 and 64497).
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
The end-entity certificate is issued by the CA. This certificate
grants signature authority for one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24).
Signature authority for AS numbers is not needed for geofeed data
signatures, so no AS numbers are included in the certificate.
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
The end-entity certificate is displayed below in detail. For
brevity, the other two certificates are not.
0 1189: SEQUENCE {
4 909: SEQUENCE {
8 3: [0] {
10 1: INTEGER 2
: }
13 20: INTEGER 27AD394083D7F2B5B99B8670C775B2B96EE166E4
35 13: SEQUENCE {
37 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
48 0: NULL
: }
50 51: SEQUENCE {
52 49: SET {
54 47: SEQUENCE {
56 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
61 40: PrintableString
: '3ACE2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642'
: }
: }
: }
103 30: SEQUENCE {
105 13: UTCTime 20/05/2021 16:05:45 GMT
120 13: UTCTime 16/03/2022 16:05:45 GMT
: }
135 51: SEQUENCE {
137 49: SET {
139 47: SEQUENCE {
141 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
146 40: PrintableString
: '914652A3BD51C144260198889F5C45ABF053A187'
: }
: }
: }
188 290: SEQUENCE {
192 13: SEQUENCE {
194 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption
: (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
205 0: NULL
: }
207 271: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
212 266: SEQUENCE {
216 257: INTEGER
: 00 B2 71 34 2B 39 BF EA 07 65 B7 8B 72 A2 F0 F8
: 40 FC 31 16 CA 28 B6 4E 01 A8 F6 98 02 C0 EF 65
: B0 84 48 E9 96 FF 93 E6 92 89 65 8F F6 44 9C CE
: 57 10 82 D3 C2 57 0A FA DA 14 D0 64 22 28 C0 13
: 74 04 BD 1C 2B 4F F9 93 58 A6 25 D8 B9 A9 D3 37
: 9E F2 AC C0 CF 02 9E 84 75 D6 F0 7C A5 01 70 AE
: E6 66 AF 9C 69 85 74 6F 13 E9 B3 B8 95 4B 82 ED
: 95 D6 EA 66 05 7B 96 96 87 B2 9A E7 61 E9 65 89
: F8 60 E3 C0 F5 CE DD 18 97 05 E8 C1 AC E1 4D 5E
: 16 85 2D ED 3C CB 80 CF 7E BF D2 FE D5 C9 38 19
: BB 43 34 29 B6 66 CF 2D 8B 46 7E 9A D8 BB 8E 65
: 88 51 6A A8 FF 78 51 E2 E9 21 27 D7 77 7E 80 28
: 6C EA 4C 50 9C 73 71 16 F6 5E 54 14 4D 4C 14 B9
: 67 A0 4A 20 AA DA 0B A0 A0 01 B7 42 24 38 51 8A
: 78 2F C4 81 E6 81 75 62 DE E3 AF 5D 74 2F 6B 41
: FB 79 C3 A8 3A 72 6C 46 F9 A6 03 74 81 01 DF 8C
: EB
477 3: INTEGER 65537
: }
: }
: }
482 431: [3] {
486 427: SEQUENCE {
490 29: SEQUENCE {
492 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
497 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
499 20: OCTET STRING
: 91 46 52 A3 BD 51 C1 44 26 01 98 88 9F 5C 45 AB
: F0 53 A1 87
: }
: }
521 31: SEQUENCE {
523 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)
528 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
530 22: SEQUENCE {
532 20: [0]
: 3A CE 2C EF 4F B2 1B 7D 11 E3 E1 84 EF C1 E2 97
: B3 77 86 42
: }
: }
: }
554 12: SEQUENCE {
556 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
561 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
564 2: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
566 0: SEQUENCE {}
: }
: }
568 14: SEQUENCE {
570 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
575 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
578 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
580 2: BIT STRING 7 unused bits
: '1'B (bit 0)
: }
: }
584 24: SEQUENCE {
586 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32)
591 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
594 14: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
596 12: SEQUENCE {
598 10: SEQUENCE {
600 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: resourceCertificatePolicy (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 14 2)
: }
: }
: }
: }
610 97: SEQUENCE {
612 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
617 90: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
619 88: SEQUENCE {
621 86: SEQUENCE {
623 84: [0] {
625 82: [0] {
627 80: [6]
: 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F'
: 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.crl'
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
709 108: SEQUENCE {
711 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityInfoAccess
: (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1)
721 96: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
723 94: SEQUENCE {
725 92: SEQUENCE {
727 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER caIssuers (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2)
737 80: [6]
: 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F'
: 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.cer'
: }
: }
: }
: }
819 25: SEQUENCE {
821 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ipAddrBlocks (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7)
831 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
834 10: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
836 8: SEQUENCE {
838 6: SEQUENCE {
840 2: OCTET STRING 00 01
844 0: NULL
: }
: }
: }
: }
846 69: SEQUENCE {
848 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectInfoAccess
: (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 11)
858 57: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
860 55: SEQUENCE {
862 53: SEQUENCE {
864 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 13'
874 41: [6]
: 'https://rrdp.example.net/notification.xml'
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
917 13: SEQUENCE {
919 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption
: (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
930 0: NULL
: }
932 257: BIT STRING
: 48 C2 F7 C8 15 A7 43 1B EE E8 8A 68 7C A5 3F 4E
: 39 DE 6B 49 F8 09 0D D3 B7 EC 2B FA 86 C3 F7 BD
: D0 32 6F ED CA 75 86 F8 E3 E2 EC B7 B2 07 FB 3C
: 94 3B 70 A3 46 AE 0C 9B AB F9 44 D2 37 1E F8 04
: 60 56 36 E2 D8 1A F3 66 C5 80 9C 1F 38 E9 29 F0
: B2 4B 70 E9 C7 A7 6A 27 FA 03 0C 3A AB 4D 0D B2
: 90 1E A4 C0 5D D9 58 3F F6 C2 85 BC EC 09 15 53
: A0 35 CA A2 42 25 CF E6 B1 89 3D 60 5C 38 CB F9
: D9 AF FB 69 D8 DF 5F 0A 67 3A 28 E2 4C E8 0C 96
: 84 06 98 2D 93 3D 9A 72 75 92 A3 97 11 00 4D D1
: 44 42 CB 1A DF 7C 43 9E 5A 69 FB FA FD C6 E3 55
: 61 1B 51 70 2D FA A1 6A DA 54 0D E3 CC DE 85 EA
: B0 C4 F2 BF 31 B3 7C A5 21 25 73 E8 97 82 43 86
: 11 63 06 CC B2 38 DC FE D8 89 2C CE D9 63 12 1E
: E4 8A D8 CF 56 6D 37 A9 FF 48 4B 2C 24 0B 30 44
: 88 29 B3 61 21 0A DF C7 4B 6C 40 98 60 8E 86 05
: }
To allow reproduction of the signature results, the end-entity
private key is provided. For brevity, the other two private keys are
not.
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
Signing of "192.0.2.0/24,US,WA,Seattle," (terminated by CR and LF)
yields the following detached CMS signature.
# RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0 - 192.0.2.255
# MIIGjwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGgDCCBnwCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ
# IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSpMIIEpTCCA42gAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu
# QwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExR
# TNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMTA1MjAxNjA1NDVaFw0yMjAzMTYx
# NjA1NDVaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM
# 0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycT
# QrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEWyii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQg
# tPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0cK0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZm
# r5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upmBXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXha
# FLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQptmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKG
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Acknowledgments
Thanks to Rob Austein for CMS and detached signature clue, George
Michaelson for the first and substantial external review, and Erik
Kline who was too shy to agree to coauthorship. Additionally, we
express our gratitude to early implementors, including Menno
Schepers; Flavio Luciani; Eric Dugas; Job Snijders, who provided
running code; and Kevin Pack. Also, thanks to the following
geolocation providers who are consuming geofeeds with this described
solution: Jonathan Kosgei (ipdata.co), Ben Dowling (ipinfo.io), and
Pol Nisenblat (bigdatacloud.com). For an amazing number of helpful
reviews, we thank Adrian Farrel, Antonio Prado, Francesca Palombini,
Jean-Michel Combes (INTDIR), John Scudder, Kyle Rose (SECDIR), Martin
Duke, Murray Kucherawy, Paul Kyzivat (GENART), Rob Wilton, and Roman
Danyliw. The authors also thank George Michaelson, the awesome
document shepherd.
Authors' Addresses
Randy Bush
IIJ & Arrcus
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
United States of America
Email: randy@psg.com
Massimo Candela
NTT
Siriusdreef 70-72
2132 WT Hoofddorp
Netherlands
Email: massimo@ntt.net
Warren Kumari
Google
1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
Mountain View, CA 94043
United States of America
Email: warren@kumari.net
Russ Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
516 Dranesville Road
Herndon, VA 20170
United States of America
Email: housley@vigilsec.com
