Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) K. Nishizuka
Request for Comments: 9133 NTT Communications
Category: Standards Track M. Boucadair
ISSN: 2070-1721 Orange
T. Reddy.K
Akamai
T. Nagata
Lepidum
September 2021
Controlling Filtering Rules Using Distributed Denial-of-Service Open
Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel
Abstract
This document specifies an extension to the Distributed Denial-of-
Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) signal channel protocol so that
DOTS clients can control their filtering rules when an attack
mitigation is active.
Particularly, this extension allows a DOTS client to activate or
deactivate existing filtering rules during a Distributed Denial-of-
Service (DDoS) attack. The characterization of these filtering rules
is conveyed by a DOTS client during an 'idle' time (i.e., no
mitigation is active) by means of the DOTS data channel protocol.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9133.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1.1. The Problem
1.2. Controlling Filtering Rules Using DOTS Signal Channel
2. Terminology
3. Controlling Filtering Rules of a DOTS Client
3.1. Binding DOTS Data and Signal Channels
3.2. DOTS Signal Channel Extension
3.2.1. Parameters and Behaviors
3.2.2. DOTS Signal Filtering Control Module
3.2.2.1. Tree Structure
3.2.2.2. YANG Module
4. Some Examples
4.1. Conflict Handling
4.2. On-Demand Activation of an Accept-List Filter
4.3. DOTS Servers/Mitigators Lacking Capacity
5. IANA Considerations
5.1. DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Key Values Subregistry
5.2. A New YANG Module
6. Security Considerations
7. References
7.1. Normative References
7.2. Informative References
Acknowledgements
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
1.1. The Problem
In the Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS)
architecture [RFC8811], DOTS clients and servers communicate using
both a signal channel protocol [RFC9132] and a data channel protocol
[RFC8783].
The DOTS data channel protocol [RFC8783] is used for bulk data
exchange between DOTS agents to improve the coordination of parties
involved in the response to a Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)
attack. Filter management, which is one of the tasks of the DOTS
data channel protocol, enables a DOTS client to retrieve the
filtering capabilities of a DOTS server and to manage filtering
rules. Typically, these filtering rules are used for dropping or
rate-limiting unwanted traffic, and permitting accept-listed traffic.
The DOTS signal channel protocol [RFC9132] is designed to be
resilient under extremely hostile network conditions and provides
continued contact between DOTS agents even as DDoS attack traffic
saturates the link. The DOTS signal channel can be established
between two DOTS agents prior to or during an attack. At any time,
the DOTS client may send mitigation requests (as per Section 4.4 of
[RFC9132]) to a DOTS server over the active signal channel. While
mitigation is active, the DOTS server periodically sends status
messages to the DOTS client, including basic mitigation feedback
details. In case of a massive DDoS attack that saturates the
incoming link(s) to the DOTS client, all traffic from the DOTS server
to the DOTS client will likely be dropped. However, the DOTS server
may still receive DOTS messages sent from the DOTS client over the
signaling channel thanks to the heartbeat requests keeping the
channel active (as described in Section 4.7 of [RFC9132]).
Unlike the DOTS signal channel protocol, the DOTS data channel
protocol is not expected to deal with attack conditions. As such, an
issue that might be encountered in some deployments is when filters
installed by means of the DOTS data channel protocol may not function
as expected during DDoS attacks or, worse, exacerbate an ongoing DDoS
attack. In such conditions, the DOTS data channel protocol cannot be
used to change these filters, which may complicate DDoS mitigation
operations [INTEROP].
A typical case is a conflict between filtering rules installed by a
DOTS client and the mitigation actions of a DDoS mitigator.
Consider, for instance, a DOTS client that configures during 'idle'
time (i.e., no mitigation is active) some filtering rules using the
DOTS data channel protocol to permit traffic from accept-listed
sources. However, during a volumetric DDoS attack, the DDoS
mitigator identifies the source addresses/prefixes in the accept-
listed filtering rules are attacking the target. For example, an
attacker can spoof the IP addresses of accept-listed sources to
generate attack traffic, or the attacker can compromise the accept-
listed sources and program them to launch a DDoS attack.
[RFC9132] is designed so that the DDoS server notifies the above
conflict to the DOTS client (that is, the 'conflict-cause' parameter
is set to 2 (conflict-with-acceptlist)), but the DOTS client may not
be able to withdraw the accept-list rules during the attack period
due to the high-volume attack traffic saturating the inbound link to
the DOTS client domain. In other words, the DOTS client cannot use
the DOTS data channel protocol to withdraw the accept-list filters
when a DDoS attack is in progress.
1.2. Controlling Filtering Rules Using DOTS Signal Channel
This specification addresses the problems discussed in Section 1.1 by
adding a capability for managing filtering rules using the DOTS
signal channel protocol, which enables a DOTS client to request the
activation (or deactivation) of filtering rules during a DDoS attack.
Note that creating these filtering rules is still the responsibility
of the DOTS data channel [RFC8783].
The DOTS signal channel protocol is designed to enable a DOTS client
to contact a DOTS server for help even under severe network
congestion conditions. Therefore, extending the DOTS signal channel
protocol to manage the filtering rules during an attack will enhance
the protection capability offered by DOTS protocols.
| Note: The experiment at the IETF 103 hackathon [INTEROP] showed
| that even when the inbound link is saturated by DDoS attack
| traffic, the DOTS client can signal mitigation requests using
| the DOTS signal channel over the saturated link.
Conflicts that are induced by filters installed by other DOTS clients
of the same domain are not discussed in this specification.
An augmentation to the DOTS signal channel YANG module is defined in
Section 3.2.2.
Sample examples are provided in Section 4, in particular:
* Section 4.1 illustrates how the filter control extension is used
when conflicts with Access Control Lists (ACLs) are detected and
reported by a DOTS server.
* Section 4.2 shows how a DOTS client can instruct a DOTS server to
safely forward some specific traffic in 'attack' time.
* Section 4.3 shows how a DOTS client can react if the DDoS traffic
is still being forwarded to the DOTS client domain even if
mitigation requests were sent to a DOTS server.
The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) encoding of YANG-modeled data
[RFC7951] is used to illustrate the examples.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in [RFC8612].
The terminology for describing YANG modules is defined in [RFC7950].
The meaning of the symbols in the tree diagram is defined in
[RFC8340] and [RFC8791].
3. Controlling Filtering Rules of a DOTS Client
3.1. Binding DOTS Data and Signal Channels
The filtering rules eventually managed using the DOTS signal channel
protocol are created a priori by the same DOTS client using the DOTS
data channel protocol. Managing conflicts with filters installed by
other DOTS clients of the same domain is out of scope.
As discussed in Section 4.4.1 of [RFC9132], a DOTS client must use
the same 'cuid' for both the DOTS signal and data channels. This
requirement is meant to facilitate binding DOTS channels used by the
same DOTS client.
The DOTS signal and data channels from a DOTS client may or may not
use the same DOTS server. Nevertheless, the scope of the mitigation
request, alias, and filtering rules are not restricted to the DOTS
server but to the DOTS server domain. To that aim, DOTS servers
within a domain are assumed to have a mechanism to coordinate the
mitigation requests, aliases, and filtering rules to coordinate their
decisions for better mitigation operation efficiency. The exact
details about such a mechanism is out of the scope of this document.
A filtering rule controlled by the DOTS signal channel is identified
by its ACL name (Section 4.3 of [RFC8783]). Note that an ACL name
unambiguously identifies an ACL bound to a DOTS client, but the same
name may be used by distinct DOTS clients.
The activation or deactivation of an ACL by the DOTS signal channel
overrides the 'activation-type' (defined in Section 4.3 of [RFC8783])
a priori conveyed with the filtering rules using the DOTS data
channel protocol.
Once the attack is mitigated, the DOTS client may use the data
channel to control the 'activation-type' (e.g., revert to a default
value) of some of the filtering rules controlled by the DOTS signal
channel or delete some of these filters. This behavior is deployment
specific.
3.2. DOTS Signal Channel Extension
3.2.1. Parameters and Behaviors
This specification extends the mitigation request defined in
Section 4.4.1 of [RFC9132] to convey the intended control of
configured filtering rules. Concretely, the DOTS client conveys the
'acl-list' attribute with the following sub-attributes in the Concise
Binary Object Representation (CBOR) body of a mitigation request (see
the YANG structure in Section 3.2.2.1):
acl-name: A name of an access list defined using the DOTS data
channel (Section 4.3 of [RFC8783]) that is associated with the
DOTS client.
As a reminder, an ACL is an ordered list of Access Control Entries
(ACEs). Each ACE has a list of match criteria and a list of
actions [RFC8783]. The list of configured ACLs can be retrieved
using the DOTS data channel during 'idle' time.
This is a mandatory attribute when 'acl-list' is included.
activation-type: An attribute indicating the activation type of an
ACL overriding the existing 'activation-type' installed by the
DOTS client using the DOTS data channel.
As a reminder, this attribute can be set to 'deactivate',
'immediate', or 'activate-when-mitigating' as defined in
[RFC8783].
Note that both 'immediate' and 'activate-when-mitigating' have an
immediate effect when a mitigation request is being processed by
the DOTS server.
This is an optional attribute.
By default, ACL-related operations are achieved using the DOTS data
channel protocol when no attack is ongoing. DOTS clients MUST NOT
use the filtering control over the DOTS signal channel in 'idle'
time; such requests MUST be discarded by DOTS servers with 4.00 (Bad
Request).
During an attack time, DOTS clients may include 'acl-list', 'acl-
name', and 'activation-type' attributes in a mitigation request.
This request may be the initial mitigation request for a given
mitigation scope or a new one overriding an existing request. In
both cases, a new 'mid' MUST be used. Nevertheless, it is NOT
RECOMMENDED to include ACL attributes in an initial mitigation
request for a given mitigation scope or in a mitigation request
adjusting the mitigation scope. This recommendation is meant to
avoid delaying attack mitigations because of failures to process ACL
attributes.
As the attack evolves, DOTS clients can adjust the 'activation-type'
of an ACL conveyed in a mitigation request or control other filters
as necessary. This can be achieved by sending a PUT request with a
new 'mid' value.
It is RECOMMENDED for a DOTS client to subscribe to asynchronous
notifications of the attack mitigation, as detailed in
Section 4.4.2.1 of [RFC9132]. If not, the polling mechanism in
Section 4.4.2.2 of [RFC9132] has to be followed by the DOTS client.
A DOTS client relies on the information received from the DOTS server
and/or local information to the DOTS client domain to trigger a
filter control request. Only filters that are pertinent for an
ongoing mitigation should be controlled by a DOTS client using the
DOTS signal channel.
'acl-list', 'acl-name', and 'activation-type' are defined as
comprehension-required parameters. Following the rules in Section 6
of [RFC9132], if the DOTS server does not understand the 'acl-list',
'acl-name', or 'activation-type' attributes, it responds with a 4.00
(Bad Request) error response code.
If the DOTS server does not find the ACL name ('acl-name') conveyed
in the mitigation request for this DOTS client, it MUST respond with
a 4.04 (Not Found) error response code.
If the DOTS server finds the ACL name for this DOTS client, and
assuming the request passed the validation checks in Section 4.4.1 of
[RFC9132], the DOTS server MUST proceed with the 'activation-type'
update. The update is immediately enforced by the DOTS server and
will be maintained as the new activation type for the ACL name even
after the termination of the mitigation request. In addition, the
DOTS server MUST update the lifetime of the corresponding ACL similar
to the update when a refresh request is received using the DOTS data
channel (Section 7.2 of [RFC8783]). If, for some reason, the DOTS
server fails to apply the filter update, it MUST respond with a 5.03
(Service Unavailable) error response code and include the failed ACL
update in the diagnostic payload of the response (an example is shown
in Figure 1). Else, the DOTS server replies with the appropriate
response code defined in Section 4.4.1 of [RFC9132].
{
"ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
"scope": [
{
"mid": 123,
"ietf-dots-signal-control:acl-list": [
{
"acl-name": "an-accept-list",
"activation-type": "deactivate"
}
]
}
]
}
}
Figure 1: Example of a Diagnostic Payload Including Failed ACL Update
The JSON/YANG mappings for DOTS filter control attributes are shown
in Table 1. As a reminder, the mapping for 'acl-name' is defined in
Table 5 of [RFC9132].
+===================+=============+======+=================+========+
| Parameter Name | YANG Type | CBOR | CBOR Major Type | JSON |
| | | Key | & Information | Type |
+===================+=============+======+=================+========+
| activation-type | enumeration | 52 | 0 unsigned | String |
+-------------------+-------------+------+-----------------+--------+
| ietf-dots- | list | 53 | 4 array | Array |
| signal- | | | | |
| control:acl-list | | | | |
+-------------------+-------------+------+-----------------+--------+
| acl-name | leafref | 23 | 3 text string | String |
+-------------------+-------------+------+-----------------+--------+
Table 1: JSON/YANG Mapping to CBOR for Filter Control Attributes
If the DOTS client receives a 5.03 (Service Unavailable) with a
diagnostic payload indicating a failed ACL update as a response to an
initial mitigation or a mitigation with adjusted scope, the DOTS
client MUST immediately send a new request that repeats all the
parameters as sent in the failed mitigation request but without
including the ACL attributes. After the expiry of Max-Age returned
in the 5.03 (Service Unavailable) response, the DOTS client retries
with a new mitigation request (i.e., a new 'mid') that repeats all
the parameters as sent in the failed mitigation request (i.e., the
one including the ACL attributes).
If, during an active mitigation, the 'activation-type' is changed at
the DOTS server (e.g., as a result of an external action) for an ACL
bound to a DOTS client, the DOTS server notifies that DOTS client of
the change by including the corresponding ACL parameters in an
asynchronous notification (the DOTS client is observing the active
mitigation) or in a response to a polling request (Section 4.4.2.2 of
[RFC9132]).
If the DOTS signal and data channels of a DOTS client are not
established with the same DOTS server of a DOTS server domain, the
above request processing operations are undertaken using the
coordination mechanism discussed in Section 3.1.
This specification does not require any modification to the efficacy
update and the withdrawal procedures defined in [RFC9132]. In
particular, ACL-related clauses are not included in a PUT request
used to send an efficacy update and DELETE requests.
3.2.2. DOTS Signal Filtering Control Module
3.2.2.1. Tree Structure
This document augments the "ietf-dots-signal-channel" YANG module
defined in [RFC9132] for managing filtering rules.
This document defines the YANG module "ietf-dots-signal-control",
which has the following tree structure:
module: ietf-dots-signal-control
augment-structure /dots-signal:dots-signal/dots-signal:message-type
/dots-signal:mitigation-scope/dots-signal:scope:
+-- acl-list* [acl-name]
+-- acl-name
| -> /data-channel:dots-data/dots-client/acls/acl/name
+-- activation-type? data-channel:activation-type
3.2.2.2. YANG Module
This YANG module is not intended to be used via NETCONF/RESTCONF for
DOTS server management purposes; such a module is out of the scope of
this document. It serves only to provide a data model and encoding,
but not a management data model.
This module uses types defined in [RFC8783].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-signal-control@2021-09-02.yang"
module ietf-dots-signal-control {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-control";
prefix dots-control;
import ietf-dots-signal-channel {
prefix dots-signal;
reference
"RFC 9132: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification";
}
import ietf-yang-structure-ext {
prefix sx;
reference
"RFC 8791: YANG Data Structure Extensions";
}
import ietf-dots-data-channel {
prefix data-channel;
reference
"RFC 8783: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel Specification";
}
organization
"IETF DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dots/>
WG List: <mailto:dots@ietf.org>
Author: Kaname Nishizuka
<mailto:kaname@nttv6.jp>
Author: Mohamed Boucadair
<mailto:mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
Author: Tirumaleswar Reddy.K
<mailto:kondtir@gmail.com>
Author: Takahiko Nagata
<mailto:nagata@lepidum.co.jp>";
description
"This module contains YANG definition for the signaling
messages exchanged between a DOTS client and a DOTS server
to control, by means of the DOTS signal channel, filtering
rules configured using the DOTS data channel.
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 9133; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2021-09-02 {
description
"Initial revision.";
reference
"RFC 9133: Controlling Filtering Rules Using Distributed
Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS)
Signal Channel";
}
sx:augment-structure "/dots-signal:dots-signal"
+ "/dots-signal:message-type"
+ "/dots-signal:mitigation-scope"
+ "/dots-signal:scope" {
description
"ACL name and activation type.";
list acl-list {
key "acl-name";
description
"List of ACLs as defined using the DOTS data
channel. ACLs bound to a DOTS client are uniquely
identified by a name.";
leaf acl-name {
type leafref {
path "/data-channel:dots-data/data-channel:dots-client"
+ "/data-channel:acls/data-channel:acl"
+ "/data-channel:name";
}
description
"Reference to the ACL name bound to a DOTS client.";
}
leaf activation-type {
type data-channel:activation-type;
default "activate-when-mitigating";
description
"Sets the activation type of an ACL.";
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
4. Some Examples
This section provides some examples to illustrate the behavior
specified in Section 3.2.1. These examples are provided for
illustration purposes; they should not be considered as deployment
recommendations.
4.1. Conflict Handling
Let's consider a DOTS client that contacts its DOTS server during
'idle' time to install an accept-list allowing for UDP traffic issued
from 2001:db8:1234::/48 with a destination port number 443 to be
forwarded to 2001:db8:6401::2/127. It does so by sending, for
example, a PUT request as shown in Figure 2.
PUT /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\
/dots-client=paL8p4Zqo4SLv64TLPXrxA/acls\
/acl=an-accept-list HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
{
"ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {
"acl": [
{
"name": "an-accept-list",
"type": "ipv6-acl-type",
"activation-type": "activate-when-mitigating",
"aces": {
"ace": [
{
"name": "test-ace-ipv6-udp",
"matches": {
"ipv6": {
"destination-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:6401::2/127",
"source-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:1234::/48"
},
"udp": {
"destination-port-range-or-operator": {
"operator": "eq",
"port": 443
}
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "accept"
}
}
]
}
}
]
}
}
Figure 2: DOTS Data Channel Request to Create a Filter
Sometime later, consider that a DDoS attack is detected by the DOTS
client on 2001:db8:6401::2/127. Consequently, the DOTS client sends
a mitigation request to its DOTS server as shown in Figure 3.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=paL8p4Zqo4SLv64TLPXrxA"
Uri-Path: "mid=123"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"
{
"ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
"scope": [
{
"target-prefix": [
"2001:db8:6401::2/127"
],
"target-protocol": [
17
],
"lifetime": 3600
}
]
}
}
Figure 3: DOTS Signal Channel Mitigation Request
The DOTS server immediately accepts the request by replying with 2.01
(Created) (Figure 4 depicts the message body of the response).
{
"ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
"scope": [
{
"mid": 123,
"lifetime": 3600
}
]
}
}
Figure 4: Status Response (Message Body)
Assuming the DOTS client subscribed to asynchronous notifications,
when the DOTS server concludes that some of the attack sources belong
to 2001:db8:1234::/48, it sends a notification message with 'status'
code set to 1 (attack-mitigation-in-progress) and 'conflict-cause'
set to 2 (conflict-with-acceptlist) to the DOTS client to indicate
that this mitigation request is in progress, but a conflict is
detected.
Upon receipt of the notification message from the DOTS server, the
DOTS client sends a PUT request to deactivate the "an-accept-list"
ACL as shown in Figure 5.
The DOTS client can also decide to send a PUT request to deactivate
the "an-accept-list" ACL if suspect traffic is received from an
accept-listed source (2001:db8:1234::/48). The structure of that PUT
is the same as the one shown in Figure 5.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=paL8p4Zqo4SLv64TLPXrxA"
Uri-Path: "mid=124"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"
{
"ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
"scope": [
{
"target-prefix": [
"2001:db8:6401::2/127"
],
"target-protocol": [
17
],
"ietf-dots-signal-control:acl-list": [
{
"acl-name": "an-accept-list",
"activation-type": "deactivate"
}
],
"lifetime": 3600
}
]
}
}
Figure 5: PUT for Deactivating a Conflicting Filter
Then, the DOTS server deactivates the "an-accept-list" ACL and
replies with a 2.04 (Changed) response to the DOTS client to confirm
the successful operation. The message body is similar to the one
depicted in Figure 4.
Once the attack is mitigated, the DOTS client may use the data
channel to retrieve its ACLs maintained by the DOTS server. As shown
in Figure 6, the activation type is set to 'deactivate' as set by the
DOTS signal channel (Figure 5) instead of the type initially set
using the DOTS data channel (Figure 2).
{
"ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {
"acl": [
{
"name": "an-accept-list",
"type": "ipv6-acl-type",
"activation-type": "deactivate",
"pending-lifetime": 10021,
"aces": {
"ace": [
{
"name": "test-ace-ipv6-udp",
"matches": {
"ipv6": {
"destination-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:6401::2/127",
"source-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:1234::/48"
},
"udp": {
"destination-port-range-or-operator": {
"operator": "eq",
"port": 443
}
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "accept"
}
}
]
}
}
]
}
}
Figure 6: DOTS Data Channel GET Response after Mitigation
(Message Body)
4.2. On-Demand Activation of an Accept-List Filter
Let's consider a DOTS client that contacts its DOTS server during
'idle' time to install an accept-list allowing for UDP traffic issued
from 2001:db8:1234::/48 to be forwarded to 2001:db8:6401::2/127. It
does so by sending, for example, a PUT request shown in Figure 7.
The DOTS server installs this filter with a "deactivated" state.
PUT /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\
/dots-client=ioiuLoZqo4SLv64TLPXrxA/acls\
/acl=my-accept-list HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
{
"ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {
"acl": [
{
"name": "my-accept-list",
"type": "ipv6-acl-type",
"activation-type": "deactivate",
"aces": {
"ace": [
{
"name": "an-ace",
"matches": {
"ipv6": {
"destination-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:6401::2/127",
"source-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:1234::/48",
"protocol": 17
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "accept"
}
}
]
}
}
]
}
}
Figure 7: DOTS Data Channel Request to Create an Accept-List Filter
Sometime later, consider that a UDP DDoS attack is detected by the
DOTS client on 2001:db8:6401::2/127 but the DOTS client wants to let
the traffic from 2001:db8:1234::/48 be accept-listed to the DOTS
client domain. Consequently, the DOTS client sends a mitigation
request to its DOTS server as shown in Figure 8.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=ioiuLoZqo4SLv64TLPXrxA"
Uri-Path: "mid=4879"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"
{
"ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
"scope": [
{
"target-prefix": [
"2001:db8:6401::2/127"
],
"target-protocol": [
17
],
"ietf-dots-signal-control:acl-list": [
{
"acl-name": "my-accept-list",
"activation-type": "immediate"
}
],
"lifetime": 3600
}
]
}
}
Figure 8: DOTS Signal Channel Mitigation Request with a Filter
Control
The DOTS server activates the "my-accept-list" ACL and replies with a
2.01 (Created) response to the DOTS client to confirm the successful
operation.
4.3. DOTS Servers/Mitigators Lacking Capacity
This section describes a scenario in which a DOTS client activates a
drop-list or a rate-limit filter during an attack.
Consider a DOTS client that contacts its DOTS server during 'idle'
time to install an accept-list that rate-limits all (or a part
thereof) traffic to be forwarded to 2001:db8:123::/48 as a last
resort countermeasure whenever required. Installing the accept-list
can be done by sending, for example, the PUT request shown in
Figure 9. The DOTS server installs this filter with a "deactivated"
state.
PUT /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\
/dots-client=OopPisZqo4SLv64TLPXrxA/acls\
/acl=my-ratelimit-list HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
{
"ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {
"acl": [
{
"name": "my-ratelimit-list",
"type": "ipv6-acl-type",
"activation-type": "deactivate",
"aces": {
"ace": [
{
"name": "my-ace",
"matches": {
"ipv6": {
"destination-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:123::/48"
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "accept",
"rate-limit": "20000.00"
}
}
]
}
}
]
}
}
Figure 9: DOTS Data Channel Request to Create a Rate-Limit Filter
Consider now that a DDoS attack is detected by the DOTS client on
2001:db8:123::/48. Consequently, the DOTS client sends a mitigation
request to its DOTS server (Figure 10).
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=OopPisZqo4SLv64TLPXrxA"
Uri-Path: "mid=85"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"
{
"ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
"scope": [
{
"target-prefix": [
"2001:db8:123::/48"
],
"lifetime": 3600
}
]
}
}
Figure 10: DOTS Signal Channel Mitigation Request
For some reason (e.g., the DOTS server, or the mitigator, is lacking
a capability or capacity), the DOTS client is still receiving attack
traffic, which saturates available links. To soften the problem, the
DOTS client decides to activate the filter that rate-limits the
traffic destined to the DOTS client domain. To that aim, the DOTS
client sends the mitigation request to its DOTS server shown in
Figure 11.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=OopPisZqo4SLv64TLPXrxA"
Uri-Path: "mid=86"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"
{
"ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
"scope": [
{
"target-prefix": [
"2001:db8:123::/48"
],
"ietf-dots-signal-control:acl-list": [
{
"acl-name": "my-ratelimit-list",
"activation-type": "immediate"
}
],
"lifetime": 3600
}
]
}
}
Figure 11: DOTS Signal Channel Mitigation Request to Activate a
Rate-Limit Filter
Then, the DOTS server activates the "my-ratelimit-list" ACL and
replies with a 2.04 (Changed) response to the DOTS client to confirm
the successful operation.
As the attack mitigation evolves, the DOTS client may decide to
deactivate the rate-limit policy (e.g., upon receipt of a
notification status change from 'attack-exceeded-capability' to
'attack-mitigation-in-progress'). Based on the mitigation status
conveyed by the DOTS server, the DOTS client can deactivate the rate-
limit action. It does so by sending the request shown in Figure 12.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=OopPisZqo4SLv64TLPXrxA"
Uri-Path: "mid=87"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"
{
"ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
"scope": [
{
"target-prefix": [
"2001:db8:123::/48"
],
"ietf-dots-signal-control:acl-list": [
{
"acl-name": "my-ratelimit-list",
"activation-type": "deactivate"
}
],
"lifetime": 3600
}
]
}
}
Figure 12: DOTS Signal Channel Mitigation Request to Deactivate a
Rate-Limit Filter
5. IANA Considerations
5.1. DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Key Values Subregistry
Per this specification, IANA has registered the following parameters
in the "DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Key Values" subregistry within the
"Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal
Channel" registry [Key-Map].
+==================+==========+=======+============+===============+
| Parameter Name | CBOR Key | CBOR | Change | Specification |
| | Value | Major | Controller | Document(s) |
| | | Type | | |
+==================+==========+=======+============+===============+
| activation-type | 52 | 0 | IESG | RFC 9133 |
+------------------+----------+-------+------------+---------------+
| ietf-dots- | 53 | 4 | IESG | RFC 9133 |
| signal- | | | | |
| control:acl-list | | | | |
+------------------+----------+-------+------------+---------------+
Table 2
5.2. A New YANG Module
IANA has registered the following URI in the "ns" subregistry within
the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-control
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.
IANA has registered the following YANG module in the "YANG Module
Names" subregistry [RFC6020] within the "YANG Parameters" registry.
Name: ietf-dots-signal-control
Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-control
Maintained by IANA: N
Prefix: dots-control
Reference: RFC 9133
6. Security Considerations
The security considerations for the DOTS signal channel protocol are
discussed in Section 11 of [RFC9132], while those for the DOTS data
channel protocol are discussed in Section 10 of [RFC8783]. The
following discusses the security considerations that are specific to
the DOTS signal channel extension defined in this document.
This specification does not allow the creation of new filtering
rules, which is the responsibility of the DOTS data channel. DOTS
client domains should be adequately prepared prior to an attack,
e.g., by creating filters that will be activated on demand when an
attack is detected.
A DOTS client is entitled to access only the resources it creates.
In particular, a DOTS client can not tweak filtering rules created by
other DOTS clients of the same DOTS client domain. As a reminder,
DOTS servers must associate filtering rules with the DOTS client that
created these resources. Failure to ensure such association by a
DOTS server will have severe impact on DOTS client domains.
A compromised DOTS client can use the filtering control capability to
exacerbate an ongoing attack. Likewise, such a compromised DOTS
client may abstain from reacting to an ACL conflict notification
received from the DOTS server during attacks. These are not new
attack vectors, but variations of threats discussed in [RFC9132] and
[RFC8783]. DOTS operators should carefully monitor and audit DOTS
agents to detect misbehaviors and deter misuses.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8783] Boucadair, M., Ed. and T. Reddy.K, Ed., "Distributed
Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data
Channel Specification", RFC 8783, DOI 10.17487/RFC8783,
May 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8783>.
[RFC8791] Bierman, A., Björklund, M., and K. Watsen, "YANG Data
Structure Extensions", RFC 8791, DOI 10.17487/RFC8791,
June 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8791>.
[RFC9132] Boucadair, M., Ed., Shallow, J., and T. Reddy.K,
"Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling
(DOTS) Signal Channel Specification", RFC 9132,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9132, September 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9132>.
7.2. Informative References
[INTEROP] Nishizuka, K., Shallow, J., and L. Xia, "DOTS Interop test
report, IETF 103 Hackathon", November 2018,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/103/materials/
slides-103-dots-interop-report-from-ietf-103-hackathon-
00>.
[Key-Map] IANA, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling
(DOTS) Signal Channel",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/dots>.
[RFC7951] Lhotka, L., "JSON Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG",
RFC 7951, DOI 10.17487/RFC7951, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7951>.
[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.
[RFC8612] Mortensen, A., Reddy, T., and R. Moskowitz, "DDoS Open
Threat Signaling (DOTS) Requirements", RFC 8612,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8612, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8612>.
[RFC8811] Mortensen, A., Ed., Reddy.K, T., Ed., Andreasen, F.,
Teague, N., and R. Compton, "DDoS Open Threat Signaling
(DOTS) Architecture", RFC 8811, DOI 10.17487/RFC8811,
August 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8811>.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Wei Pan, Xia Liang, Jon Shallow, Dan Wing, Christer
Holmberg, Shawn Emery, Tim Chown, Murray Kucherawy, Roman Danyliw,
Erik Kline, and Éric Vyncke for the comments.
Thanks to Benjamin Kaduk for the AD review.
Authors' Addresses
Kaname Nishizuka
NTT Communications
GranPark 16F 3-4-1 Shibaura, Minato-ku, Tokyo
108-8118
Japan
Email: kaname@nttv6.jp
Mohamed Boucadair
Orange
35000 Rennes
France
Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
Tirumaleswar Reddy.K
Akamai
Embassy Golf Link Business Park
Bangalore 560071
Karnataka
India
Email: kondtir@gmail.com
Takahiko Nagata
Lepidum
Japan
Email: nagata@lepidum.co.jp
