Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Ashmore
Request for Comments: 5937 National Security Agency
Category: Informational C. Wallace
ISSN: 2070-1721 Cygnacom Solutions
August 2010
Using Trust Anchor Constraints during Certification Path Processing
Abstract
This document describes how to use information associated with a
trust anchor public key when validating certification paths. This
information can be used to constrain the usage of a trust anchor.
Typically, constraints are used to limit the certificate policies and
names that can appear in certification paths validated using a trust
anchor.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5937.
Ashmore & Wallace Informational [Page 1]RFC 5937 Using Trust Anchor Constraints August 2010
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................3
1.1. Terminology ................................................3
2. Identifying Trust Anchor Constraints ............................3
3. Using Trust Anchor Constraints during Certification Path
Processing ......................................................4
3.1. Inputs .....................................................4
3.2. Initialization .............................................4
3.3. Basic Certificate Processing ...............................6
3.4. Preparation for Certificate i+1 ............................6
3.5. Wrap-Up Procedure ..........................................6
4. Relationship to RFC 5280 ........................................6
5. Security Considerations .........................................7
6. References ......................................................7
6.1. Normative References .......................................7
6.2. Informative References .....................................7
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1. Introduction
Trust anchors are widely used to verify digital signatures and
validate certification paths [RFC5280] [X.509]. They are required
when validating certification paths. The Trust Anchor Format (TAF)
specification [RFC5914] defines a means for limiting the scope in
which a trust anchor may be used. [RFC5280] describes how to
validate a certification path. The algorithm requires processing the
name and key from a trust anchor. Usage of other information,
including enforcement of constraints, is permitted but not required,
and the processing rules are not specified (see Section 6.2 of
RFC 5280).
This document defines a mechanism to identify constraints that should
be enforced and the supplementary processing rules. The
supplementary rules specify an additional input and extend the
initialization procedures in the [RFC5280] path validation algorithm.
Post-initialization processing steps are not affected.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Identifying Trust Anchor Constraints
TAF supports three formats for representing trust anchor information:
TrustAnchorInfo, Certificate, and TBSCertificate. In all three
cases, trust anchor constraints may be represented as extensions. In
the TrustAnchorInfo structure, certificate policies, policy
constraints, name constraints, inhibit any policy, and basic
constraints do not appear as extensions and instead appear as part of
the CertPathControls field.
Extensions may be marked critical or not critical. When trust anchor
constraints are enforced, clients MUST reject certification paths
containing a trust anchor with unrecognized critical extensions.
When trust anchor constraints are not enforced, clients MAY accept
certification paths containing a trust anchor with unrecognized
critical extensions. Information appearing in the CertPathControls
field of a TrustAnchorInfo object MUST be processed, ensuring
enforcement of the constraints indicated by this field in all cases.
For some types of trust anchor constraints, there is a type mismatch
between the input parameters for the certification path validation
algorithm and the extension that contains the constraint. The
certification path validation algorithm essentially defines the
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RFC 5937 Using Trust Anchor Constraints August 2010
initial-any-policy-inhibit, initial-policy-mapping-inhibit, and
initial-explicit-policy as Boolean values. The inhibitAnyPolicy and
policyConstraints extensions that correspond to these inputs are
expressed as integer values. In the steps described below, presence
of an inhibitAnyPolicy extension results in the initial-any-policy-
inhibit value being set to true. If a policyConstraints extension is
present and contains a requireExplicitPolicy field, the initial-
explicit-policy value is set to true. If a policyConstraints
extension is present and contains an inhibitPolicyMapping field, the
initial-policy-mapping-inhibit value is set to true.
3. Using Trust Anchor Constraints during Certification Path Processing
3.1. Inputs
This algorithm assumes that the nine inputs defined in Section 6.1.1
of RFC 5280 are provided to the path processing logic, plus one
additional variable:
o enforceTrustAnchorConstraints: indicates if trust anchor
constraints should be enforced
Conforming implementations are not required to support the setting of
the enforceTrustAnchorConstraints input. If a conforming
implementation does not support the setting of this flag, it MUST
validate all certification paths using a value of TRUE for
enforceTrustAnchorConstraints.
3.2. Initialization
If enforceTrustAnchorConstraints is false, no additional
initialization steps are required.
If enforceTrustAnchorConstraints is true, perform the following
initialization steps described below. These steps (or equivalent)
MUST be performed prior to initialization steps described in
RFC 5280.
o If no subject distinguished name is associated with the trust
anchor, path validation fails. The name may appear in the subject
field of a Certificate or TBSCertificate structure or in the
taName field of CertPathControls in a TrustAnchorInfo structure.
o If name constraints are associated with the trust anchor, set the
initial-permitted-subtrees variable equal to the intersection of
the permitted subtrees from the trust anchor and the user-provided
Ashmore & Wallace Informational [Page 4]RFC 5937 Using Trust Anchor Constraints August 2010
initial-permitted-subtrees. If one of these two inputs is not
provided, the initial-permitted-subtrees variable is set to the
value that is available. If neither is provided, the initial-
permitted-subtrees variable is set to an infinite set.
o If name constraints are associated with the trust anchor, set the
initial-excluded-subtrees variable equal to the union of the
excluded subtrees from the trust anchor and the user-provided
initial-excluded-subtrees. If one of these two inputs is not
provided, the initial-excluded-subtrees variable is set to the
value that is available. If neither is provided, the initial-
excluded-subtrees variable is set to an empty set.
o If certificate policies are associated with the trust anchor, set
the user-initial-policy-set variable equal to the intersection of
the certificate policies associated with the trust anchor and the
user-provided user-initial-policy-set. If one of these two inputs
is not provided, the user-initial-policy-set variable is set to
the value that is available. If neither is provided, the
user-initial-policy-set variable is set to any-policy.
o If an inhibit any policy value of true is associated with the
trust anchor (either in a CertPathControls or in an
inhibitAnyPolicy extension) and the initial-any-policy-inhibit
value is false, set the initial-any-policy-inhibit value to true.
o If a require explicit policy value of true is associated with the
trust anchor (either in a CertPathControls or in a
PolicyConstraints extension) and the initial-explicit-policy value
is false, set the initial-explicit-policy value to true.
o If an inhibit policy mapping value of true is associated with the
trust anchor (either in a CertPathControls or in a
PolicyConstraints extension) and the initial-policy-mapping-
inhibit value is false, set the initial-policy-mapping-inhibit
value to true.
o If a basic constraints extension is associated with the trust
anchor and contains a pathLenConstraint value, set the
max_path_length state variable equal to the pathLenConstraint
value from the basic constraints extension.
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3.3. Basic Certificate Processing
This document does not require any augmentation of the basic
certificate processing steps described in Section 6.1.3 of RFC 5280.
However, some types of trust anchor constraints may have defined
additional steps, for example, CMS Content Constraints or Authority
Clearance Constraints.
3.4. Preparation for Certificate i+1
This document does not require any augmentation of the steps to
prepare for processing of certificate i+1 described in Section 6.1.4
of RFC 5280. However, some types of trust anchor constraints may
have defined additional steps, for example, CMS Content Constraints
or Authority Clearance Constraints.
3.5. Wrap-Up Procedure
This document does not require any augmentation of the wrap-up
procedure steps described in Section 6.1.5 of RFC 5280. However,
some types of trust anchor constraints may have defined additional
steps, for example, CMS Content Constraints or Authority Clearance
Constraints.
4. Relationship to RFC 5280
The processing described above can be incorporated into an RFC 5280
implementation or be implemented as pre-processing of RFC 5280 inputs
and post-processing of RFC 5280 outputs, i.e., as a wrapper around an
RFC 5280 compliant implementation.
For name constraints and policy-related constraints, pre-processing
can be used, provided the RFC 5280 implementation allows
configuration of the user-initial-policy-set, initial-policy-mapping-
inhibit, initial-explicit-policy, initial-any-policy-inhibit,
initial-permitted-subtrees, and initial-excluded-subtrees input
values. RFC 5280 does not define an input for path length
constraints, so basic constraints cannot be implemented using
pre-processing. It can be implemented as post-processing, provided
the RFC 5280 implementation returns the certification path to enable
the post-processor to perform the length check.
Some types of trust anchor constraints may impose additional
requirements on an RFC 5280 implementation to support pre-processing
or post-processing to enforce trust anchor constraints.
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RFC 5937 Using Trust Anchor Constraints August 2010
5. Security Considerations
Implementations that do not enforce trust anchor constraints may
accept some certification paths rejected by implementations that do
enforce trust anchor constraints. For example, an application that
does not enforce a certificate policy constraint included in a trust
anchor may accept certificates issued under a certificate policy that
provides a lower-than-required-level of assurance.
Trust anchor information must be securely stored. Changes to trust
anchor information can cause acceptance of certificates that should
be rejected. For example, if a trust anchor definition is altered to
remove a name constraint, applications may accept certificates
containing names that should only be trusted in certificates that
validate to a different trust anchor. Similarly, addition of
inappropriate trust anchors to a trust anchor store can result in
validation of certificates to a different trust anchor and with
different constraints than intended.
[RFC5914] and [RFC5934] provide additional security considerations
regarding the preparation, storage, and usage of trust anchors.
[RFC5280] provides additional security considerations regarding the
usage of name constraints.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5914] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor
Format", RFC 5914, June 2010.
6.2. Informative References
[RFC5934] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor
Management Protocol (TAMP)", RFC 5934, August 2010.
[X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (2005) | ISO/IEC 9594-8:2005,
Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate
frameworks.
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Authors' Addresses
Sam Ashmore
National Security Agency
Suite 6751
9800 Savage Road
Fort Meade, MD 20755
USA
EMail: srashmo@radium.ncsc.mil
Carl Wallace
Cygnacom Solutions
Suite 5400
7925 Jones Branch Drive
McLean, VA 22102
USA
EMail: cwallace@cygnacom.com
Ashmore & Wallace Informational [Page 8]
