Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Bush
Request for Comments: 9632 IIJ Research & Arrcus
Obsoletes: 9092 M. Candela
Category: Standards Track NTT
ISSN: 2070-1721 W. Kumari
Google
R. Housley
Vigil Security
August 2024
Finding and Using Geofeed Data
Abstract
This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy
Specification Language (RPSL) inetnum: class to refer specifically to
geofeed comma-separated values (CSV) data files and describes an
optional scheme that uses the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) to authenticate the geofeed data files. This document
obsoletes RFC 9092.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9632.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1.1. Requirements Language
2. Geofeed Files
3. inetnum: Class
4. Fetching Geofeed Data
5. Authenticating Geofeed Data (Optional)
6. Operational Considerations
7. Privacy Considerations
8. Implementation Status
9. Security Considerations
10. IANA Considerations
11. References
11.1. Normative References
11.2. Informative References
Appendix A. Example
Acknowledgments
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
Providers of Internet content and other services may wish to
customize those services based on the geographic location of the user
of the service. This is often done using the source IP address used
to contact the service, which may not point to a user; see Section 14
of [RFC6269] in particular. Also, administrators of infrastructure
and other services might wish to publish the locale of said
infrastructure or services. infrastructure and other services might
wish to publish the locale of their services. [RFC8805] defines
geofeed, a syntax to associate geographic locales with IP addresses,
but it does not specify how to find the relevant geofeed data given
an IP address.
This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy
Specification Language (RPSL) [RFC2725] inetnum: class to refer
specifically to geofeed data files and how to prudently use them. In
all places inetnum: is used, inet6num: should also be assumed
[RFC4012].
The reader may find [INETNUM] and [INET6NUM] informative, and
certainly more verbose, descriptions of the inetnum: database
classes.
An optional utterly awesome but slightly complex means for
authenticating geofeed data is also defined in Section 5.
This document obsoletes [RFC9092]. Changes from [RFC9092] include
the following:
* RIPE has implemented the geofeed: attribute.
* This document allows, but discourages, an inetnum: to have both a
geofeed remarks: attribute and a geofeed: attribute.
* The Authentication section (Section 5) has been rewritten to be
more formal.
* Geofeed files are only UTF-8 CSV.
* This document stresses that authenticating geofeed data is
optional.
* IP Address Delegation extensions must not use "inherit".
* If geofeed data are present, geographic location hints in other
data should be ignored.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Geofeed Files
Geofeed files are described in [RFC8805]. They provide a facility
for an IP address resource "owner" to associate those IP addresses to
geographic locales.
Per [RFC8805], geofeed files consist of comma-separated values (CSV)
in UTF-8 text format, not HTML, richtext, or other formats.
Content providers and other parties who wish to locate an IP address
to a geographic locale need to find the relevant geofeed data. In
Section 3, this document specifies how to find the relevant geofeed
[RFC8805] file given an IP address.
Geofeed data for large providers with significant horizontal scale
and high granularity can be quite large. The size of a file can be
even larger if an unsigned geofeed file combines data for many
prefixes, if dual IPv4/IPv6 spaces are represented, etc.
Geofeed data do have privacy considerations (see Section 7); this
process makes bulk access to those data easier.
This document also suggests an optional signature to strongly
authenticate the data in the geofeed files.
3. inetnum: Class
The original RPSL specifications starting with [RIPE81], [RIPE181],
and a trail of subsequent documents were written by the RIPE
community. The IETF standardized RPSL in [RFC2622] and [RFC4012].
Since then, it has been modified and extensively enhanced in the
Regional Internet Registry (RIR) community, mostly by RIPE [RIPE-DB].
At the time of publishing this document, change control of the RPSL
effectively lies in the operator community.
The inetnum: database class is specified by the RPSL, as well as
Routing Policy System Security [RFC2725] and RPSLng [RFC4012], which
are used by the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). Each of these
objects describes an IP address range and its attributes. The
inetnum: objects form a hierarchy ordered on the address space.
Ideally, the RPSL would be augmented to define a new RPSL geofeed:
attribute in the inetnum: class. Absent implementation of the
geofeed: attribute in a particular RIR database, this document
defines the syntax of a Geofeed remarks: attribute, which contains an
HTTPS URL of a geofeed file. The format of the inetnum: geofeed
remarks: attribute MUST be as in this example, "remarks: Geofeed ",
where the token "Geofeed " MUST be case sensitive, followed by a URL
that will vary, but it MUST refer only to a single geofeed [RFC8805]
file.
inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example
remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed
While we leave global agreement of RPSL modification to the relevant
parties, we specify that a proper geofeed: attribute in the inetnum:
class MUST be "geofeed:" and MUST be followed by a single URL that
will vary, but it MUST refer only to a single geofeed [RFC8805] file.
inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example
geofeed: https://example.com/geofeed
The URL uses HTTPS, so the WebPKI provides authentication, integrity,
and confidentiality for the fetched geofeed file. However, the
WebPKI cannot provide authentication of IP address space assignment.
In contrast, the RPKI (see [RFC6481]) can be used to authenticate IP
space assignment; see optional authentication in Section 5.
Until all producers of inetnum: objects, i.e., the RIRs, state that
they have migrated to supporting a geofeed: attribute, consumers
looking at inetnum: objects to find geofeed URLs MUST be able to
consume both the remarks: and geofeed: forms.
The migration not only implies that the RIRs support the geofeed:
attribute, but that all registrants have migrated any inetnum:
objects from remarks: to geofeed: attributes.
Any particular inetnum: object SHOULD have, at most, one geofeed
reference, whether a remarks: or a proper geofeed: attribute when it
is implemented. As the remarks: form cannot be formally checked by
the RIR, this cannot be formally enforced. A geofeed: attribute is
preferred, of course, if the RIR supports it. If there is more than
one type of attribute in the intetnum: object, the geofeed: attribute
MUST be used.
For inetnum: objects covering the same address range, a signed
geofeed file MUST be preferred over an unsigned file. If none are
signed, or more than one is signed, the (signed) inetnum: with the
most recent last-modified: attribute MUST be preferred.
If a geofeed file describes multiple disjoint ranges of IP address
space, there are likely to be geofeed references from multiple
inetnum: objects. Files with geofeed references from multiple
inetnum: objects are not compatible with the signing procedure in
Section 5.
An unsigned, and only an unsigned, geofeed file MAY be referenced by
multiple inetnum: objects and MAY contain prefixes from more than one
registry.
When fetching, the most specific inetnum: object with a geofeed
reference MUST be used.
It is significant that geofeed data may have finer granularity than
the inetnum: that refers to them. For example, an INETNUM object for
an address range P could refer to a geofeed file in which P has been
subdivided into one or more longer prefixes.
4. Fetching Geofeed Data
This document provides a guideline for how interested parties should
fetch and read geofeed files.
Historically, before [RFC9092], this was done in varied ways, at the
discretion of the implementor, often without consistent
authentication, where data were mostly imported from email without
formal authorization or validation.
To minimize the load on RIRs' WHOIS [RFC3912] services, the RIR's FTP
[RFC0959] services SHOULD be used for large-scale access to gather
inetnum: objects with geofeed references. This uses efficient bulk
access instead of fetching via brute-force search through the IP
space.
When reading data from an unsigned geofeed file, one MUST ignore data
outside the referring inetnum: object's address range. This is to
avoid importing data about ranges not under the control of the
operator. Note that signed files MUST only contain prefixes within
the referring inetnum:'s range as mandated in Section 5.
If geofeed files are fetched, other location information from the
inetnum: MUST be ignored.
Given an address range of interest, the most specific inetnum: object
with a geofeed reference MUST be used to fetch the geofeed file. For
example, if the fetching party finds the following inetnum: objects:
inetnum: 192.0.0.0/22 # example
remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed_1
inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example
remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed_2
An application looking for geofeed data for 192.0.2.0/29 MUST ignore
data in geofeed_1 because 192.0.2.0/29 is within the more specific
192.0.2.0/24 inetnum: covering that address range and that inetnum:
does have a geofeed reference.
Hints in inetnum: objects such as country:, geoloc:, etc., tend to be
administrative, and not deployment specific. Consider large,
possibly global, providers with headquarters very far from most of
their deployments. Therefore, if geofeed data are specified, either
as a geofeed: attribute or in a geofeed remarks: attribute, other
geographic hints such as country:, geoloc:, DNS geoloc RRsets, etc.,
for that address range MUST be ignored.
There is open-source code to traverse the RPSL data across all of the
RIRs, collect all geofeed references, and process them
[GEOFEED-FINDER]. It implements the steps above and of all the
Operational Considerations described in Section 6, including caching.
It produces a single geofeed file, merging all the geofeed files
found. This open-source code can be run daily by a cron job, and the
output file can be directly used.
RIRs are converging on Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)
support, which includes geofeed data; see [RDAP-GEOFEED]. This
SHOULD NOT be used for bulk retrieval of geofeed data.
5. Authenticating Geofeed Data (Optional)
The question arises whether a particular geofeed [RFC8805] data set
is valid, i.e., is authorized by the "owner" of the IP address space
and is authoritative in some sense. The inetnum: that points to the
geofeed [RFC8805] file provides some assurance. Unfortunately, the
RPSL in some repositories is weakly authenticated at best. An
approach where the RPSL was signed per [RFC7909] would be good,
except it would have to be deployed by all RPSL registries, and there
is a fair number of them.
The remainder of this section specifies an optional authenticator for
the geofeed data set that follows "Signed Object Template for the
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)" [RFC6488].
A single optional authenticator MAY be appended to a geofeed
[RFC8805] file. It is a digest of the main body of the file signed
by the private key of the relevant RPKI certificate for a covering
address range. The following format bundles the relevant RPKI
certificate with a signature over the geofeed text.
The canonicalization procedure converts the data from their internal
character representation to the UTF-8 [RFC3629] character encoding,
and the <CRLF> sequence MUST be used to denote the end of each line
of text. A blank line is represented solely by the <CRLF> sequence.
For robustness, any non-printable characters MUST NOT be changed by
canonicalization. Trailing blank lines MUST NOT appear at the end of
the file. That is, the file must not end with multiple consecutive
<CRLF> sequences. Any end-of-file marker used by an operating system
is not considered to be part of the file content. When present, such
end-of-file markers MUST NOT be covered by the digital signature.
If the authenticator is not in the canonical form described above,
then the authenticator is invalid.
Borrowing detached signatures from [RFC5485], after file
canonicalization, the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] is
used to create a detached DER-encoded signature that is then Base64
encoded with padding (as defined in Section 4 of [RFC4648]) and line
wrapped to 72 or fewer characters. The same digest algorithm MUST be
used for calculating the message digest of the content being signed,
which is the geofeed file, and for calculating the message digest on
the SignerInfo SignedAttributes [RFC8933]. The message digest
algorithm identifier MUST appear in both the CMS SignedData
DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers and the SignerInfo
DigestAlgorithmIdentifier [RFC5652]. The RPKI certificate covering
the geofeed inetnum: object's address range is included in the CMS
SignedData certificates field [RFC5652].
The address range of the signing certificate MUST cover all prefixes
in the signed geofeed file. If not, the authenticator is invalid.
The signing certificate MUST NOT include the Autonomous System
Identifier Delegation certificate extension [RFC3779]. If it is
present, the authenticator is invalid.
As with many other RPKI signed objects, the IP Address Delegation
certificate extension MUST NOT use the "inherit" capability defined
in Section 2.2.3.5 of [RFC3779]. If "inherit" is used, the
authenticator is invalid.
An IP Address Delegation extension using "inherit" would complicate
processing. The implementation would have to build the certification
path from the end entity to the trust anchor, then validate the path
from the trust anchor to the end entity, and then the parameter would
have to be remembered when the validated public key was used to
validate a signature on a CMS object. Having to remember things from
certification path validation for use with CMS object processing
would be quite complex and error-prone. Additionally, the
certificates do not get that much bigger by repeating the
information.
An address range A "covers" address range B if the range of B is
identical to or a subset of A. "Address range" is used here because
inetnum: objects and RPKI certificates need not align on Classless
Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) [RFC4632] prefix boundaries, while those
of the lines in a geofeed file do align.
The Certification Authority (CA) SHOULD sign only one geofeed file
with each generated private key and SHOULD generate a new key pair
for each new version of a particular geofeed file. The CA MUST
generate a new end entity (EE) certificate for each signing of a
particular geofeed file. An associated EE certificate used in this
fashion is termed a "one-time-use" EE certificate (see Section 3 of
[RFC6487]).
Identifying the private key associated with the certificate and
getting the department that controls the private key (which might be
stored in a Hardware Security Module (HSM)) to generate the CMS
signature is left as an exercise for the implementor. On the other
hand, verifying the signature has no similar complexity; the
certificate, which is validated in the public RPKI, contains the
needed public key. The RPKI trust anchors for the RIRs are expected
to already be available to the party performing signature validation.
Validation of the CMS signature over the geofeed file involves:
1. Obtaining the signer's certificate from the CMS SignedData
CertificateSet [RFC5652]. The certificate SubjectKeyIdentifier
extension [RFC5280] MUST match the SubjectKeyIdentifier in the
CMS SignerInfo SignerIdentifier [RFC5652]. If the key
identifiers do not match, then validation MUST fail.
2. Validating the signer's certificate MUST ensure that it is part
of the current [RFC9286] manifest and that all resources are
covered by the RPKI certificate.
3. Constructing the certification path for the signer's certificate.
All of the needed certificates are expected to be readily
available in the RPKI repository. The certification path MUST be
valid according to the validation algorithm in [RFC5280] and the
additional checks specified in [RFC3779] associated with the IP
Address Delegation certificate extension and the Autonomous
System Identifier Delegation certificate extension. If
certification path validation is unsuccessful, then validation
MUST fail.
4. Validating the CMS SignedData as specified in [RFC5652] using the
public key from the validated signer's certificate. If the
signature validation is unsuccessful, then validation MUST fail.
5. Confirming that the eContentType object identifier (OID) is id-
ct-geofeedCSVwithCRLF (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.47). This OID
MUST appear within both the eContentType in the encapContentInfo
object and within the ContentType signed attribute in the
signerInfo object (see [RFC6488]).
6. Verifying that the IP Address Delegation certificate extension
[RFC3779] covers all of the address ranges of the geofeed file.
If all of the address ranges are not covered, then validation
MUST fail.
All of the above steps MUST be successful to consider the geofeed
file signature as valid.
The authenticator MUST be hidden as a series of "#" comments at the
end of the geofeed file. The following simple example is
cryptographically incorrect:
# RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0 - 192.0.2.255
# MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ
# IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu
...
# imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa
# O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk=
# End Signature: 192.0.2.0 - 192.0.2.255
A correct and full example is in Appendix A.
The CMS signature does not cover the signature lines.
The bracketing "# RPKI Signature:" and "# End Signature:" MUST be
present as shown in the example. The RPKI Signature's IP address
range MUST match that of the geofeed URL in the inetnum: that points
to the geofeed file.
6. Operational Considerations
To create the needed inetnum: objects, an operator wishing to
register the location of their geofeed file needs to coordinate with
their Regional Internet Registry (RIR) or National Internet Registry
(NIR) and/or any provider Local Internet Registry (LIR) that has
assigned address ranges to them. RIRs/NIRs provide means for
assignees to create and maintain inetnum: objects. They also provide
means of assigning or sub-assigning IP address resources and allowing
the assignee to create WHOIS data, including inetnum: objects,
thereby referring to geofeed files.
The geofeed files MUST be published via and fetched using HTTPS
[RFC9110].
When using data from a geofeed file, one MUST ignore data outside the
referring inetnum: object's inetnum: attribute address range.
If and only if the geofeed file is not signed per Section 5, then
multiple inetnum: objects MAY refer to the same geofeed file, and the
consumer MUST use only lines in the geofeed file where the prefix is
covered by the address range of the inetnum: object's URL it has
followed.
If the geofeed file is signed, and the signer's certificate changes,
the signature in the geofeed file MUST be updated.
It is good key hygiene to use a given key for only one purpose. To
dedicate a signing private key for signing a geofeed file, an RPKI
Certification Authority (CA) may issue a subordinate certificate
exclusively for the purpose shown in Appendix A.
Harvesting and publishing aggregated geofeed data outside of the RPSL
model should be avoided as it could lead to detailed data of one
aggregatee undesirably affecting the less detailed data of a
different aggregatee. Moreover, publishing aggregated geofeed data
prevents the reader of the data from performing the checks described
in Sections 4 and 5.
At the time of publishing this document, geolocation providers have
bulk WHOIS data access at all the RIRs. An anonymized version of
such data is openly available for all RIRs except ARIN, which
requires an authorization. However, for users without such
authorization, the same result can be achieved with extra RDAP
effort. There is open-source code to pass over such data across all
RIRs, collect all geofeed references, and process them
[GEOFEED-FINDER].
To prevent undue load on RPSL and geofeed servers, entity-fetching
geofeed data using these mechanisms MUST NOT do frequent real-time
lookups. Section 3.4 of [RFC8805] suggests use of the HTTP Expires
header [RFC9111] to signal when geofeed data should be refetched. As
the data change very infrequently, in the absence of such an HTTP
Header signal, collectors SHOULD NOT fetch more frequently than
weekly. It would be polite not to fetch at magic times such as
midnight UTC, the first of the month, etc., because too many others
are likely to do the same.
7. Privacy Considerations
[RFC8805] geofeed data may reveal the approximate location of an IP
address, which might in turn reveal the approximate location of an
individual user. Unfortunately, [RFC8805] provides no privacy
guidance on avoiding or ameliorating possible damage due to this
exposure of the user. In publishing pointers to geofeed files as
described in this document, the operator should be aware of this
exposure in geofeed data and be cautious. All the privacy
considerations of Section 4 of [RFC8805] apply to this document.
Where [RFC8805] provided the ability to publish location data, this
document makes bulk access to those data readily available. This is
a goal, not an accident.
8. Implementation Status
At the time of publishing this document, the geofeed: attribute in
inetnum objects has been implemented in the RIPE and APNIC databases.
Registrants in databases that do not yet support the geofeed:
attribute are using the remarks: attribute, or equivalent.
At the time of publishing this document, the registry data published
by ARIN are not the same RPSL as that of the other registries (see
[RFC7485] for a survey of the WHOIS Tower of Babel). Therefore, when
fetching from ARIN via FTP [RFC0959], WHOIS [RFC3912], the RDAP
[RFC9082], etc., the "NetRange" attribute/key must be treated as
"inetnum", and the "Comment" attribute must be treated as "remarks".
[rpki-client] can be used to authenticate a signed geofeed file.
9. Security Considerations
It is generally prudent for a consumer of geofeed data to also use
other sources to cross-validate the data. All the security
considerations of [RFC8805] apply here as well.
The consumer of geofeed data SHOULD fetch and process the data
themselves. Importing data sets produced and/or processed by a
third-party places significant trust in the third-party.
As mentioned in Section 5, some RPSL repositories have weak, if any,
authentication. This allows spoofing of inetnum: objects pointing to
malicious geofeed files. Section 5 suggests an unfortunately complex
method for stronger authentication based on the RPKI.
For example, if an inetnum: for a wide address range (e.g., a /16)
points to an RPKI-signed geofeed file, a customer or attacker could
publish an unsigned equal or narrower (e.g., a /24) inetnum: in a
WHOIS registry that has weak authorization, abusing the rule that the
most-specific inetnum: object with a geofeed reference MUST be used.
If signatures were mandatory, the above attack would be stymied, but
of course that is not happening anytime soon.
The RPSL providers have had to throttle fetching from their servers
due to too-frequent queries. Usually, they throttle by the querying
IP address or block. Similar defenses will likely need to be
deployed by geofeed file servers.
10. IANA Considerations
In the SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) in the Structure of Management Information
(SMI) Numbers (MIB Module Registrations) registry group (located at
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/>), the reference for
this registration has been updated to this document:
+=========+==========================+===========+
| Decimal | Description | Reference |
+=========+==========================+===========+
| 47 | id-ct-geofeedCSVwithCRLF | RFC 9632 |
+---------+--------------------------+-----------+
Table 1: From SMI Security for S/MIME Module
Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2622] Alaettinoglu, C., Villamizar, C., Gerich, E., Kessens, D.,
Meyer, D., Bates, T., Karrenberg, D., and M. Terpstra,
"Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL)", RFC 2622,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2622, June 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2622>.
[RFC2725] Villamizar, C., Alaettinoglu, C., Meyer, D., and S.
Murphy, "Routing Policy System Security", RFC 2725,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2725, December 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2725>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
[RFC4012] Blunk, L., Damas, J., Parent, F., and A. Robachevsky,
"Routing Policy Specification Language next generation
(RPSLng)", RFC 4012, DOI 10.17487/RFC4012, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4012>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8805] Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W.
Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation
Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8805>.
[RFC8933] Housley, R., "Update to the Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS) for Algorithm Identifier Protection", RFC 8933,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8933, October 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8933>.
[RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110>.
[RFC9286] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 9286, DOI 10.17487/RFC9286, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9286>.
11.2. Informative References
[GEOFEED-FINDER]
"geofeed-finder", commit 5f557a4, March 2024,
<https://github.com/massimocandela/geofeed-finder>.
[INET6NUM] RIPE NCC, "RIPE Database Documentation: Description of the
INET6NUM Object", <https://apps.db.ripe.net/docs/RPSL-
Object-Types/Descriptions-of-Primary-Objects/#description-
of-the-inet6num-object>.
[INETNUM] RIPE NCC, "RIPE Database Documentation: Description of the
INETNUM Object", <https://apps.db.ripe.net/docs/RPSL-
Object-Types/Descriptions-of-Primary-Objects/#description-
of-the-inetnum-object>.
[RDAP-GEOFEED]
Singh, J. and T. Harrison, "An RDAP Extension for Geofeed
Data", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
regext-rdap-geofeed-07, 6 August 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-regext-
rdap-geofeed-07>.
[RFC0959] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol",
STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, October 1985,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc959>.
[RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3912, September 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3912>.
[RFC4632] Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
(CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, DOI 10.17487/RFC4632, August
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4632>.
[RFC5485] Housley, R., "Digital Signatures on Internet-Draft
Documents", RFC 5485, DOI 10.17487/RFC5485, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5485>.
[RFC6269] Ford, M., Ed., Boucadair, M., Durand, A., Levis, P., and
P. Roberts, "Issues with IP Address Sharing", RFC 6269,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6269, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6269>.
[RFC7485] Zhou, L., Kong, N., Shen, S., Sheng, S., and A. Servin,
"Inventory and Analysis of WHOIS Registration Objects",
RFC 7485, DOI 10.17487/RFC7485, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7485>.
[RFC7909] Kisteleki, R. and B. Haberman, "Securing Routing Policy
Specification Language (RPSL) Objects with Resource Public
Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Signatures", RFC 7909,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7909, June 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7909>.
[RFC9082] Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "Registration Data Access
Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", STD 95, RFC 9082,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9082, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9082>.
[RFC9092] Bush, R., Candela, M., Kumari, W., and R. Housley,
"Finding and Using Geofeed Data", RFC 9092,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9092, July 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9092>.
[RFC9111] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Caching", STD 98, RFC 9111,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9111, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9111>.
[RIPE-DB] RIPE NCC, "RIPE Database Documentation", September 2023,
<https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-
asns/db/support/documentation/ripe-database-
documentation>.
[RIPE181] RIPE NCC, "Representation Of IP Routing Policies In A
Routing Registry", October 1994,
<https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-181>.
[RIPE81] RIPE NCC, "Representation Of IP Routing Policies In The
RIPE Database", February 1993,
<https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-081>.
[rpki-client]
Snijders, J., "Example on how to use rpki-client to
authenticate a signed Geofeed", September 2023,
<https://sobornost.net/~job/
using_geofeed_authenticators.txt>.
Appendix A. Example
This appendix provides an example, including a trust anchor, a
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) signed by the trust anchor, a CA
certificate subordinate to the trust anchor, a CRL signed by the CA,
an end entity certificate subordinate to the CA for signing the
geofeed, and a detached signature.
The trust anchor is represented by a self-signed certificate. As
usual in the RPKI, the trust anchor has authority over all IPv4
address blocks, all IPv6 address blocks, and all Autonomous System
(AS) numbers.
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
The CRL is issued by the trust anchor.
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----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-----END X509 CRL-----
The CA certificate is issued by the trust anchor. This certificate
grants authority over one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24) and two
AS numbers (64496 and 64497).
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIE7DCCA9SgAwIBAgIUcyCzS10hdfG65kbRq7toQAvRDLkwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL
BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMzA5MjMxNTU1MzhaFw0yNDA5
MjIxNTU1MzhaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVG
QzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDc
zz1qwTxC2ocw5rqp8ktm2XyYkl8riBVuqlXwfefTxsR2YFpgz9vkYUd5Az9EVEG7
6wGIyZbtmhK63eEeaqbKz2GHub467498BXeVrYysO+YuIGgCEYKznNDZ4j5aaDbo
j5+4/z0Qvv6HEsxQd0f8br6lKJwgeRM6+fm7796HNPB0aqD7Zj9NRCLXjbB0DCgJ
liH6rXMKR86ofgll9V2mRjesvhdKYgkGbOif9rvxVpLJ/6zdru5CE9yeuJZ59l+n
YH/r6PzdJ4Q7yKrJX8qD6A60j4+biaU4MQ72KpsjhQNTTqF/HRwi0N54GDaknEwE
TnJQHgLJDYqww9yKWtjjAgMBAAGjggIUMIICEDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUOs4s70+yG30R
4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUwL1SXb7SeLIW7LOjQ5XSBguZCDIwDwYD
VR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggr
BgEFBQcOAjBDBgNVHR8EPDA6MDigNqA0hjJyc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5u
ZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS9leGFtcGxlLXRhLmNybDBOBggrBgEFBQcBAQRCMEAwPgYI
KwYBBQUHMAKGMnJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4
YW1wbGUtdGEuY2VyMIG5BggrBgEFBQcBCwSBrDCBqTA+BggrBgEFBQcwCoYycnN5
bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvZXhhbXBsZS1jYS5tZnQw
NQYIKwYBBQUHMA2GKWh0dHBzOi8vcnJkcC5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9ub3RpZmljYXRp
b24ueG1sMDAGCCsGAQUFBzAFhiRyc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVw
b3NpdG9yeS8wHwYIKwYBBQUHAQcBAf8EEDAOMAwEAgABMAYDBADAAAIwIQYIKwYB
BQUHAQgBAf8EEjAQoA4wDDAKAgMA+/ACAwD78TANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEA
arIrZWb22wFmP+hVjhdg3IsKHB6fQdMuUR0u2DyZTVvbL6C+HyGAH32pi5mR/QLX
FAfdqALaB7r68tQTGLIW6bGljT+BqUPJmZcj56x3cBLJlltxwFatTloypjFt3cls
xFCuuD9J2iBxc6odTKi6u0mhQjD+C9m4xkbe8XXWWx85IHm1s6rYbpGgiMWxBC80
qqAzmBHGROWKUEvh00EYIYdiAvyFcrj7QtDiRJL5TDOySVd9pWJkerDzhqwE1IaZ
rpHck+lkYTS7jTD++6v32HG62GdsmryOQUk3aU1rLb3kS8vzaGbrgHpGPid0Hd0x
ZSl1AoIMpp5mZ7/h9aW5+A==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
The CRL is issued by the CA.
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----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-----END X509 CRL-----
The end entity certificate is issued by the CA. This certificate
grants signature authority for one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24).
Signature authority for AS numbers is not needed for geofeed data
signatures, so no AS numbers are included in the end entity
certificate.
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
The end entity certificate is displayed below in detail. For
brevity, the other two certificates are not.
0 1110: SEQUENCE {
4 830: SEQUENCE {
8 3: [0] {
10 1: INTEGER 2
: }
13 20: INTEGER
: 27 AD 39 40 83 D7 F2 B5 B9 9B 86 70 C7 75 B2 B9
: 6E E1 66 F0
35 13: SEQUENCE {
37 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
48 0: NULL
: }
50 51: SEQUENCE {
52 49: SET {
54 47: SEQUENCE {
56 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
61 40: PrintableString
: '3ACE2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642'
: }
: }
: }
103 30: SEQUENCE {
105 13: UTCTime 23/09/2023 15:55:38 GMT
120 13: UTCTime 19/07/2024 15:55:38 GMT
: }
135 51: SEQUENCE {
137 49: SET {
139 47: SEQUENCE {
141 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
146 40: PrintableString
: '914652A3BD51C144260198889F5C45ABF053A187'
: }
: }
: }
188 290: SEQUENCE {
192 13: SEQUENCE {
194 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
205 0: NULL
: }
207 271: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
212 266: SEQUENCE {
216 257: INTEGER
: 00 B2 71 34 2B 39 BF EA 07 65 B7 8B 72 A2 F0 F8
: 40 FC 31 16 CA 28 B6 4E 01 A8 F6 98 02 C0 EF 65
: B0 84 48 E9 96 FF 93 E6 92 89 65 8F F6 44 9C CE
: 57 10 82 D3 C2 57 0A FA DA 14 D0 64 22 28 C0 13
: 74 04 BD 1C 2B 4F F9 93 58 A6 25 D8 B9 A9 D3 37
: 9E F2 AC C0 CF 02 9E 84 75 D6 F0 7C A5 01 70 AE
: E6 66 AF 9C 69 85 74 6F 13 E9 B3 B8 95 4B 82 ED
: 95 D6 EA 66 05 7B 96 96 87 B2 9A E7 61 E9 65 89
: F8 60 E3 C0 F5 CE DD 18 97 05 E8 C1 AC E1 4D 5E
: 16 85 2D ED 3C CB 80 CF 7E BF D2 FE D5 C9 38 19
: BB 43 34 29 B6 66 CF 2D 8B 46 7E 9A D8 BB 8E 65
: 88 51 6A A8 FF 78 51 E2 E9 21 27 D7 77 7E 80 28
: 6C EA 4C 50 9C 73 71 16 F6 5E 54 14 4D 4C 14 B9
: 67 A0 4A 20 AA DA 0B A0 A0 01 B7 42 24 38 51 8A
: 78 2F C4 81 E6 81 75 62 DE E3 AF 5D 74 2F 6B 41
: FB 79 C3 A8 3A 72 6C 46 F9 A6 03 74 81 01 DF 8C
: EB
477 3: INTEGER 65537
: }
: }
: }
482 352: [3] {
486 348: SEQUENCE {
490 29: SEQUENCE {
492 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
497 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
499 20: OCTET STRING
: 91 46 52 A3 BD 51 C1 44 26 01 98 88 9F 5C 45 AB
: F0 53 A1 87
: }
: }
521 31: SEQUENCE {
523 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)
528 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
530 22: SEQUENCE {
532 20: [0]
: 3A CE 2C EF 4F B2 1B 7D 11 E3 E1 84 EF C1 E2 97
: B3 77 86 42
: }
: }
: }
554 14: SEQUENCE {
556 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
561 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
564 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
566 2: BIT STRING 7 unused bits
: '1'B (bit 0)
: }
: }
570 24: SEQUENCE {
572 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32)
577 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
580 14: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
582 12: SEQUENCE {
584 10: SEQUENCE {
586 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: resourceCertificatePolicy (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 14 2)
: }
: }
: }
: }
596 97: SEQUENCE {
598 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
603 90: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
605 88: SEQUENCE {
607 86: SEQUENCE {
609 84: [0] {
611 82: [0] {
613 80: [6]
: 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE'
: '2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.crl'
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
695 108: SEQUENCE {
697 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: authorityInfoAccess (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1)
707 96: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
709 94: SEQUENCE {
711 92: SEQUENCE {
713 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: caIssuers (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2)
723 80: [6]
: 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE'
: '2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.cer'
: }
: }
: }
: }
805 31: SEQUENCE {
807 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: ipAddrBlocks (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7)
817 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
820 16: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
822 14: SEQUENCE {
824 12: SEQUENCE {
826 2: OCTET STRING 00 01
830 6: SEQUENCE {
832 4: BIT STRING
: '010000000000000000000011'B
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
838 13: SEQUENCE {
840 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
851 0: NULL
: }
853 257: BIT STRING
: 97 1B 76 E4 55 1E 7B 4F AE 0A 27 53 1F EE 29 EC
: 0B 77 BB 69 DC 80 77 06 4E C6 A0 DD 47 28 3E 37
: 04 FC 8D 49 81 02 51 BB D4 E2 33 88 8D 07 50 BB
: 2D B7 5D D7 7D 60 31 D9 62 2F 91 90 DC FE 10 7C
: A9 DF 92 E3 D1 E9 2D 55 F2 CB AA E9 94 F5 29 04
: 72 2C 9C 7E 10 F8 03 37 6A DB FE 28 E2 D1 33 8A
: E9 12 8F 34 17 46 95 75 4B 8E D8 78 C7 FB AE D4
: EE 15 E7 81 8B 12 10 C0 3D 00 BC 21 49 B9 8A 7B
: 4B FC 7C 75 33 5C 76 A6 D3 7F FA 3E 47 0F 75 D4
: 5D DD F1 D7 7C A2 B3 AB BB E7 C9 DB 03 B3 43 E3
: 42 4D 84 61 B9 24 D1 90 80 37 21 2F 82 10 CC 88
: 72 94 C3 42 F9 B2 94 8B 2C 8C 1F 3D CC AA 85 40
: 92 52 01 F3 A2 16 51 CB FB D8 C7 A4 AB E8 B8 E9
: 3F F0 DD 19 DA 1A 7E 31 ED 10 09 72 D5 49 5B 0D
: DE E5 83 2B 16 74 1C BA E6 86 3A CD 10 72 8C 56
: EC 18 B8 5B B1 20 F1 F2 B5 7D DF DF E9 F8 D9 F7
: }
To allow reproduction of the signature results, the end entity
private key is provided. For brevity, the other two private keys are
not.
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
The signing of "192.0.2.0/24,US,WA,Seattle," (terminated by CR and
LF) yields the following detached CMS signature.
# RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24
# MIIGQAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGMTCCBi0CAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ
# IhvcNAQkQAS+gggRaMIIEVjCCAz6gAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZv
# AwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExR
# TNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMzA5MjMxNTU1MzhaFw0yNDA3MTkx
# NTU1MzhaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM
# 0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycT
# QrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEWyii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQg
# tPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0cK0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZm
# r5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upmBXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXha
# FLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQptmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKG
# zqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEogqtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQ
# ft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMBAAGjggFgMIIBXDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71R
# wUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkI
# wDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgeAMBgGA1UdIAEB/wQOMAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHDgIwYQYDVR
# 0fBFowWDBWoFSgUoZQcnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvc
# nkvM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0Mi5jcmww
# bAYIKwYBBQUHAQEEYDBeMFwGCCsGAQUFBzAChlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXB
# sZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRT
# I5N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNlcjAfBggrBgEFBQcBBwEB/wQQMA4wDAQCAAEwBgMEAMAAA
# jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAlxt25FUee0+uCidTH+4p7At3u2ncgHcGTsag
# 3UcoPjcE/I1JgQJRu9TiM4iNB1C7Lbdd131gMdliL5GQ3P4QfKnfkuPR6S1V8su
# q6ZT1KQRyLJx+EPgDN2rb/iji0TOK6RKPNBdGlXVLjth4x/uu1O4V54GLEhDAPQ
# C8IUm5intL/Hx1M1x2ptN/+j5HD3XUXd3x13yis6u758nbA7ND40JNhGG5JNGQg
# DchL4IQzIhylMNC+bKUiyyMHz3MqoVAklIB86IWUcv72Mekq+i46T/w3RnaGn4x
# 7RAJctVJWw3e5YMrFnQcuuaGOs0QcoxW7Bi4W7Eg8fK1fd/f6fjZ9zGCAaowggG
# mAgEDgBSRRlKjvVHBRCYBmIifXEWr8FOhhzALBglghkgBZQMEAgGgazAaBgkqhk
# iG9w0BCQMxDQYLKoZIhvcNAQkQAS8wHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIzMDkyMzE1N
# TUzOFowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEICvi8p5S8ckg2wTRhDBQzGijjyqs5T6I+4Vt
# BHypfcEWMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAKZND7pKdVdfpB6zaJN89wTt+sXd0io
# 0WULMc+o6gRJFt3wmKNW2nYPrDbocJ+Q/rDMGxbp4QetJ0MQtn1+AYAS8v5jPDO
# 4a63U4/mJ2D3wSnQsDP0lUVknqRzfnS66HgHqiOVdHB0U+OnMEJuqHNTLx0dknb
# L3zwxyDJTHdo+dMB0U9xdcjwpsPM3xqg57EXj5EIQK5JbardXCjrsysAnEdktUY
# oyayGNbbQelANYJcOmuHhSXArR+qqzvNP2MDRqqKEcpd65YW6FSnqlVMIBH2M3P
# D2F0p3sdm4IeGAZWaERVB4AXO1PUFDNdhamr4XpIwqIoAig7xiLm7j8qu5Oc=
# End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Rob Austein for the CMS and detached signature clue, George
Michaelson for the first and substantial external review, and Erik
Kline who was too shy to agree to coauthorship. Additionally, we
express our gratitude to early implementors, including Menno
Schepers, Flavio Luciani, Eric Dugas, and Kevin Pack. Also, thanks
to the following geolocation providers who are consuming geofeeds
with this described solution: Jonathan Kosgei (ipdata.co), Ben
Dowling (ipinfo.io), and Pol Nisenblat (bigdatacloud.com). For an
amazing number of helpful reviews, we thank Job Snijders, who also
found an ASN.1 'inherit' issue, Adrian Farrel, Antonio Prado,
Francesca Palombini, Jean-Michel Combes (INTDIR), John Scudder, Kyle
Rose (SECDIR), Martin Duke, Mohamed Boucadair, Murray Kucherawy, Paul
Kyzivat (GENART), Rob Wilton, Roman Danyliw, and Ties de Kock.
Authors' Addresses
Randy Bush
IIJ Research & Arrcus
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
United States of America
Email: randy@psg.com
Massimo Candela
NTT
Veemweg 23
3771 MT Barneveld
Netherlands
Email: massimo@ntt.net
Warren Kumari
Google
1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
Mountain View, CA 94043
United States of America
Email: warren@kumari.net
Russ Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
516 Dranesville Road
Herndon, VA 20170
United States of America
Email: housley@vigilsec.com
